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1   Migration and Secularization 
Alongside growing ethnic diversity in North-Western European countries during the last dec-
ades (Koopmans et al. 2015, Schaeffer 2014), the religious landscape in many immigration 
societies underwent a multitude of changes, too (Phalet et al. 2018). Since World War II, North-
Western Europe experienced extended immigration waves from various parts of the world. 
Guest workers from less developed countries in the European periphery, colonial migrants to 
former colonial powers, families reuniting with their previously migrated relatives and immi-
grants from Eastern Europe, resulting from the breakdown of the Soviet Union, contributed to 
the modification and diversification of Western European populations (Castles et al. 2014). 
With recent refugee immigration from crisis areas in the Middle East and Africa, these pro-
cesses continue in contemporary times (Brücker et al. 2016). As a result of diverse ethnic and 
cultural compositions of these heterogeneous immigration waves, the traditionally Christian 
societies in North-Western Europe came into contact with new manifestations to live and prac-
tice religion, among them most prominently Islam (Buijs & Rath 2006, Foner & Alba 2008, 
Voas & Fleischmann 2012). In 2016, more than 25 million Muslims reside in Europe, making 
up almost 5 percent of Europe’s total population, with higher shares in popular North and West-
ern European immigration countries such as Germany (6.1 percent), the Netherlands (7.1 per-
cent), Sweden (8.1 percent) and the United Kingdom (6.3 percent) (Pew Research Center 2017). 
These immigration processes coincide with secularization tendencies in Western Europe. Em-
pirical evidence indicates that religious institutions lost their social functions and authority 
(Gorski & Altınordu 2008). According to well-known secularization theory, modernization is 
incompatible with religion for several reasons (Ruiter & van Tubergen 2009). One line of ar-
gumentation of secularization theory assigns superior importance to the growing role of ration-
alization in modern societies (‘rational worldview perspective’). When objectified procedures, 
techniques and criteria (mainly: science) develop, they replace religious authority and truth as 
the organizing and justifying principle in social order. Religious explanations become increas-
ingly implausible contrasted with scientific explanations in order to understand the world. 
Therefore, the former is not any longer the only and even not the most important source of 
knowledge in modern times. Other scholars argue that functional differentiation is the key 
mechanism for secularization in modern societies. More precisely, religion differentiates itself 
from other societal systems and starts to constitute an autonomous institution within social 
structure (for instance, separation of church and state). Thus, social control and guidance of 
  
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
 
3 
religion with regard to other institutions in modern societies diminishes, institutions and actors 
therein are able to choose and think both freely and autonomously and finally become more and 
more independent from the religious sphere (Tschannen 1991). In fact, societal cohesion and 
solidarity, which in pre-modern times was guaranteed mainly by religion, is nowadays achieved 
by other means. A third argument can be derived from cultural pluralism – alternative sources 
of knowledge replace theological doctrines by offering alternative explanations and values 
(Smits & Ultee 2013). A further reason for secularization is seen in increasing welfare paired 
with diminishing insecurity of life. When individuals are feeling insecure, for instance in eco-
nomic or existential terms (i.e. survival is not taken for granted), they seek for predictable rules 
and trust in a supernatural (religious) force that is capable to improve their life situation (Im-
merzeel & van Tubergen 2013). 
As a consequence, personal religious beliefs and practices in daily life are on a lower level than 
they used to be in traditional societies in the past, such that North-Western European immigra-
tion societies can be considered highly secularized (Burkimsher 2014, Franck & Iannaccone 
2014, Gorski & Altınordu 2008, Halman & Draulans 2006, Norris & Inglehart 2011, Phalet et 
al. 2008, Pickel 2010). To illustrate this with a concrete numerical example, the proportion of 
people who attend religious services every week has dropped considerably by about or even 
more than half between 1970 and 1998 (e.g. Belgium from 52 to 10 percent, Germany from 29 
to 15 percent, the Netherlands from 41 to 14 percent) (Eurobarometer surveys, Norris & Ingle-
hart 2011: 71ff.). 
How do these parallel societal processes interact with each other and what are the conse-
quences? In this dissertation, I explore one direction of these influences: How do secularized 
societies in North-Western Europe influence immigrants and their descendants who are residing 
in these countries?1 Immigrants, which stem from rather religious world regions such as North-
ern Africa, Middle East, Eastern and Western Asia and Eastern Europe (Phalet et al. 2018) are 
confronted with highly secular societies after migration; and the question is how they react to 
these trends that basically contradict their families’ experiences which is characterized by 
                                                 
1
 Throughout my dissertation, I use the terms ‘immigrants’, ‘immigrant children’, ‘minorities’ or ‘persons with 
migration background’ – if not otherwise specified – interchangeably for individuals who either were born out-
side the country they are living in, thus experienced migration themselves (first generation), or who are having 
parents (second generation) or at least two grandparents (third generation) who migrated to their current country 
of residence (Dollmann et al. 2014). 
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comparatively higher levels of religious involvement (e.g. Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, 
Güveli 2015, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). What can be expected? Drawing on theories 
and approaches from the sociology of migration, three possible scenarios can be identified: 
According to assimilation theory, immigrants tend to become similar to members of the host 
societies with respect to diverse aspects of behavior and attitudes (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 
1964, Park 1950). “In the most general terms, assimilation can be defined as the decline, and at 
its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differ-
ences that express it.” (Alba & Nee 1997: 863). Thus, with mere exposure to the host society 
and increasing contact to members of the native population over time and especially over gen-
erations, immigrants lose their ethnic peculiarities, adapt their customs and identities and melt 
with the culture of the country they are living in. With respect to religion, this implies an adap-
tation to the above described secularization trends in North-Western European societies when 
immigrants are exposed to alternative and non-religious values and worldviews (Diehl & 
Koenig 2009, Güngör et al. 2011, van Tubergen 2007). A decrease in religiosity would there-
fore be likely, the more immigrants are integrated in structural or social terms (Maliepaard et 
al. 2010). 
However, newer theoretical insights and empirical evidences contradict the expectation that 
assimilation ultimately takes place (Bankston & Zhou 1995, Kalter 2008, Portes & Rumbaut 
2001, Portes & Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997b).2 The theory of segmented assimilation posits that 
there is another – for some ethnic groups and under certain societal circumstances even domi-
nant – path of assimilation: Immigrants might integrate very well into other domains of life, 
such as the educational system or the labor market, while not assimilating culturally but instead 
maintaining their cultural heritage and contacts to members of their country of origin. Which 
path is most likely to occur depends on several factors, among them resources that immigrants 
bring with them, characteristics of the receiving society – for instance, governmental policies 
towards minorities, characteristics of the labor market and the general population’s acceptance 
of immigrants (“modes of incorporation”, Portes & Rumbaut 2001: 46ff.), and the neighbor-
hood in which immigrant families are living in. Accordingly, instead of religious decline as it 
                                                 
2
 More precisely, classical assimilation theory does not reflect empirical reality. Additionally, segmented assimi-
lation theory objects that assimilation is an inevitable, irreversible and instable process. Finally, ethnic charac-
teristics are not per se inferior in comparison with those of the host society. 
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is proposed by assimilation theory, stable religious attachments among immigrants is also pos-
sible. 
An even stronger expectation has been formulated: a religious revival. In migration research, 
reactive ethnicity is assumed to occur when immigrants feel less welcome in host societies; 
experiencing discrimination and social exclusion. Extending this idea to the area of religion, 
this would imply immigrants strengthen their religious identities as a means to compensate for 
lacking upward-mobility and discrimination (Connor 2010, Diehl & Schnell 2006, Fleischmann 
& Phalet 2012, Lewis & Kashyap 2013a, Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Consequently, one would 
expect an increase in religiosity, especially for immigrant groups who are affected by prejudice 
and social exclusion. 
To sum up, major theories in the sociology of migration suggest three possible ways in which 
immigrants and their descendants might react to secularized societies in North-Western Europe: 
Decrease, stability or increase in religious involvement. Likewise, they specify several factors 
that are supposed to be related to immigrants’ religiosity, for instance, the degree of structural 
and social inclusion into the host societies or discrimination experiences. In the next section of 
this chapter, I will address the appertained current state of research about religiosity of immi-
grants. 
 
2   State of Research 
After a strong focus on structural integration such as the incorporation into the labor market 
and the educational system (Heath & Brinbaum 2007, Heath & Cheung 2007) – which is not 
surprising given that for a long time scholars have regarded them as preconditions for social, 
cultural and emotional integration (Esser 1980, Gordon 1964, Kalter 2008) – migration research 
has gradually expanded its scope to the study of other aspects of integration, including religion 
(Buijs & Rath 2006, Foner & Alba 2008, Voas & Fleischmann 2012). 
The reasons for this interest are explained straightforwardly: Anti-Muslim sentiments and Is-
lamophobia have grown during the last 15 to 20 years, especially as a reaction to terror attacks 
and other negative events disseminated by the media (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2009, 
Schlueter et al. 2019, Strabac & Listhaug 2008, Zolberg & Woon 1999). This is also evident 
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considering protests against Muslim practices such as wearing headscarves, building mosques 
and teaching Islam curriculums in schools (Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Additionally, Islam is 
oftentimes regarded as a problem in and of itself since its values contradict prevalent liberal 
and modern values and ideologies of European societies. As a consequence, Islam has been 
conceptualized as a “bright boundary” (Alba 2005), and Muslim immigrants are the least ac-
cepted minority group in many European countries (Spruyt & Elchardus 2012). As this is a 
challenge for societal cohesion and interethnic contact, a major part of this research field con-
centrates on Muslim religious identities. Furthermore, strong religious identities are seen as a 
hindrance to integration in other dimensions. For instance, strong religious identities are re-
garded as a reason for failure in the educational system and the labor market, as impediment to 
interethnic social contacts as well as cultural inclusion (Bisin et al. 2008, Carol & Schulz 2018, 
Connor & Koenig 2013, Damstra & Tillie 2016, Diehl et al. 2009, Foner & Alba 2008). These 
possible consequences of religiosity can be attributed to incentives of immigrants for (non-) 
integration or discrimination by the majority population (Soehl 2017). Thus, it is necessary to 
take a step backwards and understand the determinants for religious integration or the resistance 
to it. 
Briefly worded, previous research on the religiosity of immigrants concentrates on descriptive 
and exploratory questions: How religious are immigrants in Western Europe and how does the 
migratory event shape religious attachments in the short and in the long run? And which ex-
planatory factors derived from theoretical assumptions have an effect on religious beliefs and 
behavior?3 
With respect to first-mentioned kind of studies, it is widely acknowledged that immigrants in 
North-Western Europe are more religious than natives in terms of affiliation, beliefs and prac-
tices alike (e.g. Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Güveli 2015, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 
2011), and that Muslim immigrants stand out as ranking exceptionally high by all accounts (e.g. 
Güngör et al. 2012, Lewis & Kashyap 2013a, 2013b, Scourfield et al. 2012, van Tubergen 
2007), although sometimes differences within the group of Muslim immigrants are observable 
(e.g. Brünig & Fleischmann 2015, Güveli & Platt 2011, Smits & Ultee 2013). 
                                                 
3
 See Table 1.A1 in the appendix for details. This overview is not exhaustive; instead, it is intended to give a rough 
impression about the variety of studies conducted in different countries, investigating different ethnic and reli-
gious groups, applying different methods, and yielding different results. 
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Studies which are interested in how religiosity develops after migration apply various method-
ological approaches: some compare religious attachments between synthetic generations (usu-
ally first vs. second generation immigrants) (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güveli 2015, 
Maliepaard et al. 2010, McAndrews & Voas 2014), others investigate whether length of stay in 
the receiving society is related to changes in religiosity (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2013, Garcia-
Munoz & Neuman 2013, van Tubergen 2013), or they analyze series of repeated cross-sectional 
data sets in order to detect trends over time (Maliepaard et al. 2012, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits & 
Ultee 2013). In doing so, they seek to find evidence in favor of or against central arguments of 
assimilation theory: if empirical evidence confirms that immigrants and their descendants be-
come less religious over time or over successive immigrant generations, this would point to-
wards assimilation into the host societies, given that they are rather secularized (Diehl & Koenig 
2009, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Soehl 2017). Results are inconclusive, however. Whereas some 
studies basically find a decrease of religious involvement among immigrants (e.g. Maliepaard 
et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, Platt 2013, van der Bracht et al. 2013), others report a consider-
able stability, especially among Muslim immigrants (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2009, Maliepaard et 
al. 2012, Smits & Ultee 2013), or even an increase in immigrants’ religious practices (e.g. Diehl 
& Koenig 2013, Smits et al. 2010, van Heelsum & Koomen 2016). 
Additionally, very little is known about how divergent patterns of adaptation in religiosity can 
be explained. More precisely, several factors have been identified that (sometimes) influence 
religious attachments and behaviors. With regard to structural characteristics such as educa-
tional attainment and employment, empirical results are mixed (e.g. Fleischmann & Phalet 
2012, Güveli & Platt 2011, van Tubergen 2006). In contrast, contact with native and secular 
peers has an effect on immigrants’ religiosity in the majority of studies (e.g. Leszczensky et al. 
2019, Maliepaard & Phalet 2012, van der Bracht et al. 2016, 2017), whereas cultural aspects do 
not seem to be important (e.g. Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Güveli & Platt 2011). In addition, 
discrimination experiences and perceived acceptance are sometimes related to religiosity, 
sometimes they are not (e.g. Connor 2010, Fleischmann et al. 2019, Platt 2013, Torrekens & 
Jacobs 2015, van der Bracht et al. 2013). 
However, beyond the fact that these results do not allow conclusions regarding confirmed em-
pirical relations, they cannot fully account for differences between religious groups in general 
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and the exception of Muslim immigrants in particular. Therefore, why immigrants are (and 
stay) more religious compared to natives is still an unanswered research question. 
 
3   Dissertation Outline and Summary 
Against this background, two core questions constitute the framework of my dissertation (see 
Table 1.1 for a detailed chapter overview): 
 
(1) How religious are majority and minority youths with different religious backgrounds, and 
how does religious attachment change over time and over generations? 
Chapter 2 is intended to give a first comprehensive overview about the religiosity of immigrants 
and non-immigrants in North-Western Europe. It addresses majority and minority adolescents’ 
religiosity in four major immigration societies, namely England, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden; and it examines different aspects of religion, that is, affiliation, visits of religious 
meeting places, praying behavior and religious salience. With this chapter it is possible to gain 
comprehensive insights into the research area of migration and religion. In this way, it extends 
existing research by jointly examining different countries, various measures of religiosity and 
their relations to explanatory factors, such as generation or education. 
After these quite descriptive and exploratory views, I apply advanced research methods and 
designs in order to investigate how religiosity changes after migration. Studies to date have 
mainly analyzed religiosity dependent on immigrant generation, length of stay or time trends 
(e.g. Maliepaard et al. 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2013, Smits & Ultee 2013). However, these re-
search designs suffer from one methodological drawback since they are not able to take into 
account different compositions of immigrants in terms of unobserved characteristics (Borjas 
1994, Diehl & Koenig 2009). In order to overcome this problem, I investigate changes in reli-
gious attachment between successive generations within one and the same family (chapters 3 
and 4). Such transmission approaches became popular recently. Analyzing parent-child dyads, 
these studies find strong intergenerational resistance to secularization in Muslim families in 
comparison to Christian families with or without migration background (e.g. Güngör et al. 
2011, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2012, Scourfield et al. 2012, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2013). 
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An additional advantage of this approach is that it enables me to directly study intrafamilial 
transmission processes at the micro-level to observe whether family characteristics and every-
day interactions account for group differences in religious developments. Since secularization 
tendencies in modern societies are regarded as predominantly driven by failure of parents to 
successfully pass on religion to their offspring (Scourfield et al. 2012, Voas & Crockett 2005), 
it is essential to enlarge our exact knowledge about transmission processes (chapter 4). 
Chapter 5 focuses on religious change between the age of 14 and 22 years. Applying a longitu-
dinal approach, I am able to observe dynamics of religious change or stability in crucial years 
of religious identity development, which has yet to be explored in the case of immigrants in 
North-Western Europe. Thus, to my knowledge it is so far the first study that investigates ethnic 
differences in the development of religious beliefs and practice at the transition from adoles-
cence to early adulthood. 
 
(2) To what extent can alternative theoretical approaches be used to study religious develop-
ments in North-Western European immigrant societies? 
As outlined earlier in section 2 of this chapter, research in the field of migration and religion 
has yet to explain ethnic and/or religious group differences in levels and changes of religious 
involvement. More precisely, although several factors have been identified that can influence 
religious attachment and behavior, these factors cannot completely account for differences be-
tween natives and immigrants in general and the exception of Muslim immigrants in particular. 
Therefore, the second aim of my dissertation is to theoretically examine and empirically test 
both existing and alternative theoretical approaches applied to the study of immigrants’ religi-
osity in Europe. 
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This endeavor begins in chapter 3, which addresses the influence of cognitive-structural and 
social integration on the intergenerational transmission in religiosity. As a matter of fact, estab-
lished theories in the sociology of religion and of migration reach different conclusions with 
respect to general trends in immigrants’ religious attachment as well as the influence of im-
portant explanatory factors, such as education and social contacts. The empirical results again 
confirm that neither existing theory is able to fully account for patterns of majority’s and mi-
nority’s intergenerational transmission in religiosity. Thus, it is promising to extend existing 
theoretical perspectives by adopting arguments from a broader range of study fields (chapters 
4 and 5) in order to theoretically and empirically explain divergent trends in religiosity as well 
as group differences therein. 
In chapter 4, I develop a theoretical model of intergenerational transmission in religiosity fol-
lowing central ideas from psychological and social psychological approaches of socialization 
processes, value transmission and social learning (Bandura 1977, Bao et al. 1999, Myers 1996, 
Nauck 2001, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001). In this model, opportunities to pass on religion from 
one generation to the next and perceived transmission benefits of parents and children are of 
crucial importance. Testing this theory empirically, my findings suggest that family character-
istics and everyday interactions influence intergenerational transmission in religiosity, but they 
can only partly explain Muslims’ strong resistance to secularization. 
Chapter 5 extends life-course research (George 1993) to the situation of immigrant children. 
As already mentioned, scientific knowledge about the long-lasting impact of intergenerational 
transmission in religiosity beyond mid-adolescence is scarce. Therefore, this chapter is intended 
to make use and adapt theoretical assumptions about religious developments prevalent in the 
literature on majority youths. In concrete terms, I examine and empirically test whether crucial 
transitions (leaving school, moving out) and characteristics of peers and parents have an influ-
ence on immigrants’ and natives’ tendency to change their religious salience and behavior. 
 
The empirical analyses in all chapters make use of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal 
Survey in Four European Countries and its German extension (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE) 
(Kalter et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2019). This project aims at answering key questions on the 
integration of immigrant children in four European countries: England, Germany, the 
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Netherlands and Sweden (Dollmann & Jacob 2016). Applying a three-stage school-based sam-
pling design with oversampling schools with high immigrant proportions, 18,716 adolescents 
with and without an immigrant background were surveyed in 480 schools in 2010/2011 
(CILS4EU 2016). Participants attended the school grade in English, Dutch, German and Swe-
dish schools in which most of the students are 14 years old in wave 1 (England: tenth grade, 
Germany: ninth grade, Netherlands: third grade, Sweden: eighth grade). In addition, bilingual 
interviews were conducted with one parent, which allow me to study the intergenerational trans-
mission in religiosity by investigating pairs of youths and their parents (chapters 3 and 4). Five 
subsequent waves – with a time gap of approximately one year between each survey – enable 
me to study religious developments from mid-adolescence into early adulthood in the German 
subsample (chapter 5). 
Due to the sampling design, the data set includes a considerable share of minority students (45.7 
percent have at least one grandparent who was born outside the survey country) (Dollmann & 
Jacob 2016). In addition, the questionnaires comprise several questions of religious involve-
ment, among them affiliation, practice and salience, as well as important explanatory factors, 
which can be used to explain degrees of religiosity. Many questions are also available for one 
parent, and they are repeated in subsequent waves of CILS4EU. Therefore, the data set is well 
suited to study the religiosity of minority youth in Europe. 
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s?
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
(c
o
n
te
x
t 
o
f 
re
ce
p
ti
v
it
y
) 
E
S
S
 2
0
0
2
, 
2
0
0
4
, 
2
0
0
6
 
E
u
ro
p
e*
*
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 (
b
o
rn
 o
u
t-
si
d
e 
co
u
n
tr
y
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
-
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e 
E
S
S
) 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
M
u
sl
im
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 t
h
e 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e 
n
at
iv
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
re
g
io
n
 o
f 
re
si
d
en
ce
. 
- 
T
h
e 
le
ss
 w
el
co
m
in
g
 t
h
e 
co
n
te
x
ts
 a
re
, 
th
e 
m
o
re
 M
u
sl
im
 i
m
-
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 d
ev
ia
te
 f
ro
m
 n
at
iv
es
' r
el
ig
io
u
s 
o
u
tc
o
m
es
 –
 t
h
is
 
p
er
ta
in
s 
to
 a
tt
en
d
an
ce
 a
n
d
 p
ra
y
er
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
. 
D
e 
H
o
o
n
 &
 
v
an
 T
u
b
er
g
en
 
(2
0
1
4
) 
T
o
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
d
o
 p
ar
en
ts
 a
ff
ec
t 
th
e 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
ad
o
le
sc
en
t 
ch
il
-
d
re
n
, 
am
o
n
g
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 m
aj
o
ri
ty
 
g
ro
u
p
s?
 T
o
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
d
o
 p
ee
rs
 
fr
o
m
 t
h
ei
r 
o
w
n
 g
ro
u
p
 a
n
d
 t
h
at
 o
f 
o
th
er
 g
ro
u
p
s 
af
fe
ct
 t
h
e 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 o
f 
m
in
o
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 m
aj
o
ri
ty
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
? 
--
 
C
IL
S
4
E
U
 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
, 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
1
st
, 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 2
.5
th
 g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
 
- 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 n
at
iv
es
, 
M
u
sl
im
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 o
th
er
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
. 
- 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 o
f 
im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 i
s 
st
ro
n
g
er
 i
n
 i
m
m
i-
g
ra
n
t 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 n
at
iv
e 
fa
m
il
ie
s,
 a
n
d
 s
tr
o
n
g
er
 i
n
 M
u
sl
im
 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 o
th
er
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
t 
fa
m
il
ie
s;
 e
sp
ec
ia
ll
y
 i
n
 h
ig
h
ly
 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
fa
m
il
ie
s.
 
- 
N
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
fo
r 
at
te
n
d
an
ce
 a
n
d
 p
ra
y
er
. 
- 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 o
f 
p
ee
rs
 m
at
te
rs
. 
 
 
15 
  
S
tu
d
y
 
R
es
ea
rc
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o
n
 
T
h
eo
ri
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D
at
a
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
/g
ro
u
p
s 
C
en
tr
al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ie
h
l 
&
 
K
o
en
ig
 (
2
0
0
9
) 
H
o
w
 c
an
 t
h
e 
in
te
rg
en
er
at
io
n
al
 s
ta
b
il
-
it
y
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
m
o
n
g
 T
u
rk
is
h
 f
am
-
il
ie
s 
b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
? 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
y
m
b
o
li
c 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
V
al
u
e 
st
ab
il
it
y
 
C
o
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
 
G
G
S
 
2
0
0
5
/0
6
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
T
u
rk
is
h
 c
it
iz
en
s 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
m
ig
ra
te
d
 
af
te
r 
ag
e 
o
f 
6
 
- 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
el
y
 d
ec
re
as
in
g
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 b
et
w
ee
n
 1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 d
u
e 
to
 a
g
e 
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
g
en
er
at
io
n
s.
 
- 
S
y
m
b
o
li
c 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
: 
P
ra
ct
ic
e 
v
s.
 a
tt
it
u
d
es
: 
o
 
D
ec
re
as
in
g
: 
A
tt
en
d
in
g
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
m
ee
ti
n
g
s 
(s
tr
o
n
g
er
 
fo
r 
w
o
m
en
 t
h
an
 m
en
) 
o
 
In
cr
ea
si
n
g
: 
Im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
ce
re
m
o
n
ie
s 
(s
tr
o
n
g
er
 f
o
r 
w
o
m
en
 t
h
an
 m
en
) 
o
 
S
ta
b
le
: 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 a
s 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 g
o
al
 
- 
V
al
u
e 
st
ab
il
it
y
: 
O
th
er
 f
am
il
y
-r
el
at
ed
 v
al
u
es
 a
re
 s
u
b
je
ct
 t
o
 
in
te
rg
en
er
at
io
n
al
 d
ec
re
as
e.
 
- 
C
o
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
: 
W
o
rs
e 
as
si
m
il
at
ed
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 d
o
 n
o
t 
sh
o
w
 h
ig
h
er
 d
eg
re
es
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
. 
D
ie
h
l 
&
 
K
o
en
ig
 (
2
0
1
3
) 
In
v
es
ti
g
at
io
n
 o
f 
ea
rl
y
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
in
te
-
g
ra
ti
o
n
 d
y
n
am
ic
s,
 e
x
am
p
le
 o
f 
ca
th
o
-
li
c 
P
o
le
s 
an
d
 M
u
sl
im
 T
u
rk
s 
in
 G
er
-
m
an
y
 
- 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
m
ig
ra
to
ry
 e
v
en
t 
o
n
 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 r
el
ig
io
s-
it
y
 i
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
o
ri
g
in
 
- 
C
h
an
g
es
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
im
e 
p
er
io
d
 a
f-
te
r 
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 
R
el
at
io
n
 t
o
 o
th
er
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 d
im
en
-
si
o
n
s 
(s
o
ci
al
, 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l)
 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 a
rg
u
m
en
t 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 a
rg
u
m
en
t 
B
o
u
n
d
ar
y
 m
ak
in
g
 a
rg
u
m
en
t 
S
C
IP
 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
P
o
li
sh
, 
T
u
rk
is
h
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
m
ax
. 
1
 ½
 
y
ea
rs
 l
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 
C
at
h
o
li
c,
 M
u
sl
im
 
- 
B
o
th
 g
ro
u
p
s 
ar
e 
st
ro
n
g
ly
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 n
at
iv
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
, 
b
u
t 
le
ss
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 i
n
 t
h
ei
r 
co
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
o
ri
g
in
. 
- 
In
 b
o
th
 g
ro
u
p
s,
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
p
ra
ct
ic
e 
d
ec
li
n
es
 a
ft
er
 m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 s
it
u
at
io
n
 b
ef
o
re
 m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
. 
T
h
is
 i
s 
m
o
re
 p
ro
-
n
o
u
n
ce
d
 f
o
r 
T
u
rk
s 
th
an
 P
o
le
s.
 B
es
id
es
 t
h
at
, 
d
ec
li
n
e 
is
 l
es
s 
st
ro
n
g
 f
o
r 
p
ra
y
in
g
. 
- 
W
it
h
 i
n
cr
ea
si
n
g
 l
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
, 
T
u
rk
s 
b
ec
o
m
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
i-
g
io
u
s,
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
P
o
le
s 
→
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
re
-o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 o
f 
T
u
rk
s 
w
h
o
 a
rr
iv
e 
at
 t
h
ei
r 
in
it
ia
l 
le
v
el
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
. 
- 
W
it
h
 i
n
cr
ea
si
n
g
 a
tt
ac
h
m
en
t 
to
 G
er
m
an
y
 (
so
ci
al
 a
ss
im
il
a-
ti
o
n
) 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
p
ra
ct
ic
e 
d
ec
re
as
es
 f
o
r 
P
o
le
s,
 b
u
t 
n
o
 i
n
fl
u
-
en
ce
 f
o
r 
T
u
rk
s.
 
E
il
er
s 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
0
8
) 
In
v
es
ti
g
at
io
n
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 o
f 
M
u
s-
li
m
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 i
n
 G
er
m
an
y
 
--
 
K
ie
l 
su
rv
ey
 
2
0
0
4
/0
5
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
M
u
sl
im
 
A
g
e:
 1
0
-3
0
 
- 
F
ir
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
s 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 l
at
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n
s.
 
- 
H
ig
h
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ts
 a
n
d
 r
e-
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 
- 
T
h
e 
lo
n
g
er
 t
h
e 
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
re
si
d
en
ce
, 
th
e 
le
ss
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
is
 
th
e 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t.
 
- 
W
ea
k
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 w
it
h
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
- 
G
ap
 b
et
w
ee
n
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
 a
n
d
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
p
ra
ct
ic
e 
F
le
is
ch
m
an
n
 
&
 P
h
al
et
 
(2
0
1
0
) 
H
o
w
 d
o
 s
ec
o
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
m
m
i-
g
ra
n
ts
 c
o
m
b
in
e 
et
h
n
ic
, 
re
li
g
io
u
s,
 n
a-
ti
o
n
al
 a
n
d
 c
it
y
 i
d
en
ti
ti
es
? 
A
re
 t
h
er
e 
cr
o
ss
-n
at
io
n
al
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s?
 
S
eg
m
en
te
d
 a
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
e-
o
ry
 (
m
o
d
es
 o
f 
in
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
) 
T
IE
S
 
B
el
g
iu
m
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 
S
w
ed
en
 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
 (
n
o
t 
in
 S
w
ed
en
) 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
A
g
e:
 1
8
-3
5
 
T
h
e 
m
o
re
 f
av
o
ra
b
le
 t
h
e 
co
n
te
x
t 
is
, 
…
 
- 
th
e 
h
ig
h
er
 a
re
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 l
ev
el
s 
in
 g
en
er
al
. 
- 
th
e 
le
ss
 p
ro
n
o
u
n
ce
d
 i
s 
co
m
p
at
ib
il
it
y
 b
et
w
ee
n
 e
th
n
ic
/r
el
i-
g
io
u
s 
an
d
 n
at
io
n
al
/c
it
y
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
. 
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D
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C
o
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tr
y
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ro
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C
en
tr
al
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es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
le
is
ch
m
an
n
 
&
 P
h
al
et
 2
0
1
2
 
H
o
w
 i
s 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
m
o
n
g
 t
h
e 
T
u
rk
is
h
 
se
co
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
so
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
 i
n
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
t 
fa
m
il
ie
s 
an
d
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s 
an
d
 t
o
 t
h
ei
r 
st
ru
c-
tu
ra
l 
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
to
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 s
o
ci
e-
ti
es
? 
A
re
 t
h
er
e 
cr
o
ss
-n
at
io
n
al
 d
if
fe
r-
en
ce
s 
in
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
th
o
se
 r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s?
 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 +
 c
la
ss
i-
ca
l 
as
si
m
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
v
it
al
it
y
 (
v
ia
 r
el
i-
g
io
u
s 
so
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
) 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
T
IE
S
 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
B
el
g
iu
m
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 S
w
ed
en
 
T
u
rk
is
h
 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
M
u
sl
im
 
A
g
e:
 1
8
-3
5
 
- 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 i
n
te
re
th
n
ic
 p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 a
re
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 r
el
ig
i-
o
si
ty
 o
n
ly
 i
n
 G
er
m
an
y
, 
n
o
t 
in
 t
h
e 
o
th
er
 t
h
re
e 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 
- 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
so
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
 h
as
 a
n
 e
ff
ec
t 
in
 a
ll
 4
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 
- 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
re
le
v
an
t 
fo
r 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
. 
F
le
is
ch
m
an
n
 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
1
9
) 
H
o
w
 a
re
 e
th
n
ic
, 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
an
d
 n
a-
ti
o
n
al
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
? 
A
re
 i
d
en
ti
ti
es
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 d
is
cr
im
in
a-
ti
o
n
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
s?
 
D
o
 a
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
s 
ch
an
g
e 
as
 a
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
? 
S
o
ci
al
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ej
ec
ti
o
n
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 m
o
d
el
 
F
ri
en
d
sh
ip
 
an
d
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 
in
 s
ch
o
o
l 
2
0
1
3
/1
4
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
- 
N
at
io
n
al
 a
n
d
 e
th
n
ic
/r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
re
 w
ea
k
ly
 
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 o
r 
n
o
t 
as
so
ci
at
ed
. 
- 
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
 i
s 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 m
o
re
 c
o
n
fl
ic
ti
n
g
 p
at
te
rn
s 
o
f 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
. 
- 
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 p
at
te
rn
s 
ar
e 
ra
th
er
 s
ta
b
le
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e 
1
 ½
 y
ea
r 
su
rv
ey
 p
er
io
d
. 
F
u
h
se
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
In
v
es
ti
g
at
io
n
 o
f 
re
le
v
an
ce
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
 
fo
r 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 
M
o
d
er
n
iz
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 (
im
p
li
ci
t)
 
D
JI
 F
o
r-
ei
g
n
er
 s
u
r-
v
ey
 1
9
9
6
/9
7
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
It
al
ia
n
, 
G
re
ek
, 
T
u
rk
is
h
 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
- 
R
el
ig
io
n
 i
s 
m
o
st
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
T
u
rk
s,
 l
ea
st
 f
o
r 
It
al
ia
n
s.
 
- 
W
ea
k
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 
- 
(i
n
 g
en
er
al
: 
d
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e,
 m
et
h
o
d
 u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
) 
G
ar
ci
a-
M
u
n
o
z 
&
 N
eu
m
an
 
(2
0
1
3
) 
A
re
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 
n
at
iv
es
? 
W
h
at
 a
re
 t
h
e 
m
o
ti
v
es
 b
eh
in
d
 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
n
d
 d
o
 t
h
ey
 
v
ar
y
 b
y
 d
es
ti
n
at
io
n
 c
o
n
te
x
t?
 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 a
s 
a 
b
ri
d
g
e 
in
 a
s-
si
m
il
at
io
n
 p
ro
ce
ss
 o
r 
a 
b
u
ff
er
 
IS
S
P
 2
0
0
8
 
E
S
S
 2
0
0
2
-
2
0
1
0
 
G
S
S
 2
0
0
2
-
2
0
1
0
 
E
u
ro
p
e*
*
*
 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
C
at
h
o
li
c,
 P
ro
te
st
an
t,
 O
r-
th
o
d
o
x
, 
o
th
er
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
, 
Je
w
is
h
, 
M
u
sl
im
 
A
g
e:
 2
0
-9
0
 
- 
F
ir
st
 a
n
d
 s
ec
o
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 n
at
iv
es
. 
S
ec
o
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
d
ap
t 
to
 n
a-
ti
v
es
, 
b
u
t 
st
il
l 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
. 
- 
Y
ea
rs
 s
in
ce
 m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 s
h
o
w
s 
in
v
er
se
 U
-p
at
te
rn
. 
N
o
 d
if
fe
r-
en
ce
 f
o
r 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 r
ec
en
tl
y
 a
rr
iv
ed
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
 m
o
re
 t
h
an
 
2
0
 y
ea
rs
 l
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
. 
M
o
re
o
v
er
, 
se
co
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
m
-
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 f
ir
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
m
m
i-
g
ra
n
ts
 w
it
h
 2
0
 y
ea
rs
 l
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
. 
- 
H
y
p
o
th
es
is
 t
h
at
 r
el
ig
io
n
 i
s 
a 
b
ri
d
g
e 
in
 t
h
e 
U
S
 a
n
d
 a
 b
u
ff
er
 
in
 E
u
ro
p
e 
is
 c
o
n
fi
rm
ed
 (
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
co
n
v
in
ci
n
g
).
 
G
ü
n
g
ö
r 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
1
1
) 
H
o
w
 d
o
es
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
n
 
ch
il
d
h
o
o
d
 a
ff
ec
t 
th
e 
ad
u
lt
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
li
fe
 o
f 
se
co
n
d
-g
en
er
at
io
n
 M
u
sl
im
s?
 
Is
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
-
ti
al
ly
 e
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
cc
u
lt
u
ra
ti
n
g
 
g
ro
u
p
s 
as
 p
ro
x
im
al
 a
cc
u
lt
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
co
n
te
x
ts
? 
H
o
w
 d
o
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 a
cc
u
l-
tu
ra
ti
o
n
 o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
s 
af
fe
ct
 t
h
e 
tr
an
s-
m
is
si
o
n
 p
ro
ce
ss
? 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 c
an
 b
e:
 
- 
E
x
p
li
ci
t 
te
ac
h
in
g
 
- 
Im
p
li
ci
t 
le
ar
n
in
g
 
R
o
le
 o
f 
ac
cu
lt
u
ra
ti
o
n
 c
o
n
te
x
ts
 
an
d
 a
cc
u
lt
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
s 
T
IE
S
 
B
el
g
iu
m
 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 2
.5
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
M
u
sl
im
 
A
g
e:
 1
8
-3
5
 
- 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
el
y
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
s 
re
p
o
rt
 h
ig
h
er
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
-
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
th
an
 T
u
rk
s.
 
- 
K
o
ra
n
 l
es
so
n
s 
an
d
 f
at
h
er
’s
 m
o
sq
u
e 
v
is
it
s 
af
fe
ct
 c
u
rr
en
t 
re
-
li
g
io
si
ty
 →
 i
n
te
rp
re
te
d
 a
s 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
. 
- 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
s 
m
o
re
 e
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
am
o
n
g
 T
u
rk
s 
(h
ig
h
er
 e
x
-
p
la
in
ed
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
).
 
- 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 o
n
 c
u
rr
en
t 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 f
u
ll
y
 
m
ed
ia
te
d
 v
ia
 c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
s;
 c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
ad
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
s 
ir
re
le
v
an
t 
in
 t
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 p
ro
ce
ss
. 
 
 
17 
  
S
tu
d
y
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 
D
at
a
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
/g
ro
u
p
s 
C
en
tr
al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
ü
n
g
ö
r 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
1
2
) 
H
o
w
 d
o
es
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 w
it
h
 h
er
it
ag
e 
cu
l-
tu
re
 a
n
d
 m
ai
n
st
re
am
 c
u
lt
u
re
 i
n
fl
u
-
en
ce
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
?
 
S
o
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
S
u
rv
ey
 i
n
 
F
la
n
d
er
s 
an
d
 A
n
k
ar
a
 
T
u
rk
s 
in
 T
u
rk
ey
, 
T
u
rk
-
is
h
 m
ig
ra
n
ts
 i
n
 B
el
-
g
iu
m
, 
B
el
g
ia
n
 
A
g
e:
 1
5
-2
0
 
- 
T
u
rk
is
h
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 i
n
 B
el
g
iu
m
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 
B
el
g
ia
n
 a
n
d
 T
u
rk
is
h
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
, 
th
is
 c
an
n
o
t 
b
e 
ex
p
la
in
e
d
 
b
y
 m
o
th
er
’s
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
. 
O
n
ly
 f
o
r 
B
el
g
ia
n
s,
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 d
e-
cl
in
ed
 w
it
h
 a
g
e.
 
- 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 i
s 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 e
th
n
ic
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 T
u
rk
is
h
 
cu
lt
u
re
 m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
to
 B
el
g
ia
n
 c
u
lt
u
re
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
. 
G
ü
v
el
i 
(2
0
1
5
) 
H
o
w
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
ar
e 
fi
rs
t 
an
d
 s
ec
o
n
d
 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 T
u
rk
is
h
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 i
n
 
E
u
ro
p
e 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 n
at
iv
e 
E
u
ro
p
e-
an
s 
an
d
 n
o
n
-i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 i
n
 T
u
rk
ey
?
 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
re
li
an
ce
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
  
E
S
S
 2
0
0
2
-
2
0
1
0
 
E
u
ro
p
e*
, 
T
u
rk
ey
 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
T
u
rk
is
h
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 
(M
u
sl
im
) 
T
u
rk
is
h
 n
o
n
-i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 
(a
ll
 a
ff
il
ia
ti
o
n
s)
 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 n
at
iv
es
 (
al
l 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
s)
 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
A
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
m
ea
su
re
s 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
re
 
lo
w
es
t 
fo
r 
T
u
rk
s 
in
 T
u
rk
ey
, 
h
ig
h
es
t 
fo
r 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 n
at
iv
es
, 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 l
ie
 i
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
. 
- 
S
el
f-
as
se
ss
ed
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
: 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 >
 1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 =
 
n
o
n
-i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 >
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 n
at
iv
es
 
- 
A
tt
en
d
an
ce
: 
N
o
n
-i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 =
 1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 =
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
-
at
io
n
 >
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 n
at
iv
es
 
- 
P
ra
y
in
g
: 
N
o
n
-i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 >
 1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 =
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
>
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 n
at
iv
es
 
G
ü
v
el
i 
&
 P
la
tt
 
(2
0
1
1
) 
In
v
es
ti
g
at
io
n
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 i
n
 t
w
o
 n
a-
ti
o
n
al
 c
o
n
te
x
ts
 (
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 a
n
d
 
th
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s)
 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
/r
ev
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
In
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
/i
d
en
ti
ty
 
N
L
: 
S
P
V
A
 
1
9
9
8
 
U
K
: 
F
N
S
E
M
 
1
9
9
3
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 U
n
it
ed
 
K
in
g
d
o
m
 
N
L
: 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
, 
S
u
ri
n
am
es
e,
 A
n
ti
ll
ea
n
 
(c
it
iz
en
sh
ip
 o
r 
co
u
n
tr
y
 
o
f 
b
ir
th
 
U
K
: 
In
d
ia
n
, 
A
fr
ic
an
 
A
si
an
, 
P
ak
is
ta
n
i,
 B
an
g
-
la
d
es
h
i,
 B
la
ck
 C
ar
ib
-
b
ea
n
, 
C
h
in
es
e,
 W
h
it
e 
m
aj
o
ri
ty
 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
/s
ec
u
ri
ty
: 
Y
es
 i
n
 t
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
(e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
la
n
g
u
ag
e,
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
m
at
te
rs
),
 n
o
 i
n
 t
h
e 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
-
d
o
m
 (
o
n
ly
 l
an
g
u
ag
e 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t)
 
- 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
/r
ev
it
al
iz
at
io
n
: 
N
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
le
n
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 i
n
 
b
o
th
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
o
n
ly
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
in
 t
h
e 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
- 
In
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
/i
d
en
ti
ty
: 
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 i
s 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
in
 b
o
th
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 b
u
t 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 a
n
d
 e
th
n
ic
 m
em
b
er
-
sh
ip
 i
s 
in
co
n
si
st
en
t.
 
- 
O
ri
g
in
: 
T
u
rk
s 
an
d
 B
an
g
la
d
es
h
i 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 
M
o
ro
cc
an
s 
an
d
 P
ak
is
ta
n
i 
in
 t
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
an
d
 t
h
e 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
K
o
o
p
m
an
s 
(2
0
1
4
) 
W
h
at
 i
s 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
fu
n
d
a-
m
en
ta
li
sm
 a
m
o
n
g
 M
u
sl
im
 i
m
m
i-
g
ra
n
ts
 a
n
d
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 n
at
iv
es
?
 
W
h
at
 a
re
 t
h
e 
so
ci
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 d
et
er
m
i-
n
an
ts
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
fu
n
d
am
en
ta
li
sm
, 
ar
e 
th
ey
 s
im
il
ar
 f
o
r 
b
o
th
 g
ro
u
p
s?
 
H
o
w
 i
s 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
fu
n
d
am
en
ta
li
sm
 r
e-
la
te
d
 t
o
 o
th
er
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
?
 
H
o
w
 a
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
fu
n
d
am
en
ta
li
sm
 
an
d
 o
u
t-
g
ro
u
p
 h
o
st
il
it
y
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
, 
ar
e 
th
ey
 s
im
il
ar
 f
o
r 
b
o
th
 
g
ro
u
p
s?
 
(S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
) 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 a
p
p
ro
ac
h
 
 
S
C
II
C
S
 
2
0
0
8
 
A
u
st
ri
a,
 B
el
g
iu
m
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
N
et
h
-
er
la
n
d
s,
 S
w
ed
en
 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
 (
n
o
t 
in
 A
T
, 
S
W
),
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 
n
at
iv
es
 
 
- 
F
u
n
d
am
en
ta
li
sm
 i
s 
w
id
es
p
re
ad
 a
m
o
n
g
 M
u
sl
im
s,
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
u
n
iv
er
sa
l,
 m
o
re
 a
m
o
n
g
 S
u
n
n
it
e 
M
u
sl
im
s,
 n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 f
o
r 
A
le
v
it
es
. 
- 
F
u
n
d
am
en
ta
li
sm
 i
s 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 s
o
ci
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 m
ar
g
in
al
iz
a-
ti
o
n
, 
b
u
t 
ag
e 
an
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
h
av
e 
an
 e
ff
ec
t 
(b
u
t 
th
es
e 
fa
ct
o
rs
 d
o
 n
o
t 
ex
p
la
in
 g
ro
u
p
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s)
. 
- 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 i
s 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 f
u
n
d
am
en
ta
li
sm
, 
st
ro
n
g
er
 f
o
r 
S
u
n
n
it
es
. 
- 
F
u
n
d
am
en
ta
li
st
 b
el
ie
v
er
s 
sh
o
w
 s
tr
o
n
g
er
 o
u
t-
g
ro
u
p
 h
o
st
il
-
it
y
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S
tu
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R
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h
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 
D
at
a
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
/g
ro
u
p
s 
C
en
tr
al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
es
zc
ze
n
sk
y
 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
1
9
) 
H
o
w
 d
o
es
 t
h
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
in
-
g
ro
u
p
 m
em
b
er
s 
as
 a
n
 a
sp
ec
t 
o
f 
re
li
-
g
io
u
s 
cl
as
sr
o
o
m
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 r
el
at
e 
to
 t
h
e 
im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 s
tu
d
en
ts
 a
tt
ac
h
 t
o
 
re
li
g
io
n
? 
O
p
ti
m
al
 d
is
ti
n
ct
iv
en
es
s 
th
e-
o
ry
 
C
IL
S
4
E
U
 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
, 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 S
w
ed
en
 
N
at
iv
e 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
, 
im
m
i-
g
ra
n
t 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
, 
im
m
i-
g
ra
n
t 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
M
u
sl
im
 h
av
e 
th
e 
h
ig
h
es
t 
im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
 w
h
en
 2
/3
 
co
-r
el
ig
io
u
s 
cl
as
sm
at
es
 a
re
 p
re
se
n
t 
(U
-s
h
ap
ed
 r
el
at
io
n
-
sh
ip
).
 N
o
 a
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
 i
s 
fo
u
n
d
 f
o
r 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s.
 
- 
A
 h
ig
h
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
M
u
sl
im
s 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s’
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
ce
 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
. 
L
ew
is
 &
 
K
as
h
y
ap
 
(2
0
1
3
a)
 
D
o
 M
u
sl
im
s 
d
if
fe
r 
in
 t
h
ei
r 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 
an
d
 a
tt
it
u
d
es
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s 
an
d
 p
er
so
n
s 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
an
y
 a
ff
il
ia
ti
o
n
? 
C
an
 d
eg
re
e 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
n
d
 S
E
S
 
ex
p
la
in
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 a
tt
it
u
d
es
? 
--
 
F
M
: 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
M
u
sl
im
s 
2
0
0
9
 
B
S
A
 2
0
0
9
 
G
re
at
 B
ri
ta
in
 
- 
M
u
sl
im
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 B
ri
ti
sh
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s 
an
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
. 
- 
M
u
sl
im
s 
al
so
 h
o
ld
 m
o
re
 c
o
n
se
rv
at
iv
e 
v
al
u
es
. 
- 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
n
d
 S
E
S
 c
an
 e
x
p
la
in
 M
u
sl
im
 e
ff
ec
t 
ex
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
se
x
 b
ef
o
re
 m
ar
ri
a
g
e 
an
d
 h
o
m
o
se
x
u
al
it
y
. 
L
ew
is
 &
 
K
as
h
y
ap
 
(2
0
1
3
b
) 
A
re
 f
o
re
ig
n
-b
o
rn
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 
n
at
iv
e 
b
o
rn
? 
A
re
 M
u
sl
im
s 
m
o
re
 r
el
i-
g
io
u
s 
th
an
 n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
s?
 C
an
 s
o
ci
o
-
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 f
ac
to
rs
 e
x
p
la
in
 h
ig
h
er
 l
ev
-
el
s 
o
f 
M
u
sl
im
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
? 
D
o
 t
h
es
e 
fa
ct
o
rs
 s
im
il
ar
ly
 a
ff
ec
t 
M
u
sl
im
 a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
?
 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
C
it
iz
en
sh
ip
 
S
u
rv
ey
 
2
0
0
8
/0
9
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
, 
W
al
es
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 n
a-
ti
v
e-
b
o
rn
 
A
n
y
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
 
- 
M
u
sl
im
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
s;
 a
m
o
n
g
 
n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
s,
 f
o
re
ig
n
-b
o
rn
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s;
 n
o
 d
if
fe
r-
en
ce
 t
h
er
ei
n
 a
m
o
n
g
 M
u
sl
im
s.
 
- 
E
th
n
ic
it
y
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 b
ac
k
g
ro
u
n
d
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
re
d
u
ce
 m
ai
n
 e
f-
fe
ct
s,
 b
u
t 
ca
n
n
o
t 
fu
ll
y
 e
x
p
la
in
 t
h
o
se
. 
- 
In
 c
o
n
tr
as
t 
to
 n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
s,
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 i
s 
n
o
t 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 r
e-
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
m
o
n
g
 M
u
sl
im
s.
 
M
al
ie
p
aa
rd
 &
 
L
u
b
b
er
s 
(2
0
1
3
) 
T
o
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
ar
e 
fi
rs
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 w
h
o
 i
d
en
ti
fy
 a
s 
M
u
sl
im
 
ab
le
 t
o
 t
ra
n
sm
it
 t
h
ei
r 
re
li
g
io
n
 t
o
 t
h
ei
r 
ch
il
d
re
n
, 
w
h
o
 a
re
 b
ei
n
g
 r
ai
se
d
 i
n
 t
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s?
 D
o
es
 t
h
e 
so
ci
al
 a
n
d
 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
ch
il
d
re
n
 
in
to
 t
h
e 
D
u
tc
h
 s
o
ci
et
y
 h
am
p
er
 t
h
e 
p
ar
en
ta
l 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
? 
V
er
ti
ca
l,
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
an
d
 
o
b
li
q
u
e 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 
E
x
p
li
ci
t 
te
ac
h
in
g
, 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
 
an
d
 i
m
it
at
io
n
 e
tc
. 
(o
n
ly
 a
s-
su
m
p
ti
o
n
s)
 
S
P
V
A
 1
9
9
8
, 
2
0
0
2
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
, 
S
u
-
ri
n
am
es
e,
 A
n
ti
ll
ea
n
 (
1
st
, 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 2
.5
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n
) 
F
am
il
ie
s 
w
it
h
 c
h
il
d
 1
5
-
2
5
 
- 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
: 
C
h
il
d
re
n
 a
re
 l
es
s 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
th
an
 p
ar
en
ts
 
- 
M
u
lt
iv
ar
ia
te
: 
o
 
S
tr
o
n
g
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 o
n
 c
h
il
d
re
n
’s
 r
e-
li
g
io
si
ty
 
o
 
S
ex
 o
f 
p
ar
en
t 
h
as
 n
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
 
S
m
al
l 
ag
e 
ef
fe
ct
s:
 o
ld
er
 c
h
il
d
re
n
 v
is
it
in
g
 m
o
sq
u
es
 
le
ss
 f
re
q
u
en
tl
y
, 
n
o
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 w
it
h
 p
ar
en
ta
l 
re
li
g
io
s-
it
y
 →
 P
ar
en
ta
l 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
d
im
in
is
h
 w
it
h
 a
g
e 
- 
E
th
n
ic
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 t
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
: 
o
 
O
n
ly
 f
o
r 
m
o
sq
u
e 
at
te
n
d
an
ce
: 
H
ig
h
er
 t
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
n
 
T
u
rk
is
h
 f
am
il
ie
s,
 i
n
 c
o
n
tr
as
t,
 i
n
 M
o
ro
cc
an
 f
am
il
ie
s 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 b
ec
o
m
es
 i
n
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
- 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
fr
ie
n
d
s 
an
d
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
: 
o
 
S
h
ar
e 
o
f 
D
u
tc
h
/c
o
-e
th
n
ic
 f
ri
en
d
s 
ex
er
ts
 s
o
m
e 
in
fl
u
-
en
ce
 o
n
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
, 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
o
 
N
o
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
fr
ie
n
d
s/
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 p
a-
re
n
ta
l 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 (
o
n
e 
ex
ce
p
ti
o
n
: 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 i
m
-
p
o
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
sc
h
o
o
ls
) 
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S
tu
d
y
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 
D
at
a
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
/g
ro
u
p
s 
C
en
tr
al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
al
ie
p
aa
rd
 &
 
P
h
al
et
 (
2
0
1
2
) 
H
o
w
 d
o
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 m
aj
o
ri
ty
 g
ro
u
p
 
co
n
ta
ct
s 
af
fe
ct
 h
o
w
 o
ft
en
 D
u
tc
h
 
M
u
sl
im
s 
v
is
it
 a
 m
o
sq
u
e 
o
r 
h
o
w
 t
h
ey
 
fe
el
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
 i
n
 p
o
li
-
ti
cs
? 
S
o
ci
al
 c
ap
it
al
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
o
ci
al
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
IM
 2
0
0
6
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
S
o
ci
al
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 w
it
h
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
an
d
 s
o
ci
al
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 
w
it
h
 m
aj
o
ri
ty
 d
ec
re
as
es
 M
u
sl
im
s’
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 e
x
p
re
ss
io
n
. 
- 
T
h
er
eb
y
, 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f 
m
in
o
ri
ty
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 s
tr
o
n
g
er
 
th
an
 t
h
o
se
 o
f 
th
e 
m
aj
o
ri
ty
 f
o
r 
p
ra
ct
ic
e,
 b
u
t 
eq
u
al
 f
o
r 
as
se
r-
ti
o
n
. 
- 
M
in
o
ri
ty
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 s
tr
o
n
g
er
 f
o
r 
T
u
rk
s 
th
an
 f
o
r 
M
o
ro
c-
ca
n
s.
 
- 
T
h
o
se
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
so
ci
al
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 o
n
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ty
 e
x
-
p
re
ss
io
n
 a
re
 p
ar
tl
y
 m
ed
ia
te
d
 b
y
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 
- 
(n
o
 n
et
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
im
m
ig
ra
n
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
sm
al
l 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 e
f-
fe
ct
 o
n
 a
ss
er
ti
o
n
) 
M
al
ie
p
aa
rd
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
1
0
) 
H
o
w
 s
tr
o
n
g
ly
 i
s 
se
co
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
o
ri
en
te
d
 t
o
w
ar
d
s 
p
ar
en
ts
’ 
co
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
b
ir
th
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 f
ir
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 (
in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f 
et
h
n
ic
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
et
h
n
o
-c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 r
e-
li
g
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
)?
 
H
o
w
 s
tr
o
n
g
ly
 a
re
 e
th
n
ic
 a
n
d
 r
el
i-
g
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
in
-
te
rr
el
at
ed
? 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
eg
m
en
te
d
 a
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
e-
o
ry
 
L
A
S
 
2
0
0
4
/0
5
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
 a
n
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
 
1
st
, 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 2
.5
th
 g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
 
- 
G
ro
ss
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 m
ig
ra
n
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
s 
- 
A
ft
er
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
 (
et
h
n
ic
 o
ri
g
in
, 
se
x
, 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t,
 m
ar
it
al
 s
ta
tu
s,
 c
h
il
d
re
n
),
 a
l-
m
o
st
 n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
re
m
ai
n
 f
o
r 
et
h
n
ic
 i
d
en
ti
ty
,  
b
u
t 
th
ey
 
d
o
 s
o
 f
o
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
p
ra
ct
ic
e 
- 
E
th
n
ic
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 h
as
 a
 s
tr
o
n
g
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ty
, 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
fo
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
p
ra
ct
ic
e 
(b
u
t 
st
il
l 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
re
m
ai
n
 
b
et
w
ee
n
 g
en
er
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
p
ra
ct
ic
e)
 
- 
R
el
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 e
th
n
ic
 a
n
d
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ty
 i
s 
st
ro
n
g
er
 
in
 t
h
e 
se
co
n
d
 t
h
an
 i
n
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 
M
al
ie
p
aa
rd
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
1
2
) 
R
ep
li
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 e
x
te
n
si
o
n
 o
f 
re
su
lt
s 
in
 P
h
al
et
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
8
) 
(i
n
cr
ea
si
n
g
 
se
cu
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 o
v
er
 t
im
e 
an
d
 g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
s,
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 o
n
 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
) 
–
 H
o
w
 d
o
es
 s
ec
u
la
ri
za
-
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
ed
 i
n
 r
ec
en
t 
y
ea
rs
?
 
E
x
p
la
n
at
io
n
 o
f 
m
ac
ro
 t
re
n
d
s 
v
ia
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
S
IM
 1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
6
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
 a
n
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
G
ro
ss
 t
re
n
d
s:
 D
ec
li
n
e 
1
9
9
8
-2
0
0
4
, 
n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 2
0
0
4
-0
6
 
- 
D
ec
li
n
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s:
 G
en
er
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 a
s 
ex
p
ec
te
d
, 
b
u
t 
ca
n
n
o
t 
fu
ll
y
 e
x
p
la
in
 g
ro
ss
 t
re
n
d
s 
- 
V
it
al
it
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s:
 A
g
e,
 m
ar
it
al
 s
ta
tu
s,
 c
h
il
d
re
n
 a
n
d
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
co
-e
th
n
ic
s 
in
 l
o
ca
l 
ar
ea
 a
s 
ex
p
ec
te
d
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
m
o
sq
u
e 
in
 n
ei
g
h
b
o
rh
o
o
d
. 
G
ro
ss
 e
ff
ec
ts
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 s
li
g
h
tl
y
 
→
 S
u
p
p
re
ss
io
n
 o
f 
d
o
w
n
w
ar
d
 t
re
n
d
s 
b
y
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
 e
tc
. 
- 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
w
it
h
 y
ea
r 
o
f 
su
rv
ey
: 
- 
In
it
ia
l 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 T
u
rk
s 
an
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
s 
(T
>
M
) 
d
is
ap
p
ea
rs
 o
v
er
 t
im
e.
 
- 
S
ex
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
(M
>
F
) 
in
cr
ea
se
 o
v
er
 t
im
e.
 
- 
G
en
er
at
io
n
al
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
re
v
er
se
 o
v
er
 t
im
e:
 I
n
 2
0
0
4
/0
6
, 
2
n
d
 i
s 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
. 
- 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 a
ls
o
 d
im
in
is
h
es
 o
v
er
 t
im
e.
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T
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D
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C
o
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y
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ro
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en
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M
cA
n
d
re
w
 &
 
V
o
as
 (
2
0
1
4
) 
 
H
o
w
 d
o
es
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 v
ar
y
 b
y
 i
m
m
i-
g
ra
n
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
et
h
n
ic
 
g
ro
u
p
s?
 H
o
w
 d
o
 g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
et
h
n
ic
 
g
ro
u
p
 a
n
d
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 a
ff
ec
t 
so
ci
al
 
tr
u
st
, 
ci
v
ic
 e
n
g
ag
em
en
t 
an
d
 v
o
lu
n
-
te
er
in
g
?
 
(S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
) 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
E
M
B
E
S
 
2
0
1
0
 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
S
o
u
th
 A
si
an
, 
A
fr
ic
an
, 
A
fr
o
-C
ar
ib
b
ea
n
 
1
st
, 
1
.5
th
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
 
- 
T
h
er
e 
is
 e
v
id
en
ce
 f
o
r 
g
en
er
at
io
n
al
 d
ec
li
n
e 
in
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
, 
b
u
t 
m
o
re
 m
o
d
es
t 
fo
r 
P
ak
is
ta
n
i 
an
d
 B
an
g
la
d
es
h
i 
(M
u
sl
im
) 
g
ro
u
p
s.
 
- 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 i
s 
li
n
k
ed
 t
o
 c
iv
ic
 e
n
g
ag
em
en
t 
an
d
 v
o
lu
n
te
er
-
in
g
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
g
en
er
al
iz
ed
 t
ru
st
. 
P
h
al
et
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
8
) 
H
o
w
 w
el
l 
d
o
es
 s
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 e
x
p
la
in
 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
ch
an
g
e 
o
f 
M
u
sl
im
s 
in
 t
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s?
 H
o
w
 i
s 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 o
f 
M
u
sl
im
s 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 i
n
te
rg
en
er
at
io
n
al
 
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
 o
th
er
 l
if
e 
d
o
m
ai
n
s?
 
U
n
d
er
 w
h
ic
h
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
d
o
es
 s
ec
u
-
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 o
r 
re
v
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 a
m
o
n
g
 
M
u
sl
im
s 
in
 t
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
o
cc
u
r?
 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
v
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
P
V
A
 1
9
9
8
, 
2
0
0
2
 
L
A
S
 2
0
0
5
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
 a
n
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
 
1
st
, 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 2
.5
th
 g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
 
M
u
sl
im
 
A
g
e:
 1
5
-6
5
 
- 
D
ec
re
as
in
g
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
e-
tw
ee
n
 1
9
9
8
 a
n
d
 2
0
0
5
, 
w
h
ic
h
 c
an
n
o
t 
fu
ll
y
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y
 
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
M
u
sl
im
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
- 
T
u
rk
s 
v
is
it
 m
o
sq
u
es
 m
o
re
 o
ft
en
 a
n
d
 h
av
e 
h
ig
h
er
 p
re
fe
r-
en
ce
s 
fo
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
sp
o
u
se
s 
th
an
 M
o
ro
cc
an
s,
 b
u
t 
M
o
ro
c-
ca
n
s 
h
av
e 
h
ig
h
er
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
 f
o
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
sc
h
o
o
ls
 
- 
S
ec
o
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 l
es
s 
an
d
 h
as
 l
o
w
er
 p
re
fe
r-
en
ce
s 
fo
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
sc
h
o
o
ls
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
 f
o
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
sp
o
u
se
 (
in
 l
in
e 
w
it
h
 t
h
es
is
 o
n
 e
n
-
d
u
ri
n
g
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 i
n
 p
ri
v
at
e 
sp
h
er
e)
 
- 
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l 
an
d
 s
o
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 a
re
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 l
o
w
er
 
le
v
el
s 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
p
ra
ct
ic
e 
an
d
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s 
- 
D
ec
li
n
e 
in
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
an
d
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
 s
p
o
u
se
 i
s 
le
ss
 p
ro
-
n
o
u
n
ce
d
 f
o
r 
M
o
ro
cc
an
s,
 b
u
t 
th
e 
o
p
p
o
si
te
 i
s 
tr
u
e 
fo
r 
sc
h
o
o
l 
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s 
P
la
tt
 (
2
0
1
3
) 
Is
 t
h
er
e 
as
si
m
il
at
io
n
 i
n
 n
at
io
n
al
, 
et
h
-
n
ic
 a
n
d
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ti
es
? 
A
re
 e
th
-
n
ic
 i
d
en
ti
ti
es
 s
u
b
st
it
u
te
d
 b
y
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ti
es
 i
n
 t
h
e 
se
co
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
? 
C
an
 w
e 
fi
n
d
 e
v
id
en
ce
 f
o
r 
re
ac
ti
v
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
/r
el
ig
io
si
ty
?
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
E
M
B
E
S
 
2
0
1
0
 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
B
la
ck
 C
ar
ib
b
ea
n
, 
B
la
ck
 
A
fr
ic
an
, 
In
d
ia
n
, 
P
ak
i-
st
an
i,
 B
an
g
la
d
es
h
i 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
- 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
d
en
ti
fi
es
 m
o
re
 s
tr
o
n
g
ly
 w
it
h
 B
ri
ta
in
 a
n
d
 
le
ss
 s
tr
o
n
g
ly
 w
it
h
 o
w
n
 e
th
n
ic
 g
ro
u
p
 t
h
an
 1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
(t
im
e 
si
n
ce
 a
rr
iv
al
 i
s 
al
so
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 r
el
at
e
d
 t
o
 n
at
io
n
al
 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
et
h
n
ic
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
).
 
- 
F
o
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ty
, 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 t
re
n
d
 t
o
w
ar
d
s 
as
si
m
il
at
io
n
 
in
 t
h
e 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
b
u
t 
fo
r 
M
u
sl
im
s 
o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
p
ri
v
at
e 
re
li
-
g
io
u
s 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s 
(a
n
d
 n
o
t 
fo
r 
im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
, 
p
u
b
li
c 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s 
an
d
 c
o
m
m
o
n
al
it
y
 w
it
h
 c
o
-r
el
ig
io
u
s 
g
ro
u
p
) 
- 
T
h
er
e 
is
 n
o
 e
v
id
en
ce
 f
o
r 
a 
sh
if
t 
fr
o
m
 e
th
n
ic
 t
o
w
ar
d
s 
re
li
-
g
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 (
ex
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
In
d
ia
n
 
H
in
d
u
s)
. 
- 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
, 
b
u
t 
eq
u
al
ly
 f
o
r 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
. 
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D
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C
o
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y
/g
ro
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C
en
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al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
co
u
rf
ie
ld
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
1
2
) 
In
 w
h
ic
h
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
g
ro
u
p
s 
is
 t
h
e 
in
-
te
rg
en
er
at
io
n
al
 t
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 o
f 
re
li
-
g
io
n
 m
o
st
 s
u
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 W
h
ic
h
 v
ar
ia
-
b
le
s 
ar
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 h
ig
h
er
 r
at
es
 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
? 
(S
o
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
) 
H
O
C
S
 2
0
0
3
 
Y
P
S
 2
0
0
3
 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
, 
W
al
es
 
N
o
 r
es
tr
ic
ti
o
n
s 
in
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 o
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
 
A
g
e 
1
6
-7
0
 
- 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
n
 M
u
sl
im
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 n
o
n
-C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 d
en
o
m
i-
n
at
io
n
s 
is
 s
tr
o
n
g
er
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
it
y
. 
- 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
s 
m
o
re
 e
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
fo
r 
fe
m
al
e 
an
d
 f
o
r 
M
u
sl
im
 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 (
tw
ic
e 
as
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 a
s 
fo
r 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s,
 c
o
m
-
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 o
th
er
 n
o
n
-C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 r
el
ig
io
n
s,
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
ec
o
m
es
 
n
o
n
-s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
b
ac
k
g
ro
u
n
d
 v
ar
ia
-
b
le
s)
. 
S
im
o
n
 &
 T
i-
b
er
j 
(2
0
1
8
) 
E
x
p
lo
ri
n
g
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 o
f 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 
an
d
 t
h
ei
r 
d
es
ce
n
d
an
ts
 
D
o
 f
am
il
ie
s 
se
cu
la
ri
ze
, 
re
p
ro
d
u
ce
 o
r 
re
in
fo
rc
e 
re
li
g
io
n
 f
ro
m
 o
n
e 
g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
h
e 
n
ex
t?
 
Is
 t
h
er
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
a 
w
it
h
d
ra
w
al
 i
n
 
b
o
u
n
d
ed
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s?
 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
T
eO
 
2
0
0
8
/0
9
 
M
G
IS
 1
9
9
2
 
F
ra
n
ce
 
A
g
e 
1
8
-6
0
 
- 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
(I
sl
am
 i
s 
th
e 
d
o
m
in
an
t 
d
e-
n
o
m
in
at
io
n
 a
m
o
n
g
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
) 
in
 c
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
 t
o
 n
at
iv
es
 
an
d
 c
h
il
d
re
n
 o
f 
m
ix
ed
 c
o
u
p
le
s.
  
- 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 d
ec
re
as
es
 w
it
h
 a
g
e 
fo
r 
m
aj
o
ri
ty
, 
it
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
fo
r 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
. 
- 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
re
n
d
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 1
9
9
2
 a
n
d
 2
0
0
8
/0
9
 a
re
 
st
ro
n
g
er
 f
o
r 
m
aj
o
ri
ty
 t
h
an
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 r
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
 (
ev
en
 i
n
-
cr
ea
se
 f
o
r 
A
lg
er
ia
n
s)
. 
- 
P
ar
en
t-
ch
il
d
-t
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
: 
R
ei
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
is
 l
ea
st
 l
ik
el
y
 
fo
r 
al
l 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
, 
re
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
s 
m
o
st
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 f
o
r 
im
-
m
ig
ra
n
ts
, 
fo
r 
n
at
iv
es
 i
t 
is
 s
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
. 
- 
E
th
n
ic
 h
o
m
o
p
h
il
y
 r
eg
ar
d
in
g
 f
ri
en
d
sh
ip
 a
n
d
 u
n
io
n
 f
o
r-
m
at
io
n
 i
s 
h
ig
h
er
 a
m
o
n
g
 M
u
sl
im
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
. 
S
im
se
k
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
1
9
) 
T
o
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
d
o
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 a
n
d
 
M
u
sl
im
 y
o
u
th
 w
it
h
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
im
-
m
ig
ra
n
t 
b
ac
k
g
ro
u
n
d
 d
if
fe
r 
in
 t
h
ei
r 
re
-
li
g
io
u
s 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
d
u
ri
n
g
 a
d
o
le
s-
ce
n
ce
? 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
eg
m
en
te
d
 a
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
e-
o
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
In
se
cu
ri
ty
 t
h
eo
ry
 
C
IL
S
4
E
U
 
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
3
 
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
, 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 S
w
ed
en
 
N
at
iv
e 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
, 
im
m
i-
g
ra
n
t 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
, 
im
m
i-
g
ra
n
t 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 n
at
iv
es
 a
n
d
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 b
ec
o
m
e 
sl
ig
h
tl
y
 m
o
re
 
se
cu
la
r 
o
n
 a
ll
 3
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
rs
 (
n
o
 s
tr
o
n
g
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 c
h
an
g
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
es
e 
2
 g
ro
u
p
s)
. 
- 
M
u
sl
im
 d
o
 n
o
t 
sh
o
w
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 d
ev
el
o
p
-
m
en
t 
- 
M
u
sl
im
s 
sh
o
w
 h
ig
h
 h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 r
eg
ar
d
in
g
 c
h
an
g
e:
 s
o
m
e 
b
ec
o
m
e 
le
ss
, 
so
m
e 
b
ec
o
m
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s;
 t
h
is
 i
s 
le
ss
 t
h
e 
ca
se
 f
o
r 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s.
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en
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al
 r
es
u
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S
o
eh
l 
(2
0
1
7
) 
C
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
 o
f 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 o
f 
re
li
g
-
io
si
ty
 f
ro
m
 p
ar
en
ts
 t
o
 c
h
il
d
re
n
 a
n
d
 
d
eg
re
e 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
h
o
m
o
g
am
y
 
am
o
n
g
 t
h
es
e 
ch
il
d
re
n
 a
s 
th
ey
 f
o
rm
 
u
n
io
n
s 
ac
ro
ss
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
d
en
o
m
in
a-
ti
o
n
s 
an
d
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
s 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
S
el
ec
ti
v
e 
ac
cu
lt
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 a
p
p
ro
ac
h
 
T
eO
 
2
0
0
8
/0
9
 
F
ra
n
ce
 
1
st
, 
1
.5
th
, 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
an
d
 3
+
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s,
 M
u
sl
im
s 
A
g
e 
1
8
-6
0
 
- 
T
h
er
e 
is
 a
 s
tr
o
n
g
 s
ta
b
il
it
y
 i
n
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 i
n
 M
u
sl
im
 f
am
il
ie
s 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
s 
w
it
h
 s
m
al
l 
v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 g
en
-
er
at
io
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
g
ro
u
p
s,
 a
n
d
 m
o
re
 v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 b
e-
tw
ee
n
 g
en
er
at
io
n
s 
in
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 f
am
il
ie
s.
 
- 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
ch
o
o
si
n
g
 a
 r
e
li
g
io
u
sl
y
 h
o
m
o
g
en
o
u
s 
p
ar
tn
er
 
is
 l
ar
g
er
 f
o
r 
M
u
sl
im
s,
 b
u
t 
d
is
ap
p
ea
rs
 w
h
en
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
o
ri
g
in
; 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
h
o
m
o
g
am
y
 d
e-
cl
in
es
 o
v
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n
s.
 I
n
 a
d
d
it
io
n
, 
te
rt
ia
ry
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 i
s 
a 
st
ro
n
g
 p
re
d
ic
to
r 
fo
r 
h
et
er
o
g
en
eo
u
s 
p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
. 
- 
V
er
y
 s
tr
o
n
g
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 w
h
il
e 
g
ro
w
-
in
g
 u
p
 a
n
d
 h
av
in
g
 r
el
ig
io
u
sl
y
 h
o
m
o
g
en
o
u
s 
p
ar
en
ts
 o
n
 i
n
d
i-
v
id
u
al
 
im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
; 
th
es
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
ar
e 
ev
en
 
st
ro
n
g
er
 f
o
r 
M
u
sl
im
s.
 
- 
T
ak
en
 t
o
g
et
h
er
, 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
ec
li
n
e 
in
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
-
p
ec
te
d
. 
S
m
it
s 
&
 U
lt
ee
 
(2
0
1
3
) 
D
id
 M
u
sl
im
 s
el
f-
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 o
f 
m
o
sq
u
e 
at
te
n
d
an
ce
 
am
o
n
g
 p
eo
p
le
 o
f 
T
u
rk
is
h
 a
n
d
 M
o
ro
c-
ca
n
 d
es
ce
n
t 
in
 t
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
ag
ed
 
1
2
+
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 t
h
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
7
–
2
0
0
9
 
an
d
, 
if
 s
o
, 
to
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
an
d
 i
n
 
w
h
ic
h
 d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
? 
In
 w
h
ic
h
 w
ay
 d
o
es
 
th
e 
tr
en
d
 a
m
o
n
g
 t
h
is
 s
u
b
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
d
if
fe
r 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
tr
en
d
 a
m
o
n
g
 o
th
er
 i
n
-
h
ab
it
an
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s?
 T
o
 
w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
d
o
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
-
te
x
tu
al
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
th
at
 t
en
d
 t
o
 b
e 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 e
x
p
la
in
 
o
v
er
 t
im
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 o
u
r 
su
b
p
o
p
-
u
la
ti
o
n
? 
S
o
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
ci
en
ti
fi
c 
w
o
rl
d
v
ie
w
 t
h
eo
ry
 
In
se
cu
ri
ty
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
su
p
p
ly
 t
h
eo
ry
 
E
x
te
rn
al
 f
ac
to
rs
, 
g
ro
u
p
 a
n
d
 
g
en
d
er
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
P
O
L
S
 1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
9
 +
 m
u
-
n
ic
ip
al
-l
ev
el
 
d
at
a 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
 
1
st
, 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 2
.5
th
 g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 g
ro
u
p
 w
it
h
 
an
y
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
 
- 
T
re
n
d
s 
o
v
er
 t
im
e:
 M
ai
n
ly
 t
re
n
d
le
ss
 f
lu
ct
u
at
io
n
s;
 i
d
en
ti
fi
-
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s,
 a
n
d
 a
tt
en
d
an
ce
 d
ec
re
as
es
 a
 l
it
tl
e.
 F
o
r 
o
th
er
 D
u
tc
h
 i
n
h
ab
it
an
ts
, 
d
ec
re
as
in
g
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 i
s 
v
is
ib
le
 
(o
n
 a
 l
o
w
er
 l
ev
el
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 M
u
sl
im
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
).
 
- 
F
ac
to
rs
 i
n
fl
u
en
ci
n
g
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
: 
g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
M
o
ro
c-
ca
n
/T
u
rk
is
h
, 
m
ix
ed
 m
ar
ri
ag
e,
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
ti
m
e 
in
 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
/w
o
rk
 (
o
n
ly
 a
tt
en
d
an
ce
),
 g
en
d
er
 (
o
n
ly
 a
tt
en
d
-
an
ce
),
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 o
f 
D
u
tc
h
 i
n
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
, 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
co
-
et
h
n
ic
 m
o
sq
u
e,
 p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
co
-e
th
n
ic
s 
(o
n
ly
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
-
ti
o
n
),
 a
n
ti
-i
m
m
ig
ra
n
t 
v
o
te
rs
 (
o
n
ly
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
);
 n
o
 e
f-
fe
ct
: 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 i
n
co
m
e,
 u
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
, 
m
o
sq
u
e 
at
ta
ck
s,
 m
u
-
n
ic
ip
al
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
- 
S
m
al
l 
ti
m
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 g
en
er
al
 b
ec
o
m
e 
la
rg
er
 w
h
en
 t
ak
-
in
g
 i
n
to
 a
cc
o
u
n
t 
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
(e
x
ce
p
ti
o
n
: 
co
n
te
x
-
tu
al
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
fo
r 
at
te
n
d
an
ce
) 
S
m
it
s 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
1
0
) 
D
o
 w
el
l-
es
ta
b
li
sh
ed
 t
h
eo
ri
es
 d
ev
el
-
o
p
ed
 f
o
r 
p
re
d
o
m
in
an
tl
y
 C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 
an
d
 n
at
iv
e-
b
o
rn
 m
aj
o
ri
ty
 i
n
 W
es
te
rn
 
so
ci
et
ie
s 
ar
e 
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
 t
o
 n
o
n
-C
h
ri
s-
ti
an
 n
o
n
-W
es
te
rn
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
?
 
S
ci
en
ti
fi
c 
w
o
rl
d
v
ie
w
 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
su
p
p
ly
 
E
x
is
te
n
ti
al
 i
n
se
cu
ri
ty
 
S
o
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 
M
H
S
M
 
1
9
9
4
-9
6
 
B
el
g
iu
m
 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
M
u
sl
im
 
- 
E
ff
ec
ts
 f
o
u
n
d
 f
o
r:
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 (
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
fo
r 
R
am
ad
an
),
 r
el
i-
g
io
u
s 
su
p
p
ly
, 
jo
b
 s
ta
b
il
it
y
 (
b
u
t:
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
fo
r 
sh
ee
p
 s
ac
ri
fi
c-
in
g
 (
fi
n
an
ci
al
 c
o
n
st
ra
in
ts
 p
o
ss
ib
le
 e
x
p
la
n
at
io
n
),
 c
o
-e
th
n
ic
 
p
ar
tn
er
, 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
so
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
 
- 
N
o
 e
ff
ec
ts
 f
o
u
n
d
 f
o
r:
 C
o
-e
th
n
ic
s 
in
 l
iv
in
g
 e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t,
 u
r-
b
an
iz
at
io
n
 (
o
n
ly
 m
o
sq
u
e 
at
te
n
d
an
ce
: 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
) 
- 
C
o
n
ce
rn
in
g
 t
im
e 
ef
fe
ct
s:
 M
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 a
t 
o
ld
er
 a
g
es
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 (
ex
ce
p
t 
R
am
ad
an
, 
le
n
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 i
n
-
cr
ea
se
s 
(!
) 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 (
ex
ce
p
t 
R
am
ad
an
) 
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S
tu
d
y
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 
D
at
a
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
/g
ro
u
p
s 
C
en
tr
al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
o
rr
ek
en
s 
&
 
Ja
co
b
s 
(2
0
1
5
) 
T
o
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
d
o
 d
is
cu
rs
iv
e 
an
d
 p
o
-
li
ti
ca
l 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
s 
p
ro
v
o
k
e 
re
ac
ti
v
e 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
? 
T
o
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
d
o
 t
h
ey
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 
p
er
ce
iv
ed
 c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
d
is
ta
n
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
M
u
sl
im
s 
an
d
 n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
s 
(w
it
h
 r
e-
g
ar
d
 t
o
 t
h
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
n
 i
n
 s
o
ci
-
et
y
)?
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 a
p
p
ro
ac
h
 
E
U
R
IS
-
L
A
M
 2
0
1
0
 
B
el
g
iu
m
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
G
er
-
m
an
y
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
, 
U
K
 
M
o
ro
cc
an
, 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
P
a-
k
is
ta
n
i,
 E
x
-Y
u
g
o
sl
av
ia
n
 
M
u
sl
im
s 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 g
ro
u
p
 
 
- 
A
 m
o
re
 o
p
en
 d
is
cu
rs
iv
e 
an
d
 p
o
li
ti
ca
l 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
le
ad
 t
o
 h
ig
h
er
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 a
n
d
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 d
is
ta
n
ce
 
b
et
w
ee
n
 M
u
sl
im
s 
an
d
 n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
s.
 
- 
T
h
er
e 
ar
e 
g
ro
u
p
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
(c
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
o
ri
g
in
) 
w
it
h
 r
e-
sp
ec
t 
to
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 a
n
d
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 s
im
il
ar
it
ie
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 
M
u
sl
im
s 
an
d
 n
o
n
-M
u
sl
im
s.
 
V
an
 d
er
 
B
ra
ch
t 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
1
3
) 
A
re
 t
h
er
e 
in
te
rg
en
er
at
io
n
al
 d
if
fe
r-
en
ce
s 
in
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
? 
W
h
at
 i
s 
th
e 
in
-
fl
u
en
ce
 o
f 
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 r
el
i-
g
io
u
s 
co
n
te
x
t 
o
n
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
’ 
re
li
g
i-
o
si
ty
? 
A
n
d
 i
s 
th
e 
re
g
io
n
 o
r 
co
u
n
tr
y
 
le
v
el
 m
o
re
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t?
 
S
o
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
m
ar
k
et
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
et
h
n
ic
it
y
 
E
S
S
 2
0
0
2
, 
2
0
0
4
, 
2
0
0
6
, 
2
0
0
8
 
E
u
ro
p
e 
1
st
, 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 2
.5
th
 g
en
er
a-
ti
o
n
 
A
g
e:
 1
5
 y
ea
rs
 o
r 
o
ld
er
 
- 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
s 
le
ss
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 f
ir
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
. 
- 
N
at
iv
e 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 i
n
 r
eg
io
n
 a
ff
ec
ts
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
; 
th
is
 e
ff
ec
t 
is
 l
ar
g
er
 f
o
r 
2
n
d
 a
s 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
(b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
b
eh
av
io
r 
fo
r 
n
o
n
-E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
).
 R
e-
g
io
n
al
 l
ev
el
 i
s 
m
o
re
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
th
an
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
 l
ev
el
. 
- 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
d
iv
er
si
ty
 i
s 
n
o
t 
im
p
o
rt
an
t.
 
- 
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
 h
as
 a
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
, 
an
d
 t
h
is
 
ef
fe
ct
 i
s 
st
ro
n
g
er
 f
o
r 
th
e 
2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
es
p
ec
ia
ll
y
 f
o
r 
n
o
n
-
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 m
ig
ra
n
ts
.  
V
an
 d
er
 
B
ra
ch
t 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
1
6
) 
Is
 t
h
er
e 
an
 a
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 e
th
-
n
ic
 s
ch
o
o
l 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 a
d
o
le
s-
ce
n
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
sa
li
en
ce
? 
A
re
 t
h
er
e 
in
te
rg
en
er
at
io
n
al
 d
if
fe
r-
en
ce
s 
in
 m
in
o
ri
ti
es
’ 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
sa
li
-
en
ce
? 
W
h
at
 i
s 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
et
h
n
ic
 s
ch
o
o
l 
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
in
te
rg
en
er
at
io
n
al
 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s?
 
S
o
ci
al
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
aD
iS
S
 
2
0
1
1
/1
2
 
F
la
n
d
er
s 
(B
el
g
iu
m
) 
3
rd
 g
ra
d
e 
o
f 
se
co
n
d
ar
y
 
sc
h
o
o
l 
- 
P
u
p
il
s 
w
it
h
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 b
ac
k
g
ro
u
n
d
 a
re
 m
o
re
 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
in
 s
ch
o
o
ls
 w
it
h
 a
 h
ig
h
er
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
et
h
n
ic
 m
in
o
ri
-
ti
es
. 
- 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 n
at
iv
es
 a
n
d
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 o
n
ly
 e
x
is
t 
in
 
sc
h
o
o
ls
 w
it
h
 a
 h
ig
h
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
et
h
n
ic
 m
in
o
ri
ti
es
. 
V
an
 d
er
 
B
ra
ch
t 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
1
7
) 
W
h
at
 i
s 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
et
h
n
ic
 s
ch
o
o
l 
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
n
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
?
 
D
o
es
 t
h
is
 i
m
p
ac
t 
v
ar
y
 b
y
 o
w
n
 r
el
ig
i-
o
si
ty
? 
--
 
R
aD
iS
S
 
2
0
1
1
-1
5
 
F
la
n
d
er
s 
(B
el
g
iu
m
) 
3
rd
 g
ra
d
e 
o
f 
se
co
n
d
ar
y
 
sc
h
o
o
l 
- 
M
an
y
 s
tu
d
en
ts
 b
ec
o
m
e 
u
n
af
fi
li
at
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n
 a
g
e 
1
5
 a
n
d
 
1
8
. 
- 
D
ec
li
n
es
 b
et
w
ee
n
 a
g
e 
1
5
 a
n
d
 1
8
 a
re
 a
tt
en
u
at
ed
 w
h
en
 m
i-
n
o
ri
ty
 g
ro
u
p
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
is
 h
ig
h
. 
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S
tu
d
y
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 
D
at
a
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
/g
ro
u
p
s 
C
en
tr
al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
an
 d
e 
P
o
l 
&
 
v
an
 T
u
b
er
g
en
 
(2
0
1
3
) 
W
il
l 
T
u
rk
is
h
 a
n
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
 p
ar
en
ts
 
b
e 
ab
le
 t
o
 t
ra
n
sm
it
 t
h
ei
r 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 t
o
 
th
e 
n
ex
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
n
 a
 s
ec
u
la
r 
W
es
te
rn
 s
o
ci
et
y
?
 
S
o
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
“F
am
il
ia
r 
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s”
 
S
ev
er
al
 m
o
d
er
at
o
rs
 o
f 
tr
an
s-
m
is
si
o
n
 (
fa
m
il
y
, 
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
, 
so
ci
et
y
) 
N
E
L
L
S
 
2
0
0
8
-1
0
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
 a
n
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
A
g
e:
 1
5
-4
5
 
- 
S
tr
o
n
g
 t
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 f
o
r 
m
en
 a
n
d
 w
o
m
en
 
al
ik
e
 
- 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 i
s 
st
ro
n
g
er
 i
f 
o
n
e 
is
 s
at
is
fi
ed
 w
it
h
 r
el
at
io
n
 t
o
 p
ar
en
ts
 (
o
n
ly
 m
en
) 
- 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
s 
st
ro
n
g
er
 i
n
 i
n
te
re
th
n
ic
 f
am
il
ie
s 
(a
g
ai
n
st
 
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s)
 (
o
n
ly
 w
o
m
en
) 
- 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
s 
st
ro
n
g
er
 i
n
 T
u
rk
is
h
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 M
o
ro
c-
ca
n
 f
am
il
ie
s 
(o
n
ly
 m
en
) 
- 
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 i
s 
st
ro
n
g
er
 f
o
r 
fi
rs
t 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 
(o
n
ly
 w
o
m
en
) 
- 
S
o
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ts
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
s 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 r
el
ig
io
s-
it
y
 
V
an
 H
ee
ls
u
m
 
&
 K
o
o
m
en
 
(2
0
1
5
) 
 
H
o
w
 a
re
 e
th
n
ic
, r
el
ig
io
u
s 
an
d
 n
at
io
n
al
 
id
en
ti
ty
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 e
ac
h
 o
th
er
? 
H
o
w
 
d
o
es
 
as
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 
th
e 
p
ro
ce
ss
 o
f 
id
en
ti
ty
 f
o
rm
at
io
n
? 
W
h
at
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
ar
e 
th
er
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
an
d
 s
ec
o
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
? 
S
o
ci
al
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 t
h
eo
ry
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
 
E
U
R
IS
-
L
A
M
 2
0
1
1
 
B
el
g
iu
m
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
G
er
-
m
an
y
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
M
o
ro
cc
an
 
- 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ty
 i
s 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 e
th
n
ic
 i
d
en
ti
ty
. 
S
ec
o
n
d
 g
en
-
er
at
io
n
 M
u
sl
im
s 
id
en
ti
fy
 m
o
re
 s
tr
o
n
g
ly
 w
it
h
 t
h
ei
r 
re
li
g
io
n
 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 f
ir
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
. 
- 
Id
en
ti
ty
 i
s 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 e
le
m
en
ts
 o
f 
as
cr
ip
ti
o
n
. 
- 
S
ec
o
n
d
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 i
s 
le
ss
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 b
y
 e
le
m
en
ts
 o
f 
as
cr
ip
-
ti
o
n
, 
es
p
ec
ia
ll
y
 r
eg
ar
d
in
g
 n
at
io
n
al
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
. 
V
an
 T
u
b
er
g
en
 
(2
0
0
6
) 
E
x
am
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
tw
o
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
re
li
g
i-
o
si
ty
: 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 r
el
i-
g
io
u
s 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 a
s 
re
su
lt
 o
f 
in
d
i-
v
id
u
al
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
te
x
tu
al
 f
ac
to
rs
 
(o
ri
g
in
, 
d
es
ti
n
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
-
m
u
n
it
y
 e
ff
ec
ts
) 
IF
IS
 1
9
7
4
-
2
0
0
0
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a,
 B
el
g
iu
m
, 
C
an
ad
a,
 D
en
m
ar
k
, 
G
re
at
 B
ri
ta
in
, 
It
al
y
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 U
S
A
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
- 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 o
ri
g
in
s 
an
d
 d
es
ti
n
at
io
n
s 
in
 a
ff
il
ia
ti
o
n
 
an
d
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 
- 
M
ac
ro
 f
ac
to
rs
 a
re
 m
o
re
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
 t
h
an
 p
ar
-
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 
- 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
o
ri
g
in
 i
s 
m
o
re
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
, 
co
u
n
tr
y
 
o
f 
d
es
ti
n
at
io
n
 i
s 
m
o
re
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 
- 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
: 
A
g
e,
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
st
at
u
s,
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
m
ar
it
al
 s
ta
tu
s 
as
 e
x
p
ec
te
d
; 
b
u
t 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
e 
m
o
re
 
- 
O
ri
g
in
 e
ff
ec
ts
: 
M
o
d
er
n
iz
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 d
o
m
in
an
ce
 o
f 
C
h
ri
st
i-
an
it
y
 a
s 
ex
p
ec
te
d
, 
n
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
su
p
p
re
ss
io
n
 
- 
D
es
ti
n
at
io
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
: 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
d
iv
er
si
ty
, 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 o
f 
n
a-
ti
v
es
, 
p
o
li
ti
ca
l 
la
n
d
sc
ap
e 
as
 e
x
p
ec
te
d
 
- 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 e
ff
ec
ts
: 
N
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
g
ro
u
p
 s
iz
e 
(n
o
t 
h
y
p
o
th
e-
si
ze
d
) 
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V
an
 T
u
b
er
g
en
 
(2
0
0
7
) 
W
h
at
 h
ap
p
en
s 
to
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
’ 
re
li
-
g
io
u
s 
co
m
m
it
m
en
t 
w
h
en
 t
h
ey
 b
e-
co
m
e 
m
o
re
 s
o
ci
al
ly
 i
n
te
g
ra
te
d
 i
n
to
 
th
e 
se
cu
la
r 
h
o
st
 s
o
ci
et
y
?
 
S
o
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
A
cc
o
m
m
o
d
at
io
n
 h
y
p
o
th
es
is
 
S
P
V
A
 1
9
9
8
, 
2
0
0
2
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
M
o
ro
cc
an
, 
S
u
-
ri
n
am
es
e,
 A
n
ti
ll
ea
n
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
- 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
w
h
o
 h
av
e 
an
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
at
ta
ch
m
en
t:
 
et
h
n
ic
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s,
 e
th
n
ic
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
n
ei
g
h
b
o
rh
o
o
d
, 
D
u
tc
h
 p
ar
tn
er
, 
ac
ti
v
e 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
st
at
u
s,
 
le
v
el
 o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
la
n
g
u
ag
e 
p
ro
fi
ci
en
cy
 i
n
 D
u
tc
h
, 
ag
e 
o
f 
ar
ri
v
al
. 
N
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
in
 m
u
lt
iv
ar
ia
te
 a
n
al
y
se
s:
 C
o
n
ta
ct
 w
it
h
 
n
at
iv
es
 i
n
 f
re
e-
ti
m
e,
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s.
 O
p
p
o
-
si
te
 e
ff
ec
t:
 L
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 (
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
 e
x
-
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
at
ti
tu
d
es
) 
- 
T
u
rk
s 
an
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 S
u
ri
n
am
es
e 
an
d
 A
n
ti
ll
ea
n
s.
 
- 
T
u
rk
is
h
 a
n
d
 M
o
ro
cc
an
 m
al
es
 a
tt
en
d
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
m
ee
ti
n
g
s 
m
o
re
 o
ft
en
, 
w
h
er
ea
s 
th
e 
o
p
p
o
si
te
 i
s 
tr
u
e 
fo
r 
S
u
ri
n
am
es
e 
an
d
 A
n
ti
ll
ea
n
s.
 
V
an
 T
u
b
er
g
en
 
(2
0
1
3
) 
D
o
 t
h
e 
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 e
v
en
t 
an
d
 t
h
e 
su
b
-
se
q
u
en
t 
st
ay
 i
n
 t
h
e 
h
o
st
 s
o
ci
et
y
 h
av
e 
an
y
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
fo
r 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 o
f 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
?
 
S
o
ci
al
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
 t
h
eo
ry
 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
m
ar
k
et
 t
h
eo
ry
 
S
C
IP
 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
n
, 
P
o
li
sh
, 
M
o
-
ro
cc
an
, 
T
u
rk
is
h
, 
S
u
ri
-
n
am
es
e,
 A
n
ti
ll
ea
n
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
, 
m
ax
. 
3
 
y
ea
rs
 l
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 
A
n
y
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
 
A
g
e:
 1
8
-6
5
 
- 
E
v
en
t 
o
f 
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 r
ed
u
ce
s 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s,
 a
tt
en
d
in
g
 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
m
ee
ti
n
g
s 
m
o
re
 t
h
an
 p
ra
y
in
g
. 
- 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
co
n
ti
n
u
it
y
 v
s.
 d
ec
li
n
e 
d
if
fe
rs
 t
o
 a
 g
re
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
b
y
 
co
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
o
ri
g
in
: 
S
m
al
le
r 
d
ec
li
n
e 
fo
r 
o
ld
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
t 
g
ro
u
p
s 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 n
ew
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 f
ro
m
 P
o
la
n
d
 a
n
d
 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
. 
T
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 p
ro
n
o
u
n
ce
d
 f
o
r 
at
te
n
d
-
an
ce
 t
h
an
 p
ra
y
in
g
. 
- 
O
th
er
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
s 
ar
e 
ra
th
er
 u
n
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
(o
n
ly
 
sm
al
l 
ef
fe
ct
s 
fo
r 
le
n
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 o
n
 a
tt
en
d
an
ce
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
p
ra
y
in
g
; 
co
n
ta
ct
 t
o
 c
o
-e
th
n
ic
 i
s 
u
n
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
p
ra
c-
ti
ce
, 
w
h
il
e 
co
n
ta
ct
 t
o
 n
at
iv
es
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s)
. 
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V
an
 T
u
b
er
g
en
 
&
 S
in
d
ra
d
ó
tt
ir
 
(2
0
1
1
) 
T
o
 w
h
at
 e
x
te
n
t 
ar
e 
cr
o
ss
-n
at
io
n
al
 d
if
-
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 
d
u
e 
to
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 (
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
) 
an
d
/o
r 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
iv
-
in
g
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
 (
co
n
te
x
tu
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
)?
 
S
ec
u
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 (
in
se
cu
-
ri
ty
 t
h
eo
ry
, 
so
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 
th
eo
ry
, 
sc
ie
n
ti
fi
c 
w
o
rl
d
v
ie
w
 
th
eo
ry
) 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
m
ar
k
et
 t
h
eo
ry
 
E
S
S
 2
0
0
2
, 
2
0
0
4
, 
2
0
0
6
, 
2
0
0
8
 
E
u
ro
p
e*
*
*
 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
- 
O
n
 a
v
er
ag
e,
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
th
an
 n
at
iv
es
, 
es
p
ec
ia
ll
y
 w
it
h
 r
es
p
ec
t 
to
 p
ra
y
in
g
. 
T
h
er
e 
ar
e 
al
so
 c
ro
ss
-
co
u
n
tr
y
 v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
s 
in
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
, 
th
o
se
 a
re
 
m
o
re
 p
ro
n
o
u
n
ce
d
 f
o
r 
p
u
b
li
c 
fo
rm
s 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 (
at
te
n
d
-
an
ce
).
 
- 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 l
ev
el
 h
as
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 →
 s
ci
en
ti
fi
c 
w
o
rl
d
v
ie
w
 
- 
U
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
→
 i
n
se
cu
ri
ty
 
th
eo
ry
; 
b
u
t 
n
ei
th
er
 u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
ra
te
 n
o
r 
in
co
m
e 
in
e-
q
u
al
it
y
 h
av
e 
a 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
ef
fe
ct
. 
- 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
d
iv
er
si
ty
 i
s 
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 r
el
ig
io
si
ty
, 
b
u
t 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
 w
h
et
h
er
 t
h
is
 e
ff
ec
t 
is
 d
ri
v
en
 b
y
 e
x
tr
em
e 
ca
se
s 
→
 
m
ar
k
et
 m
o
d
el
. 
B
u
t 
le
n
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 i
s 
n
eg
at
iv
el
y
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 (
n
o
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
o
se
 2
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s)
. 
- 
N
at
iv
es
’ 
le
v
el
 o
f 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 a
ff
ec
ts
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
 
as
 w
el
l 
as
 l
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
ay
 (
b
u
t 
n
o
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 e
ff
e
ct
) 
→
 s
o
-
ci
al
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
- 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 f
ro
m
 d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
 a
n
d
 p
re
d
o
m
in
an
tl
y
 M
u
sl
im
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s.
 
- 
N
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
af
fi
li
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
su
b
je
c-
ti
v
e 
re
li
g
io
si
ty
, 
M
u
sl
im
s 
p
ra
y
 m
o
re
 o
ft
en
 t
h
an
 C
at
h
o
li
cs
 
an
d
 E
as
te
rn
 O
rt
h
o
d
o
x
 i
m
m
ig
ra
n
ts
, 
n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 a
tt
en
d
-
an
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 M
u
sl
im
s 
an
d
 C
at
h
o
li
cs
, 
b
u
t 
M
u
sl
im
s 
>
 E
as
t-
er
n
 O
rt
h
o
d
o
x
. 
     
27 
  
S
tu
d
y
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 
D
at
a
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
/g
ro
u
p
s 
C
en
tr
al
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
er
k
u
y
te
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
1
2
) 
A
re
 r
el
ig
io
u
s,
 n
at
io
n
al
 a
n
d
 e
th
n
ic
 
id
en
ti
ti
es
 c
o
m
p
le
m
en
ta
ry
 o
r 
co
n
tr
a-
d
ic
to
ry
?
 
W
h
at
 i
s 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l 
re
li
g
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
ty
 f
o
r 
ad
o
le
sc
en
ts
’ 
re
li
g
io
u
s,
 
et
h
n
ic
 a
n
d
 n
at
io
n
al
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
? 
A
cc
u
lt
u
ra
ti
o
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
 
? 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
M
o
ro
cc
an
-D
u
tc
h
 M
u
s-
li
m
s 
A
g
e:
 1
1
-1
8
 
- 
A
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
 i
d
en
ti
fy
 l
es
s 
w
it
h
 e
th
n
ic
 a
n
d
 r
el
ig
io
u
s 
id
en
ti
-
ti
es
 a
n
d
 m
o
re
 w
it
h
 n
at
io
n
al
 i
d
en
ti
ti
es
 t
h
an
 t
h
ei
r 
p
ar
en
ts
. 
- 
P
ar
en
ts
’ 
M
u
sl
im
 i
d
en
ti
ty
 s
tr
o
n
g
ly
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
s 
ch
il
d
’s
 M
u
s-
li
m
 i
d
en
ti
ty
. 
- 
T
h
is
 e
ff
ec
t 
le
ss
 s
tr
o
n
g
 f
o
r 
o
ld
er
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
. 
 *  **
 
*
*
*
 
 **
*
*
 
*
*
*
*
*
 
 A
u
st
ri
a,
 B
el
g
iu
m
, 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
, 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
li
c,
 G
er
m
an
y
, 
D
en
m
ar
k
, 
E
st
o
n
ia
, 
S
p
ai
n
, 
F
in
la
n
d
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
, 
G
re
ec
e,
 H
u
n
g
ar
y
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 N
o
rw
ay
, 
P
o
la
n
d
, 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
R
u
ss
ia
, 
S
w
ed
en
, 
S
lo
v
en
ia
, 
S
lo
v
ak
ia
, 
U
k
ra
in
e
 
A
u
st
ri
a,
 B
el
g
iu
m
, 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
, 
D
en
m
ar
k
, 
G
er
m
a
n
y
, 
S
p
ai
n
, 
F
in
la
n
d
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
G
re
at
 B
ri
ta
in
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
It
al
y
, 
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
, 
th
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 N
o
rw
ay
, 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
S
w
ed
en
 
A
u
st
ri
a,
 B
el
g
iu
m
, 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
, 
C
y
p
ru
s,
 t
h
e 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
li
c,
 D
en
m
ar
k
, 
E
st
o
n
ia
, 
F
in
la
n
d
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
G
re
ec
e,
 H
u
n
g
ar
y
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
It
al
y
, 
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
, 
th
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 N
o
rw
ay
, 
P
o
la
n
d
, 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
R
u
ss
ia
, 
S
p
ai
n
, 
S
w
ed
en
, 
S
lo
v
ak
ia
, 
S
lo
v
en
ia
, 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
, 
U
k
ra
in
e,
 U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 B
el
g
iu
m
, 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
, 
A
u
st
ri
a,
 D
en
m
ar
k
, 
S
w
ed
en
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
N
o
rw
ay
, 
G
re
at
 B
ri
ta
in
  
A
u
st
ri
a,
 B
el
g
iu
m
, 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
, 
C
y
p
ru
s,
 t
h
e 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
li
c,
 D
en
m
ar
k
, 
E
st
o
n
ia
, 
F
in
la
n
d
, 
F
ra
n
ce
, 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
G
re
ec
e,
 H
u
n
g
ar
y
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
It
al
y
, 
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
, 
th
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 N
o
rw
ay
, 
P
o
la
n
d
, 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
R
o
m
an
ia
, 
S
lo
v
ak
ia
, 
S
lo
v
en
ia
, 
S
p
ai
n
, 
S
w
ed
en
, 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
, 
U
k
ra
in
e,
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
 
 
B
S
A
=
B
ri
ti
sh
 S
o
ci
al
 A
tt
it
u
d
es
, 
C
IL
S
4
E
U
=
C
h
il
d
re
n
 o
f 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 L
o
n
g
it
u
d
in
al
 S
u
rv
ey
 i
n
 4
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 E
M
B
E
S
=
E
th
n
ic
 M
in
o
ri
ty
 B
ri
ti
sh
 E
le
ct
io
n
 S
tu
d
y
, 
E
S
S
=
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 S
o
ci
al
 S
u
rv
ey
, 
F
M
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1   Introduction 
Religion is an important dimension of diversity in contemporary European societies. Tradition-
ally a Christian continent – despite considerable country differences regarding the prevalence 
of (a) specific type(s) of Christianity – European societies today are among the most secularized 
in the world (Norris & Inglehart 2011). Yet the large-scale immigration through post-colonial 
ties, ‘guest-worker’ recruitment and refugee movements that occurred in all North-Western Eu-
ropean countries has not only increased ethnic but also religious diversity in Europe (Castles & 
Miller 2009). In contrast to the USA, where both the religious background and average religi-
osity of migrants and non-migrants are more similar (Cadge & Ecklund 2007), immigrants and 
the majority population differ in both respects in Europe: a substantial share of immigrants are 
Muslims and have higher levels of religiosity than natives (Foner & Alba 2008, van Tubergen 
& Sindradóttir 2011, Voas & Fleischmann 2012). This has turned religion, and particularly 
Islam, into a ‘bright boundary marker’ between immigrants and European natives (Alba 2005). 
High-impact events such as terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists as well as many societal 
debates about the accommodation of religious diversity across European societies (e.g. Bader 
2007) have contributed to the widely held belief that religion hampers immigrant integration in 
Europe. 
Against the background of growing concern in public debates and among policy-makers that 
religion would stand in the way of the integration of immigrants and their offspring into secular 
European societies, this chapter examines how religious youth in Europe are today. I compare 
majority and minority youth with regard to their religious affiliation and levels of religiosity, 
and I relate the latter to social conditions such as generational status, ethnicity and gender, and 
to core explanations including religious socialization and education. So far, research on the 
topic of immigrant religion has focused mostly on adults, many of whom belonged to the first 
generation, that is, they were born and socialized in migrant sending countries with different 
religious backgrounds and often higher levels of religiosity (van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 
2011). Earlier studies have shown that Muslim immigrant families and communities in Europe 
generally tend to transmit their religiosity to the next generation (de Hoon & van Tubergen 
2014, Güngör et al. 2011, Verkuyten et al. 2012), although there is also evidence for seculari-
zation across generations and Muslim parents’ limited influence when transmitting their reli-
gion to their children (Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014). In 
(mainstream) Christian families – both of migrant and nonmigrant origin – the pattern of 
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intergenerational religious decline is well known (Jacob & Kalter 2013). The latter finding in 
particular emphasizes the need to study religion among European youth from a comparative 
perspective by including affiliates of different religious groups. While the focus on Muslim 
minorities in previous research on immigrant religion is understandable given the argument of 
Islam as a particularly bright boundary marker in European societies, a more inclusive approach 
to the study of religion among minority and majority youth that allows for a comparison across 
religious groups is needed for a comprehensive understanding of the importance of religion in 
the life of youth growing up in Europe today. 
In addition, previous research typically focused on religious minority groups or immigrants 
only and therefore lacks a comparison with the native majority. As a consequence, it is so far 
unknown whether and to what extent youth from particular religious backgrounds stand out 
compared to other religious affiliations and native-origin youth in terms of their religiosity. 
Finally, only few studies have addressed the question whether immigrant religion varies across 
European countries (Connor 2010, Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Torrekens & Jacobs 2016, van 
der Bracht et al. 2013, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), despite our knowledge about im-
portant country differences in historical church–state relations and how they affected the ac-
commodation of religious minority groups (e.g. Fetzer & Soper 2005, Rath et al. 2001). 
This chapter therefore addresses the question of how religious minority and majority youth in 
Europe are today. I ask how many are affiliated to a religion, and if so, which one? How often 
do they pray and attend religious meetings? Is religion important to them or not? In answering 
these research questions, I thus touch multiple aspects of religion. According to Foner and Alba 
(2008), the lack of similarity between natives’ and migrants’ religious affiliation is the first 
reason why religion would work as a barrier to immigrant integration in Europe. The second 
reason they describe is the high level of religiosity among immigrants, which would contrast 
with low average levels of religiosity among European majority populations. This chapter there-
fore provides important comparative insights into one of the mostly debated aspects of integra-
tion. Next to describing and explaining levels of religiosity of majority and minority youth in 
Europe, which is the central aim of this chapter, its findings can also inform other research 
questions studied in the comparative volume “Growing up in Diverse Societies” (Kalter et al. 
2018) and research on immigrant integration in general. For instance, school segregation (Kruse 
& Kalter 2018) might contribute to the persistence of religious boundaries, as minority youth 
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are less likely to be exposed to the secular norms of their majority peers in more segregated 
schools. Moreover, because religion is seen as a more or less coherent set of beliefs and values, 
many of which concern family and gender relations (Brinkerhoff & MacKie 1985), it is likely 
to shape youth’s attitudes towards gender roles, homosexuality, marriage and cohabiting 
(Kogan 2018). Differences in these attitudes and values are often perceived as cultural threats, 
which is known to affect out-group prejudice (Stephan & Stephan 1996). To the extent that 
majority and minority youth differ in their religious affiliation and religiosity, this might also 
affect their likelihood to engage in positive social contact with each other and hold positive 
attitudes towards one another (van Tubergen & Smith 2018, Wölfer et al. 2018). These exam-
ples show the relevance of studying religion for understanding the integration of minority youth 
in Europe. 
Before presenting the findings, Section 2 briefly sketches the religious contexts that youth en-
counter in the four countries under study and relates them to general expectations regarding 
religious change, stability or revival. 
 
2   Contextual and Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Religious Contexts of Reception 
Despite scholarly debates regarding the reasons for and universality of religious decline (Cas-
anova 2003), the empirical finding that European societies have strongly secularized in the 
same period in which large-scale immigration occurred stands uncontested (Bruce 2011). In all 
North-Western European societies, population statistics and survey data reveal a pattern of de-
clining rates of religious attendance and a growing share of non-affiliates (e.g. Burkimsher 
2014). While secularization is contested as a theory to account for religious change (Gorski & 
Altinordu 2008), it is firmly established as an empirical regularity in the North-Western Euro-
pean societies that are the focus of the comparative volume “Growing up in Diverse Societies” 
(Kalter et al. 2018). From a global comparative perspective, England, Germany, the Nether-
lands and Sweden are located in the most secularized region in the world and have comparable 
levels of modernization and educational expansion, which are considered core driving forces 
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of secularization (Berger 1967a, Wilson 1982). I would therefore expect only minor differences 
in the levels of religiosity between England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Still, there are gradual differences between the four countries in their levels of religiosity. Con-
cerning the share of affiliates, according to the data from the European Social Survey (2002–
14, authors’ calculations), Sweden and the Netherlands seem to be more strongly secularized 
than England and Germany. Over 60 percent of the population in the former two countries 
declare no religious affiliation, while the share of non-religious people gravitates towards 50 
percent in England and 40 percent in Germany. Keeping these differences in the share of reli-
gious persons in mind, the breakdown of affiliations is rather similar in the four countries, with 
85 percent or more of all religious persons affiliated to Christianity. 
Levels of religiosity among the general population in the four countries are also rather similar. 
In England, Germany and the Netherlands, 8-13 percent attend services weekly or more, 16-19 
percent pray daily and 13-16 percent report a high level of religiosity (i.e. they score 8 or higher 
on the 1–10 scale of self-reported religiosity). In Sweden the corresponding percentages are 
rather low, with 4 percent for attendance and 8 percent for prayer and high religiosity. This 
quick glance at the data shows that in terms of religious contexts of immigrant reception, Swe-
den is the most secularized of the four comparison countries in light of the large share of non-
affiliates as well as low levels of religiosity among the affiliated. The Netherlands, although 
similar to Sweden in terms of the share of non-affiliates, resembles England and Germany in 
terms of levels of religiosity. Overall, these three countries host a significant minority of ac-
tively religious persons, but the majority of the general population is not strongly involved with 
religion in all four countries under study. 
In addition to the religiosity of the general population, the way in which religion is regulated 
by the state and to what extent religious minority rights are recognized is an important aspect 
of the religious context of reception that immigrants encounter. The four countries under study 
also differ in this respect. The Dutch history of religious pluralism and state neutrality – also 
referred to as ‘pillarization’ (Lijphart 1968) – has provided many opportunities for religious 
minority groups to build their own religious institutions. The legacy of state churches as they 
were historically established in both England and Sweden has been argued to have facilitated 
the recognition of religious minority rights, because minorities could lobby for state recognition 
of their religious rights on the basis of equality principles in these countries, resulting in 
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relatively advanced accommodation of religious minority rights (Fetzer & Soper 2005). Of the 
four countries under study, Germany is often described as the least favorable institutional con-
text for religious minorities, particularly Muslims, because it has not systematically extended 
its system of state funding for religious activities to religious newcomers (Doomernik 1995). 
The countries studied the comparative volume “Growing up in Diverse Societies” (Kalter et al. 
2018) do not only constitute different religious contexts of reception for newcomers, they also 
host different types of migrants. In line with country-specific histories of migration (Jonsson 
2018), the ethnic and religious composition of the minority population differs between the four 
countries. For instance, ethnic minorities in Sweden more often arrived as refugees and, com-
pared to labor and post-colonial migrants, are likely to experience more insecurity – both exis-
tential and economic – and might therefore be more religious than other migrants (Norris & 
Inglehart 2011).1 Moreover, post-colonial migrants in Britain are often Muslims and therefore 
religious ‘others’ from the majority perspective, while post-colonial migrants in the Nether-
lands are predominantly Christian and therefore resemble the native majority more. I will ad-
dress these differences by presenting country-specific findings and by examining individual 
religiosity as a function of immigrant generation and origin country. 
 
2.2 Religious Change? 
Previous research on immigrant religion in Europe based on adult samples identified a common 
pattern: compared to non-migrants, immigrants are more often affiliated with a religion and 
many are affiliated to a religion that is not historically rooted in the destination country, in 
particular Islam (Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Moreover, immigrants in European societies are 
found to have higher levels of religiosity in general than natives (van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 
2011). Some scholars have predicted that the elevated levels of religiosity among first genera-
tion immigrants in Europe would decline with increasing length of stay and across immigrant 
generations based on general assimilation processes. The assimilation approach in migration 
studies posits that over time immigrants will become more similar to the majority population 
                                                 
1  Religion provides people with absolute rules and assures that following these rules will help them guarantee a 
secure future in this world or the next. People who experience higher levels of existential and economic insecu-
rities are more likely to feel stressed about their unpredictable future and have the need for the rules posed by 
religious ideologies (Norris & Inglehart 2011). 
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of their host societies (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Park 1950). In the religious contexts of 
immigrant reception in the North-Western European countries I described, this would imply an 
adaptation to the pattern of secularization. This should be evident through a trend of intergen-
erational decline in religiosity. 
However, the expectation of secularization among immigrants has been contrasted with the 
alternative scenarios of religious stability and religious revival. Religious stability can be ar-
gued from the segmented assimilation perspective (e.g. Zhou 1997a), which posits that different 
dimensions of assimilation need not co-occur. More specifically, assimilation in the economic 
domain could be accompanied by the maintenance of immigrant cultures, including religion, 
across generations. As parental religiosity is among the most important predictors of individu-
als’ religiosity (e.g. Myers 1996), and given the large contrast in religiosity between the first 
generation and the native majority, I would also expect relatively high levels of dissimilarity 
between majority and minority youth in the second generation based on this perspective. 
Finally, arguments for a religious revival – implying increasing religiosity over time and across 
generations – can be derived from the perspective of ‘reactive ethnicity’ and the religious mar-
ket approach. ‘Reactive ethnicity’ implies the strengthening of immigrant identities in response 
to negative experiences in the host society, including low socioeconomic status (SES) and dis-
crimination (Portes & Rumbaut 2001); this notion has been extended to and empirically con-
firmed in the religious realm (e.g. Fleischmann et al. 2011). The theory of religious markets 
(e.g. Finke & Stark 1998) posits that individuals will be more religious in contexts that offer a 
broader range of supply of religious goods. Therefore, the increasing religious diversity that 
comes with international migration would increase competition on the religious market and thus 
contribute to increasing religiosity. 
 
3   Studying Religion and Religiosity with CILS4EU 
In light of these contextual settings and competing theoretical perspectives regarding intergen-
erational change, I now study religion among youth with the help of the Children of Immigrants 
Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) data (Kalter et al. 2016a). More 
specifically, I start by describing how religious minority and majority youth are in Sweden, the 
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Netherlands, Germany and England.2 To answer this question, I study four aspects of religion, 
namely affiliation, prayer, attending religious services and the subjective importance of reli-
gion, and I compare majority and minority youth on these indicators. Subsequently, I relate the 
religiosity of youth – mainly focusing, for reasons of readability, on subjective importance – to 
possible determinants of individual differences in religiosity. Specifically, in Section 3.2 I will 
look at differences in religiosity by immigrant generation and country of origin, and I will relate 
the religiosity of youth to that of their parents. In a fourth step, I examine gender differences in 
religiosity. Previous research has revealed a gender gap in religious participation among Chris-
tian and Muslim populations, with women being more active than men in the case of Christians 
(Walter & Davie 1998) and an opposite gap for Muslims in terms of service attendance 
(Meuleman & Billiet 2011). Accordingly, I will be focusing on religious practices as well as 
religious salience in this particular section (3.3). In the last empirical section (3.4), to explore 
more of the individual differences in religiosity I focus on education, a commonly studied pre-
dictor of religiosity. Within secularization theory, the role of a scientific worldview takes a 
prominent place, and suggests a negative relationship between individuals’ level of education 
and their level of religiosity (Berger 1967a). Thus, I relate religiosity to the level of education 
followed by youth by focusing on Germany and the Netherlands with their tracked educational 
systems. 
 
3.1 Do Minority and Majority Youth Differ in their Religion? 
First, I investigate religious affiliation, which I present separately for the four countries and for 
majority versus minority youth in Table 2.1.3 In England and the Netherlands most majority 
youth, over 55 percent in each of the two countries, are not affiliated with any religion. In 
Sweden and Germany, most majority students (58 and 80 percent) identify as Christians. Com-
pared to majority youth, the share of non-religious and Christians among minority youth is 
lower in all four countries. Only 11 percent of minority youth are not affiliated with any religion 
                                                 
2  In accordance with Kalter and Heath (2018), ‘minority’ students are those with at least one foreign-born parent, 
i.e. children of immigrants in a literal sense. 
3  For completeness, this and all subsequent tables also show the share of majority and minority youth that are 
affiliated with other religions than Christianity and Islam. As Table 2.1 makes clear, this concerns a very small 
group among both majority and minority youth. Point estimates such as the ones presented in this chapter will 
therefore be much less robust for members of these other religious groups, which is why I do not comment on 
them in the text. 
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in Germany, while the corresponding percentages are higher in the other three countries, reach-
ing to over 30 percent in the Netherlands. The religious affiliation with most members among 
minority youth is Christians in all four countries. They constitute at least 34 percent (in the 
Netherlands) and up to 54 percent (in Germany) of the minority youth. Clearly, then, Islam is 
not the most prominent religion among minority youth; nevertheless, this religious affiliation 
is the most prominent difference among majority and minority youth. While the share of Mus-
lims and other religious groups jointly does not account for over 3 percent of the majority youth 
population in any of the countries, almost one fourth of minority youth in all countries are 
affiliated with Islam. Despite the differences in the ethnic make-up of the minority population 
between the four countries, there are only small country differences in this share, which ranges 
from 24 percent in England to 31 percent in Germany. 
Table 2.1: Religious affiliation by survey country and majority/minority 
  Survey country 
  England Germany Netherlands Sweden 
      
Majority Muslim 0.36 0.20 0.16 0.07 
 Christian 42.17 80.13 40.82 57.77 
 Other religion 1.80 0.54 1.23 1.48 
 Non-religious 55.66 19.14 57.79 40.67 
 No. of obs. 2,461 2,590 2,977 2,702 
      
Minority Muslim 23.55 30.92 27.40 27.91 
 Christian 37.64 54.04 33.95 41.09 
 Other religion 12.09 3.77 7.22 4.85 
 Non-religious 26.72 11.27 31.43 26.15 
 No. of obs. 1,533 2,304 1,340 2,048 
 
Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted. 
 
To assess individual differences in religiosity, I examine: (1) the frequency of prayer; (2) reli-
gious service attendance; and (3) the subjective importance of religion. These measures corre-
spond to religious practices and religious identity and thus capture two of the most important 
and most widely studied dimensions of religiosity (Voas 2007).4 I contrast those who pray daily 
with those who pray less frequently, and I compare youth who pay weekly visits to the church 
or mosque to those who attend less often. Regarding the subjective importance of religion 
                                                 
4  Note that this chapter does not address religious beliefs. While considered a core element of religiosity in addition 
to religious practices and identity (Voas 2007), religious beliefs are more difficult to study in comparative re-
search that includes multiple religious groups, as the content of the beliefs that are important to believers will 
differ across affiliations. 
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(‘religious identity’), I use the answer to the question ‘How important is religion to you?’ and 
contrast those who answered ‘fairly important’ and ‘very important’ to those who answered 
‘not very important’ or ‘not important at all’. Results are shown in Table 2.2. 
I observe that, regardless of religious affiliation, daily prayer (a) is significantly less prevalent 
among majority adolescents compared to minority youth. The percentage of majority youth 
who prays daily is 10 and 8 in the Netherlands and Germany, respectively, 4 percent in England 
and 1.4 percent in Sweden. The share of minority youth praying daily is lowest in Sweden 
again, with 11 percent, and largest in the Netherlands, with 26 percent. The frequency of prayer 
of minority youth differs substantially across affiliations. Specifically, with rates of daily prayer 
between 22 percent (in Sweden) and 54.5 percent (in England), Muslim minorities take the lead 
in praying in all countries except the Netherlands, where the 41 percent of Christian minorities 
who report they pray daily surpass the 36 percent of Muslims who state the same. 
Similar to daily prayers, weekly visits to religious meeting places (b) are found to be more 
widespread among minority than majority youth. The share of majority youth who attend ser-
vices weekly is below 8 percent in all countries, falling down to as low as 3 percent in the 
Netherlands. However, among minority youth over 10 percent attend religious services weekly 
in all countries, and this share reaches 26 percent in England. This country has the largest share 
of highly religious minority youth in terms of attendance: 32 percent of Christians and 44 per-
cent of Muslims in England visit religious meeting places once a week or more. In Germany 
and the Netherlands, the respective percentages are much lower, but in both countries Muslims 
more often attend religious services than Christian minority youth. The opposite is true in Swe-
den, however, where Muslims have the lowest rates of weekly attendance at 12 percent, which 
is only slightly higher than the 9 percent among affiliated majority youth and even lower than 
the 17 percent among Christian minority youth. 
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Table 2.2: Religiosity of majority and minority students by country of survey according to dif-
ferent indicators 
 
a) Daily prayer (%) 
  Survey country 
  England Germany Netherlands Sweden 
      
Majority Religious 8.72 8.64 20.39 2.29 
 Non-religious 0.17 2.95 2.04 0.11 
 All 3.97 7.57 9.72 1.40 
 No. of obs. 2,413 2,535 2,954 2,607 
      
Minority Muslim 54.46 29.86 35.66 22.28 
 Christian 23.25 12.62 40.55 9.61 
 Other religion 22.38 14.14 30.44 8.01 
 Non-religious 0.49 0.57 0.06 0.87 
 All 24.30 16.53 25.77 10.70 
 No. of obs. 1,481 2,234 1,326 1,924 
      
b) Weekly service attendance (%) 
  Survey country 
  England Germany Netherlands Sweden 
      
Majority Religious 14.44 6.47 6.97 8.82 
 Non-religious 1.67 1.31 0.09 2.67 
 All 7.33 5.50 2.99 6.32 
 No. of obs. 2,408 2,542 2,954 2,605 
      
Minority Muslim 43.63 31.54 22.06 12.16 
 Christian 31.89 13.19 17.90 16.62 
 Other religion 27.97 10.25 8.42 13.71 
 Non-religious 3.20 1.30 0.03 0.98 
 All 26.44 17.38 12.76 11.12 
 No. of obs. 1,479 2,240 1,331 1,927 
      
c) Religious salience (‘very important’ and ‘fairly important’) (%) 
  Survey country 
  England Germany Netherlands Sweden 
      
Majority Religious 47.31 32.84 31.24 20.96 
 Non-religious 5.50 6.06 5.34 2.63 
 All 24.17 27.82 16.28 13.57 
 No. of obs. 2,400 2,539 2,932 2,593 
      
Minority Muslim 93.42 91.61 94.15 85.66 
 Christian 69.08 49.50 67.80 48.65 
 Other religion 73.92 67.92 54.88 63.63 
 Non-religious 9.58 3.39 8.77 7.05 
 All 59.72 58.27 55.63 48.67 
 No. of obs. 1,487 2,251 1,321 1,926 
 
Note: Design-weighted values. Numbers of observations are displayed unweighted. 
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The two indicators of religious practices that I study – prayer and service attendance – thus 
show important differences between majority and minority youth, between countries and reli-
gious affiliations. Likewise, I observe these differences when asking youth about their religious 
identity: for majority members, the subjective importance of religion is much lower than for 
minority members. In Germany, 28 percent of the majority youth state that religion is (very) 
important to them; in England this is 24 percent. The corresponding percentages are lower in 
the Netherlands (16 percent) and Sweden (14 percent). When it comes to minority members, at 
least 49 percent (Sweden) and up to 60 percent (England) of youth indicate high levels of reli-
gious salience. Regarding differences along the lines of religious affiliation, I observe that large 
proportions of Christian minority youth score highly on religious salience and these shares are 
consistently higher than majority youth in the same country. Nonetheless, Muslims stand out 
most clearly on this indicator as religion is indisputably most salient among Muslims in all 
countries. Over 90 percent of Muslim adolescents in England, Germany and the Netherlands 
describe their religion as (very) important, and the corresponding percentage is only marginally 
lower in Sweden at 86 percent. 
In summary, common patterns in all four countries can be observed: minority youth more often 
identify themselves as being affiliated to a religion than majority youth; minorities pray more 
often, they more often attend religious service meetings and religion is more important to them 
than it is for majority youth. 
In terms of country differences, the patterns are less straightforward. Muslims are least religious 
in Sweden and most religious in England, with Germany and the Netherlands in-between. In 
terms of weekly service attendance and subjective importance of religion, majority youth and 
Christian minority youth are most active in England and least active in Sweden. When it comes 
to daily prayers, on the other hand, majority and Christian minority youth are most religious in 
the Netherlands. Considering that the share of the affiliated youth, both among the minority and 
the majority, is the smallest in England and the Netherlands in the data, those who are affiliated 
in those countries are also the most devoted in terms of religious practices. In contrast, in Swe-
den and more so in Germany, the higher rates of religious affiliation do not translate into active 
religious practice among the affiliated. In both countries, even though over 50 percent of youth 
state that they are affiliated with a religion, in practice only a small minority are engaged with 
religious rituals. These country differences echo the findings from the general population based 
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on the European Social Survey, which gives me confidence that the patterns I identified are not 
idiosyncratic to the CILS4EU data. 
So far, I have not taken into account the ethnic background of minority youth, which also could 
be correlated with religion. To have a better understanding of these explanatory factors for the 
religiosity of youth across countries, I also conducted multivariate analyses using the full scale 
of religious salience as dependent variable. Country-specific findings are presented in the Ap-
pendix (Tables 2.A1-2.A4). These analyses show that the extent to which youth report religion 
to be important in their lives differs mainly across religious affiliations, with Muslims scoring 
highest in all four countries. 
In Germany, ethnic group differences in religious salience disappear when religious affiliation 
is taken into account. In England, only Caribbeans and sub-Saharan Africans show significant 
differences in the full multivariate model. In the Netherlands and Sweden, however, more dif-
ferences between youth from different origin countries persist even after religious affiliation is 
taken into account. Strikingly, the origin groups that still show significant differences are all 
from Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey, Kosovo, Iraq and the Middle East region. This 
suggests that on top of generally heightened levels of religious salience among Muslim youth 
compared to non-Muslim youth, youngsters from these countries report religion to be even 
more important in their lives. 
 
3.2 Religion across Immigrant Generations 
In this section, I compare the religiosity of majority and minority youth across generations. I 
focus my investigation on religious salience only. The CILS4EU data allow me to compare the 
religiosity of youth to that of their parents in terms of religious salience,5 but not to other indi-
cators of religiosity. I first relate religious salience of youth to migrant generation, distinguish-
ing between youth without a (strong) migration background and minority youth who are first 
generation (foreign born), second generation, children of transnational marriages and children 
of mixed marriages in Figure 2.1 (see Kalter and Heath (2018) for the logic behind this 
                                                 
5 One parent of each participant in CILS4EU was requested to also complete a written questionnaire, and this 
included the same question on religious salience that was answered by the child. 
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generational classification). In the next step, I move from migrant generations to generational 
change within one family and compare parent-child dyads in their levels of religious salience. 
 
Comparisons across Generational Status 
We have already seen that majority youth have lower levels of religious salience than minority 
youth. Figure 2.1 further splits up this finding among the minorities and shows that religious 
salience is highest among second-generation immigrant youth. Remarkably, foreign-born youth 
are consistently less religious in terms of salience in all four countries than the pure second 
generation. This comparison across migrant generations therefore points in the direction of in-
tergenerational increase, rather than decrease, in religiosity. However, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions on intergenerational change based on the comparison in Figure 2.1, as foreign-born 
youth might have arrived in the host country at a very young age and thus be largely similar to 
the ‘second generation’ in terms of exposure to the secularized contexts of reception. Moreover, 
these findings may also mirror changes in the composition of religious groups between different 
immigrant generations. For example, religious groups with higher religiosity such as Muslims 
may be less prevalent among recent migrants compared to the more established second gener-
ation. 
Thus, I further test the effect of migrant generation on religious salience by controlling for 
religious affiliation; my findings from these multivariate analyses (see Tables 2.A1 to 2.A4 in 
the Appendix) show that when I compare the foreign born to the second generation, I do not 
find any significant differences in religious salience. When comparing to the majority youth, I 
find that in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, even after controlling for affiliation (as well 
as ethnicity and gender), both foreign-born and second-generation youth are more religious than 
youth with no strong migration background. In terms of secularizing forces, one would expect 
that children of intermarried couples (e.g. Turkish-German) are less religious compared to chil-
dren who have two minority parents (e.g. Turkish-Turkish), and indeed this is what my findings 
suggest. 
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Figure 2.1: Religious salience (‘very important’ and ‘fairly important’) by survey country and 
generational status 
 
 
Note: Design-weighted. N=17,512 
 
Comparisons across Parent-Child Dyads 
To get a better understanding of intergenerational change in religiosity, I examine how the sub-
jective importance of religion of youth relates to the importance that their parents attach to 
religion in their lives, as reported in parental questionnaires. Table 2.3 shows that while there 
is substantial intergenerational stability in terms of subjective religious importance, there are 
also considerable rates of change. Where change occurs, a decrease in religious salience from 
parents to children is more common. Yet there are also substantial shares of youth who report 
a higher importance of religion in their lives than their parents do. 
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Table 2.3: Intergenerational change in religious salience between parents and children, by 
religious affiliation (%) 
  Intergenerational change in religious salience 
  Decrease Stability Increase Correlation 
      
England Majority     
  Religious* 50.09 38.17 11.74 0.37 
  Non-religious 22.71 50.27 27.02 -0.03 
  All 42.48 41.53 15.98 0.39 
  No of obs. 452 437 175  
       
 Minority     
  Muslim 14.06 80.87 5.07 0.56 
  Christian 48.08 41.81 10.10 0.60 
  Other religion 49.47 41.15 9.38 -0.17 
  Non-religious 33.87 36.90 29.23 -0.10 
  All 40.47 46.77 12.49 0.62 
  No of obs. 140 237 64  
       
Germany Majority     
  Religious 43.55 41.03 15.42 0.31 
  Non-religious 24.93 51.93 23.14 0.12 
  All 39.74 43.26 17.00 0.38 
  No of obs. 784 912 370  
       
 Minority     
  Muslim 22.74 59.61 17.65 0.34 
  Christian 50.16 38.17 11.67 0.42 
  Other religion 56.49 35.08 8.44 0.45 
  Non-religious 25.08 44.82 30.10 -0.00 
  All 38.85 45.50 15.65 0.51 
  No of obs. 534 820 308  
       
Nether-
lands 
Majority     
 Religious* 52.30 38.23 9.47 0.30 
  Non-religious 34.09 46.00 19.91 0.03 
  All 46.27 40.80 12.92 0.33 
  No of obs. 1,087 1,049 301  
       
 Minority     
  Muslim 27.09 55.93 16.98 0.13 
  Christian 42.36 45.88 11.76 0.57 
  Other religion 41.39 48.43 10.18 0.29 
  Non-religious 34.49 35.95 29.56 0.11 
  All 38.02 45.16 16.82 0.59 
  No of obs. 261 328 120  
 
Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted. 
* Religious affiliation stated by parents. 
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Table 2.3 (continued): Intergenerational change in religious salience between parents and chil-
dren, by religious affiliation (%) 
  Intergenerational change in religious salience 
  Decrease Stability Increase Correlation 
       
Sweden Majority     
  Religious 42.60 42.89 14.52 0.37 
  Non-religious 18.68 57.87 23.45 0.18 
  All 34.84 47.75 17.41 0.36 
  No of obs. 583 840 351  
       
 Minority     
  Muslim 22.29 54.42 23.28 0.50 
  Christian 40.37 40.20 19.43 0.49 
  Other religion 44.34 30.05 25.61 0.05 
  Non-religious 16.23 46.41 37.36 0.05 
  All 30.77 44.35 24.89 0.52 
  No of obs. 256 436 254  
 
Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted. 
* Religious affiliation stated by parents. 
 
When I further unpack this general trend, I observe that over 50 percent of majority youth have 
deviated from their parents’ level of subjective religious importance and this deviation is largely 
in the direction of lower subjective religious importance. At least 35 percent of majority youth 
in the four countries indicated less subjective importance than their parents, and only around 
15 percent more, the remainder showing intergenerational stability. Among Christian minority 
youth, I observe that 40 percent or more have lower levels of religiosity than their parents. 
The rate of intergenerational decline in subjective religiosity is much smaller among Muslim 
youth. Around 17 percent of Muslim youth in the Netherlands, 18 percent in Germany and 23 
percent in Sweden indicate that religion is more important to them than to their parents. In 
England, the corresponding share is lower at 5 percent, but at the same time the proportion of 
Muslim youth who report less religious salience than their parents is only 14 percent while 
approximately 80 percent state the same level of religiosity as their parents. This high level of 
stability notwithstanding, the trend goes in the direction of decrease rather than increase in 
England, just as in Germany and the Netherlands. Only in Sweden is the share of Muslims who 
have lower levels of subjective religiosity compared to their parents roughly the same as the 
share of Muslim youth who show intergenerational increase in religious salience. 
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Although Table 2.3 makes it clear that there is no perfect association between parental religious 
salience and the religious salience of their children, the considerable stability suggests that the 
association between the two is positive. Indeed, bivariate correlations are in the range of r = 0.4 
to r = 0.5, which implies moderately strong associations (results not shown). When parental 
religious salience is entered in the multivariate analysis of youth’s religious salience, I find, in 
line with previous research on the importance of religious socialization (e.g. Myers 1996), that 
this is a positive predictor in all countries (see Models 3 in Tables 2.A1 to 2.A4 in the Appen-
dix). The association is among the few to survive in the multivariate regressions even after 
controls for origin group, generation, gender, affiliation and parental SES are taken into ac-
count. In fact, parental religious salience is the only predictor on top of religious affiliation that 
is highly significant in all countries regardless of model specifications. This attests to the central 
role of parental religiosity in shaping the religiosity of youth in Europe.6 
 
3.3 Gender and Religion 
This section examines gender differences in religious affiliation and religious practice. While I 
do not expect any differences in religious affiliation, the participation in religious practices is 
likely to differ between girls and boys. Among adult and mainly Christian populations, women 
have repeatedly been found to be more religiously active than men (e.g. Thompson 1991, Wal-
ter & Davie 1998). This finding stands in contrast with Muslim communities where service 
attendance is substantially lower among women than among men (Meuleman & Billiet 2011), 
although some studies suggest that this gender gap in religious participation of Muslims may 
diminish in the context of migration (Predelli 2008). 
Looking at the CILS4EU data, I observe that having no religious affiliation is more predomi-
nant among boys than girls (results not shown). This is true for both majority and minority 
youth and in all four survey countries, except for minorities in Germany where a gender gap in 
affiliation is absent. Moreover, in all four countries the percentage of majority girls praying 
daily is slightly higher than that of boys. A similar gender gap in praying is observed among 
                                                 
6 However, note that due to a lower response in parental over youth questionnaires, the number of valid cases in 
the multivariate models drops substantially in all countries once we enter parental characteristics (see Tables 
2.A1-2.A4 for information about the N in each model). Comparisons between models with and without parental 
characteristics must therefore be conducted with great care as they are based on different samples. 
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Christian minority youth. However, for Muslims the difference is in the opposite direction as 
the percentage of Muslim girls praying daily is somewhat lower than the percentage of Muslim 
boys. Except for England where almost an equal proportion of majority girls and boys indicated 
high levels religious salience, religion is distinctly more salient among girls than boys in all 
countries, and most specifically in Germany. This is also the case for Christian minority girls 
and boys in England, Germany and Sweden, whereas the opposite holds true in the Netherlands. 
This gender difference in religious salience also remains significant in the three countries in 
multivariate analyses (see Tables 2.A1 to 2.A4 in the Appendix). 
Figure 2.2: Weekly service attendance by survey country, majority/minority and gender 
 
 
Note: Design-weighted. N=17,475 
 
It is with regard to service attendance that most outspoken gender differences are expected, 
particularly among Muslims, based on previous research among adults. Among the majority 
youth and Christian minorities, I observe barely any gender gaps in service attendance (see 
Figure 2.2). For Muslim minority youth, however, the difference is quite sharp and consistent 
across all countries. The share of girls visiting religious meeting places weekly or more is evi-
dently smaller than the share of Muslim boys. Interestingly, although the overall percentage of 
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Muslim minority youth visiting religious meeting places weekly is higher than the correspond-
ing share among Christian minority youth, the proportion of Muslim girls paying weekly visits 
is lower than among Christian minority girls in England, the Netherlands and Sweden and also 
than majority religious girls in Sweden. The frequency of religious practices of Muslim girls is 
more similar to Christian minorities and even religious majority youth in the four countries. 
Therefore, the higher levels of religious practices that I found among Muslim youth are ac-
counted for, by a substantial amount, by the elevated religiosity of Muslim boys. Overall, how-
ever, gender gaps in religiosity are minor compared to the differences I observed in Section 3.1 
between majority and minority youth and between different affiliations. 
 
3.4 Religion and Education 
In the final empirical section of this chapter, I relate the religious salience of majority and mi-
nority youth to their level of education. Education is among the most widely studied predictors 
of individual religiosity and a prominent explanation for long-term trends of secularization. The 
declining rates of church membership and church attendance have been linked to processes of 
modernization and educational expansion (e.g. Wilson 1982). One variant of secularization the-
ory in the sociology of religion focuses on the notion of scientific worldview (Berger 1967a). 
This notion holds that scientific explanations of natural phenomena increasingly render reli-
gious accounts for existential questions less important, and therefore the higher educated – who 
are more knowledgeable about scientific phenomena and more used to applying the scientific 
method of doubting and searching for empirical evidence – are likely to be less religious. 
Throughout the comparative volume “Growing up in Diverse Societies” (Kalter et al. 2018) we 
study adolescents whose eventual educational attainment is not yet known. Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to assess the relation between education and religiosity in the data. However, the tracked 
educational systems in Germany and the Netherlands provide an opportunity to study this as-
sociation, assuming that youth attending more academically oriented educational tracks will 
have more of a scientific worldview than those attending more vocationally oriented tracks.7 
Table 2.4 therefore shows the share of majority and minority youth, by religious affiliation, 
                                                 
7 I also examined self-reported school performance, which is available for youth in all countries. However, unlike 
the distribution across tracks, self-reported performance does not differ between majority and minority students 
and therefore cannot illuminate the majority-minority gap in religiosity that I find. 
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who report high levels of religious salience as a function of the educational track they are cur-
rently attending. In Germany, I differentiate between lower secondary tracks (‘Hauptschule’; 
note that this category also includes special needs education), intermediary tracks (‘Re-
alschule’), upper secondary tracks (‘Gymnasium’) and comprehensive schools (this category 
includes schools offering multiple tracks and Rudolf Steiner schools). In the Netherlands, I 
differentiate between more applied and more theoretical tracks at the lower secondary level 
(vmbo-b/k v. vmbo-g/t, respectively), the intermediate (havo) and upper secondary level (vwo, 
including international schools). 
Table 2.4: Religious salience (‘very important’ and ‘fairly important’) by majority/minority 
and educational tracks 
Survey 
country 
  Educational tracks 
  Lower 
secondary 
Interme- 
diary 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Comprehen-
sive 
       
Germany Majority Religious 28.28 30.33 40.97 25.49 
  Non-religious 3.76 13.90 8.85 3.88 
  All 24.95 29.31 36.44 16.50 
    No. of obs. 597 750 625 567 
       
 Minority Muslim 91.59 89.02 91.81 95.51 
  Christian 53.14 46.44 47.85 52.95 
  Other religion 80.24 24.99 87.49 74.18 
  Non-religious 5.67 3.10 2.71 3.66 
    All 68.59 55.39 50.21 59.44 
    No. of obs. 916 555 351 429 
       
   vmbo-b/k vmbo-g/t havo vwo/es/ib 
       
Nether-
lands 
Majority Religious 27.80 25.59 47.24 40.91 
 Non-religious 2.36 5.76 6.23 7.34 
  All 13.35 15.50 20.38 17.70 
    No. of obs. 642 1,059 628 603 
       
 Minority Muslim 94.80 91.25 96.50 96.69 
  Christian 77.28 65.33 85.23 51.89 
  Other religion 86.44 24.20 78.23 87.79 
  Non-religious 9.31 6.80 7.82 10.88 
    All 65.66 54.65 59.11 43.96 
    No. of obs. 494 394 240 193 
 
Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted. 
 
The findings show an interesting contrast between majority and minority students in Germany. 
Among German majority youth I observe that religious salience is highest among students in 
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the upper secondary track and lowest at the lower secondary level. Among minority youth in 
Germany, however, the opposite trend is visible: the share of students with high religious sali-
ence is highest at the lower secondary level and decreases systematically in the intermediate 
and upper secondary tracks. However, this pattern does not hold for Muslim youth, as the share 
of Muslim youth with high religious salience is more or less the same in each school track. 
In the Netherlands, majority youth show a pattern of higher religious salience in higher tracks, 
namely intermediary and upper secondary tracks. With respect to minority youth, I find that 
students in the applied tracks at the lower secondary level have higher levels of religious sali-
ence than those in the more academically oriented variants. However, there is no clear decreas-
ing trend for religious salience among minority youth across the higher tracks, as the share of 
youth with high religious salience is higher in the intermediate tracks than those in the upper 
secondary tracks. 
The pattern of increasing religiosity with higher tracks among German majority youth and de-
creasing religiosity with higher tracks among Christian minorities in Germany already suggests 
that there is no straightforward, universal link between higher education and lower religiosity 
among youth. The results from multivariate analyses (not shown) provide further support for 
this interpretation. In Germany, educational track is no longer significant when origin country, 
generation, gender, affiliation and parental characteristics, that is, religiosity and socioeco-
nomic background, are included. In the Netherlands, I find the same pattern observed among 
majority youth in Table 2.4, as religious salience is significantly higher in higher tracks in the 
multivariate models. This suggests that the patterns I observe among the largest share of youth 
in Table 2.4 are robust and not due to composition effects shaped by the selectivity of different 
school types in terms of the ethnicity, generational status and parental religiosity of the students 
they attract. 
 
4   Conclusion 
Because religion has moved to the center of scholarly and societal debates about the integration 
of immigrants and their children, this chapter examined religion among majority and minority 
youth growing up in Europe today. The answer to our first research question – how many youths 
are affiliated to a religion, and if so, which one? – is that minority youth on average are more 
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often affiliated than majority youth, in line with previous findings among adult samples (van 
Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). Contrary to what the emphasis on Islam in European debates 
about immigrant religion would suggest (Alba 2005, Foner & Alba 2008), however, Christian-
ity is a more common religious affiliation among minority youth, and only between a fourth 
and a third of the minority youth in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden self-iden-
tify as Muslims. However, Muslim youth were revealed to be the most religious on all accounts 
and therefore clearly stand out from youth with other affiliations. They were found to engage 
in daily prayer and attend weekly religious services much more frequently than Christian mi-
nority youth, who in turn practice more than religious majority youth. These high levels of 
religious practice among Muslims were particularly strong among boys, with Muslim girls 
showing lower levels of involvement in religious practices in terms of mosque visits. This sug-
gests that the gender difference in religious practice that is typical in Muslim communities is 
not reversing among youth growing up in Europe, but rather that religiosity is most persistent 
among male members of the Muslim community, in line with earlier research (Diehl & Koenig 
2009). 
My findings about systematic differences in the levels of religious practice across religious 
groups, and among Muslims between boys and girls, need to be appreciated in the light of 
overall low levels of religiosity among the adolescents that I studied. The majority of youth do 
not engage in daily prayer or attend weekly services. Yet this does not mean that religion has 
ceased to be important in their lives. Considerable shares of youth, also in the majority popula-
tion, reported that religion is fairly or very important for them. Furthermore, with regard to 
religious salience, Muslim youth were found to stand out as an overwhelming majority in all 
four countries indicating high or very high levels of importance of religion. This finding is in 
line with earlier research among adult Muslim minorities who have repeatedly scored extremely 
highly on measures of religious identification, including the importance of religion to the self 
(Verkuyten 2007). 
Combining this finding of very high levels of religious importance, particularly among Muslim 
youth, with the moderate levels of religious participation that I observed, this overview of the 
religiosity of youth in Europe suggests that at this life stage for many youth attachment to reli-
gion is quite symbolic and does not translate into strict observance of religious rituals. It might 
be that some youth intend to and eventually will practice more when they become older, but it 
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is equally conceivable that the subjective importance of religion – as the identity component of 
religiosity – is the longest-lasting element where underlying religious practices point in the 
direction of religious decline and differences between religious groups have become merely 
symbolic (Gans 1994). With the notable exception of Muslim minorities, the religion of youth 
in Europe can best be described as a form of ‘fuzzy fidelity’ (Voas 2009), where religion con-
tinues to have meaning as an identity marker without strong implications for individual behav-
ior. Sociologists of religion have linked both symbolic religion and fuzzy fidelity to further 
religious decline, and the expectation would therefore be that, particularly among majority and 
Christian minority youth, the rates of religious practice and ultimately also religious identifica-
tion would further diminish in the future. 
This expectation of religious decline is further supported by my comparison of the religious 
salience of youth with that of their parents. In all groups, including Muslim minorities, and 
most countries, the changes were in the direction of religious decline rather than increase, 
though I also found quite a lot of stability (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 
2013). However, we should be careful of drawing strong conclusions about a clear trend to-
wards secularization based on these findings. For one, the comparison of parent-child dyads 
and the age of the youth samples under study imply that we are comparing individuals at very 
different stages of their life cycle. It is possible that religiosity increases over the life course, 
particularly at crucial events such as marriage and childbirth (Stolzenberg et al. 1995). Thus, 
the youth who now report lower levels of religiosity than their parents may step up their reli-
gious practice as well as salience by the time they reach the age their parents were when com-
pleting the questionnaire. On the other hand, however, one study on adolescent and adult Mus-
lim minorities, aged 15 to 45 in the Netherlands, suggested a decline of religious practices with 
increasing age (van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), which is in line with other research on the 
increasing risk of losing faith later in life among Christians in the Netherlands (Need & de 
Graaf 1996). At the same time, my intergenerational comparison also revealed that a share of 
youth – both among the majority and the minority – are more devoted to religion than their 
parents (Maliepaard & Alba 2015). Among Muslims in Sweden this share was actually just as 
large as the share that showed intergenerational decline. This is particularly interesting in light 
of the finding that, on all other accounts, Muslims in Sweden are the least religious compared 
to Muslims in the other three survey countries. Together, these findings suggest that despite 
overall low levels of religious practice and a pattern of intergenerational decline rather than 
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increase among majority and minority youth, Christians and Muslims, religion still has signif-
icance in the daily lives of youth growing up in Europe today. To what extent religion also 
matters for other outcomes of youth, such as their family values, interethnic ties and attitudes, 
is addressed in other chapters in the comparative volume “Growing up in Diverse Societies” 
(Kalter et al. 2018). 
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Appendix 
Table 2.A1: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, England 
 M1 M2 M3 
       
Origin groups (Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)      
Eastern Europe 0.149  0.075  0.339  
 (0.243)  (0.192)  (0.337)  
Caribbean 0.444 *** 0.476 *** 0.563 ** 
 (0.159)  (0.145)  (0.225)  
Middle East & North Africa -0.053  -0.305  -0.290  
 (0.208)  (0.187)  (0.246)  
Pakistan 1.319 *** 0.447 *** 0.170  
 (0.147)  (0.148)  (0.167)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.888 *** 0.636 *** 0.620 ** 
 (0.175)  (0.155)  (0.238)  
Asia -0.213  -0.027  -0.167  
 (0.174)  (0.129)  (0.201)  
India 0.656 *** 0.307 * 0.084  
 (0.211)  (0.174)  (0.196)  
Other -0.016  0.113  0.330 * 
 (0.235)  (0.169)  (0.200)  
Generational status (Ref.: Majority)       
Born abroad 0.416 * 0.090  -0.041  
 (0.179)  (0.141)  (0.187)  
2nd generation 0.826 *** 0.229  0.082  
 (0.148)  (0.139)  (0.148)  
Child of transnational marriage 0.480 ** 0.066  0.214  
 (0.174)  (0.165)  (0.146)  
Child of intermarriage 0.063  -0.068  -0.121  
 (0.127)  (0.121)  (0.155)  
Gender (Ref.: Male)       
Female 0.158 ** 0.049  -0.005  
 (0.047)  (0.039)  (0.059)  
Religious affiliation (Ref.: non-religious)       
Muslim   1.864 *** 1.616 *** 
   (0.091)  (0.190)  
Christian   1.068 *** 0.826 *** 
   (0.046)  (0.077)  
Other religion     1.394 *** 1.121 *** 
   (0.102)  (0.290)  
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10     0.028 * 
     (0.014)  
Parental religious salience     0.221 *** 
     (0.045)  
% non-religious peers in school/10     -0.017  
     (0.020)  
Intercept 0.826 *** 0.394 *** 0.171  
 (0.041)  (0.029)  (0.148)  
No. of obs. 3,879  3,879  1,467  
R2 0.207  0.477  0.430  
Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important) 
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Table 2.A2: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, Germany 
 M1 M2 M3 
       
Origin groups (Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)      
Italy 0.246  0.210  0.019  
 (0.146)  (0.143)  (0.127)  
Eastern Europe -0.092  -0.126  -0.251  
 (0.205)  (0.196)  (0.220)  
Poland -0.033  -0.031  -0.078  
 (0.125)  (0.123)  (0.139)  
Russia -0.223  -0.197  -0.109  
 (0.147)  (0.146)  (0.135)  
Serbia 0.500 ** 0.027  -0.121  
 (0.178)  (0.184)  (0.219)  
Middle East & North Africa 0.420 * 0.132  -0.012  
 (0.183)  (0.187)  (0.176)  
Turkey 0.834 *** 0.294 * 0.003  
 (0.122)  (0.148)  (0.148)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.473 ** 0.313 * 0.240  
 (0.158)  (0.143)  (0.156)  
Asia -0.230  -0.164  -0.081  
 (0.209)  (0.208)  (0.242)  
Other -0.064  -0.101  0.000  
 (0.180)  (0.175)  (0.186)  
Generational status (Ref.: Majority)       
Born abroad 0.404 ** 0.349 ** 0.173  
 (0.134)  (0.119)  (0.126)  
2nd generation 0.581 *** 0.383 *** 0.217  
 (0.114)  (0.107)  (0.121)  
Child of transnational marriage 0.220  0.070  0.141  
 (0.133)  (0.122)  (0.120)  
Child of intermarriage 0.051  0.061  0.007  
 (0.116)  (0.112)  (0.114)  
Gender (Ref.: Male)       
Female 0.241 *** 0.207 *** 0.185 *** 
 (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.041)  
Religious affiliation (Ref.: non-religious)       
Muslim   1.582 *** 1.431 *** 
   (0.109)  (0.114)  
Christian   0.839 *** 0.595 *** 
   (0.055)  (0.076)  
Other religion   1.219 *** 1.084 *** 
   (0.164)  (0.224)  
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10     0.012  
     (0.009)  
Parental religious salience     0.289 *** 
     (0.025)  
% non-religious peers in school/10     0.011  
     (0.011)  
Intercept 0.957 *** 0.288 *** 0.023  
 (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.093)  
No. of obs. 4,790  4,790  3,628  
R2 0.188  0.324  0.358  
Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important) 
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Table 2.A3: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, the Netherlands 
 M1 M2 M3 
       
Origin groups (Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)      
Eastern Europe 0.245  0.067  0.175  
 (0.256)  (0.230)  (0.203)  
Caribbean 0.263  0.148  -0.062  
 (0.221)  (0.207)  (0.219)  
Suriname 0.234  0.009  -0.038  
 (0.159)  (0.175)  (0.231)  
Middle East & North Africa 1.008 *** 0.736 *** 0.865 *** 
 (0.159)  (0.208)  (0.208)  
Morocco 1.067 *** 0.756 *** 0.502  
 (0.146)  (0.207)  (0.256)  
Turkey 1.078 *** 0.741 *** 0.646 ** 
 (0.119)  (0.190)  (0.204)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.892 *** 0.717 *** 0.555 ** 
 (0.182)  (0.161)  (0.204)  
Asia 0.132  0.161  0.166  
 (0.177)  (0.155)  (0.178)  
Other 0.104  -0.080  -0.040  
 (0.257)  (0.219)  (0.247)  
Generational status (Ref.: Majority)       
Born abroad 0.673 *** 0.545 *** 0.319 * 
 (0.133)  (0.126)  (0.130)  
2nd generation 0.757 *** 0.659 *** 0.597 ** 
 (0.127)  (0.139)  (0.207)  
Child of transnational marriage -0.007  0.082  0.120  
 (0.163)  (0.164)  (0.159)  
Child of intermarriage 0.013  0.074  0.059  
 (0.097)  (0.094)  (0.091)  
Gender (Ref.: Male)       
Female 0.186 ** 0.146 * 0.125 * 
 (0.068)  (0.058)  (0.062)  
Religious affiliation (Ref.: non-religious)       
Muslim   0.713 *** 0.651 *** 
   (0.177)  (0.188)  
Christian   0.652 *** 0.581 *** 
   (0.064)  (0.060)  
Other religion   0.660 ** 0.534 * 
   (0.211)  (0.255)  
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10     0.016  
     (0.014)  
Parental religious salience     0.195 *** 
     (0.035)  
% non-religious peers in school/10     0.016  
     (0.010)  
Intercept 0.742 *** 0.485 *** 0.105  
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.118)  
No. of obs. 4,250  4,250  3,099  
R2 0.265  0.4397  0.374  
Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important) 
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Table 2.A4: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, Sweden 
 M1 M2 M3 
       
Origin groups (Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)      
Finland -0.009  -0.013  -0.148  
 (0.141)  (0.133)  (0.148)  
Eastern Europe 0.268 * 0.186  0.191  
 (0.132)  (0.112)  (0.140)  
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.711 *** 0.310 * 0.340  
 (0.165)  (0.134)  (0.183)  
Kosovo 0.967 *** 0.428 *** 0.429 * 
 (0.138)  (0.124)  (0.196)  
Middle East & North Africa 0.906 *** 0.572 *** 0.409 ** 
 (0.137)  (0.118)  (0.153)  
Iraq 1.110 *** 0.710 *** 0.485 ** 
 (0.141)  (0.124)  (0.160)  
Turkey 1.214 *** 0.830 *** 0.690 *** 
 (0.157)  (0.162)  (0.189)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.890 *** 0.649 *** 0.596 ** 
 (0.163)  (0.141)  (0.204)  
Somalia 1.588 *** 1.001 *** 0.653 ** 
 (0.124)  (0.113)  (0.203)  
Asia 0.011  -0.142  -0.062  
 (0.119)  (0.102)  (0.148)  
Other 0.098  0.093  0.045  
 (0.137)  (0.121)  (0.169)  
Generational status (Ref.: Majority)       
Born abroad 0.558 *** 0.434 *** 0.286 * 
 (0.115)  (0.099)  (0.129)  
2nd generation 0.606 *** 0.464 *** 0.296 * 
 (0.126)  (0.109)  (0.131)  
Child of transnational marriage 0.456 *** 0.376 *** 0.469 *** 
 (0.121)  (0.104)  (0.132)  
Child of intermarriage 0.004  0.097  0.132  
 (0.096)  (0.086)  (0.111)  
Gender (Ref.: Male)       
Female 0.110 *** 0.067 * 0.088 ** 
 (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.033)  
Religious affiliation (Ref.: non-religious)       
Muslim   1.174 *** 0.826 *** 
   (0.082)  (0.102)  
Christian   0.704 *** 0.538 *** 
   (0.032)  (0.041)  
Other religion   1.194 *** 1.075 *** 
   (0.116)  (0.154)  
Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important) 
 
 
  
Chapter 2: 
Keeping or Losing Faith? Comparing Religion across Majority and Minority Youth in Europe 
 
 
59 
Table 2.A4 (continued): Multivariate analysis of religious salience, Sweden 
 M1 M2 M3 
       
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10     -0.015  
     (0.009)  
Parental religious salience     0.272 *** 
     (0.019)  
% non-religious peers in school/10     -0.031 ** 
     (0.012)  
Intercept 0.574 *** 0.168 *** 0.238 ** 
 (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.073)  
No. of obs. 4,519  4,519  2,670  
R2 0.274  0.411  0.412  
Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important) 
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Chapter 3: 
Intergenerational Change in Religious Salience Among Immi-
grant Families in Four European Countries 
Konstanze Jacob and Frank Kalter* 
 
(published in: International Migration (2013) 51(3): 38-56)† 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates religiosity among immigrant children in four European countries: Eng-
land, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Drawing on major strands of theories in the soci-
ology of religion and of migration, I analyze intergenerational change in religiosity within im-
migrant families of different religious affiliation and test how far common arguments can con-
tribute to explaining existing patterns. I overcome several challenges and shortcomings in this 
field by studying adolescent-parent dyads. Using strictly comparable and comprehensive data 
from the new Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries 
(CILS4EU), I find a considerable stability of religiosity or even an increase therein within Mus-
lim immigrant families, in contrast to Christian immigrant families, whose religiosity declines 
over generations. This finding is astonishingly stable across the four countries. My analyses 
furthermore suggest that interfamilial change in religiosity is only weakly related to assimila-
tion processes in other domains of life. 
 
                                                 
* Financial support is acknowledged from NORFACE research programme on Migration in Europe – Social, Eco-
nomic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics. 
† For the sake of consistency across chapters, I have rewritten the published version of this article from a first-
person perspective, harmonized citation style and American English use and reformulated several sections. 
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1   Introduction 
The role of religion in the intergenerational integration process of immigrants is a topic of major 
concern in immigration countries on both sides of the Atlantic. Whereas in the United States 
religion is perceived as a means for successful structural and social integration, in Western 
European immigration countries strong religious attachment is often assumed to be a barrier 
rather than a bridge to overall integration (Foner & Alba 2008, Hirschman 2004, but see Connor 
2011). Strong religious identities are seen as a reason for failure of immigrant children in the 
educational system and in the labor market, and as a hindrance to adequate contact with mem-
bers of the majority population as well as to cultural inclusion (Bisin et al. 2008, Diehl et al. 
2009, Foner & Alba 2008). While a large proportion of immigrants in the United States share 
their Christian background with the on average strongly religious majority population (Cadge 
& Ecklund 2007), the story is different in Western European countries, where the religious 
landscape is much more diverse, with Muslim immigrants constituting a considerable part of 
the overall population (Buijs & Rath 2002; Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Accordingly, the ques-
tions of how the religiosity of immigrant groups develops over generations and how it is related 
to other areas of life are of key interest in almost all European receiving countries (Voas & 
Fleischmann 2012). 
Theoretical arguments in the field of religion and migration research arrive at conflicting ex-
pectations about the development of religion and religiosity among immigrants and their de-
scendants in rather secular Western European countries (e.g. Bankston & Zhou 1995, Connor 
2010, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007). The 
empirical picture is also far from clear: Whereas some empirical studies basically find a de-
crease of religious involvement among immigrants (e.g. Connor 2010, Diehl & Schnell 2006, 
Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 
2011), others report a considerable stability, especially among Muslim immigrants (Diehl & 
Koenig 2009, Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Phalet & ter Wal 2004), or even an 
increase in immigrants’ religious practices (Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Smits 
et al. 2010). 
However, comparative research on religious trends among immigrants in Europe suffers from 
at least two major methodological drawbacks. First, given the various measures of religious 
affiliation and religiosity, there is no easy way to compare studies that were conducted in 
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different countries and that examined different immigrant groups and surveyed different points 
in time (see as a rare exception a recent study by Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Second, secu-
larization trends among immigrants are often analyzed via trend designs or by analyzing immi-
grants’ religiosity dependent on their length of stay in the country of destination, focusing on 
trends over time within generations. If it comes to intergenerational change, studies to date have 
mainly compared synthetic generations. In addition, only a few studies take into account a ref-
erence group, thereby neglecting to control for trends in religiosity among the majority popu-
lation. 
This article contributes to research on intergenerational change in religiosity by using data from 
the new Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU). 
On the one hand, the study provides strictly comparable measures and designs, which allows 
me to study immigrant youth and their peers by means of identical analyses across countries. 
On the other hand, the data include information given by one of the parents; thus I am able to 
assess trends of religiosity by looking at intergenerational change within adolescent-parent dy-
ads. Two research questions guide this article. The first one is descriptive: What patterns of 
intergenerational transmission in religiosity do I find among different religious groups in Eng-
land, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden? The second aim of the article is to analyze the 
potential causes behind these patterns. Referring to the rivalling theoretical approaches, I am 
especially interested in the impact of cognitive-structural and social integration. 
 
2   Theory and Past Research 
Major strands of theoretical argument from different fields of study would lead us to expect 
that the importance of religion to immigrants and their descendants is likely to decline. In the 
field of the sociology of religion this expectation could be derived from general secularization 
theory, which states that comparatively higher levels of modernization in the receiving coun-
tries will delimit the salience of religious beliefs and practices in daily life among minorities as 
well (Berger 1967b, Bruce 2002, Phalet et al. 2008, Wilson 1982).1 In the field of migration, 
                                                 
1 However, the applicability of this trend, which is mainly a generalization of the historical experience of predom-
inantly Christian societies in Northern and Western Europe, to non-Christian religions and non-European con-
texts, is at least questionable (Gorski & Altinordu 2008, Smits et al. 2010, Stark 1999). Counterexamples can for 
instance be found in on average highly religious societies such as the United States, or in non-Christian religions 
such as Islam (Phalet et al. 2008). 
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the same expectation would be in line with general assimilation theory, which predicts that over 
time and especially over generations immigrants tend to become similar to members of the host 
societies with respect to diverse aspects of behavior and attitudes (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 
1964, Park 1950). This implies an adaptation to the secularization trend of Western European 
societies when immigrants are exposed to alternative and non-religious values and worldviews 
(Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güngör et al. 2011, van Tubergen 2007). Accordingly, some empirical 
studies find a decline in religiosity in the second generation and with an increasing length of 
stay (Bisin et al. 2008, Connor 2010, Eilers et al. 2008, Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 
2010, Phalet & ter Wal 2004, Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007), as well as over time (Diehl 
& Schnell 2006, Phalet et al. 2008). Implicitly assumed is that mere exposure to the host society 
and increasing contact with members of the native population enhance familiarity with the 
mainstream culture, eventually leading to assimilation in different life domains. A decrease in 
religiosity would therefore be more likely, the more immigrants participate in central institu-
tions of the host society, the more frequent their social contact to the native population and the 
greater their fluency in the destination language, since cognitive-structural and social assimila-
tion can be seen as accelerators of religious assimilation (Maliepaard et al. 2010). 
However, secularization trends among immigrants and their descendants are not always sup-
ported empirically. Some studies detect a remarkable stability of religiosity, especially among 
Muslim immigrants (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Phalet 
& ter Wal 2004). As a flipside of assimilation theory, this could be explained by the fact that if 
parents are weakly assimilated in cognitive-structural and social terms, they put stronger efforts 
into the intergenerational maintenance of culture. But there are also competing theoretical per-
spectives, like the theory of segmented assimilation, which stresses that immigrants might in-
tegrate very well into other domains of life, such as the educational system or the labor market, 
while not assimilating culturally but instead maintaining their cultural heritage (Bankston & 
Zhou 1995, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes & Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997).2 Consequently, cogni-
tive-structural and social assimilation would not necessarily be positively related to a decline 
in religiosity among immigrants. 
                                                 
2 Similar predictions follow from other theoretical approaches, mainly from cultural capital theory (Bourdieu 1977, 
Sullivan 2001) and value transmission research (Idema & Phalet 2007, Nauck 1989, 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 
2001). 
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An even stronger expectation has been formulated: a religious revival. In the sociology of reli-
gion it has been argued that also modern societies provide some crucial structural conditions 
that foster religious revival and reactivity (Connor 2009, Stark 1999, Stark & Finke 2000) by 
encouraging competition among religious organizations, which in turn raises religious identifi-
cation and participation by offering more attractive and diverse religious products (Smits et al. 
2010). One empirical study shows such an increase in Muslims’ religious participation relative 
to their length of stay in Belgium (Smits et al. 2010; see also Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard 
et al. 2012). In migration research, reactive ethnicity is assumed to occur when immigrants feel 
less welcome in host societies, experience discrimination and social exclusion and in turn, as a 
means of compensation, strengthen their ethnic and religious identities (Connor 2010, Diehl & 
Schnell 2006, Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Consequently, one would expect an intergenerational 
increase in religiosity to occur due to missing cognitive-structural and social assimilation. 
In sum, we find arguments for an intergenerational decrease in religiosity, as well as for stability 
or an increase. How assimilation in other areas of life might influence the outcomes is also 
theoretically debatable. Empirical evidence is likewise ambiguous, suggesting that results 
might depend on receiving countries and groups. However, research to date has suffered from 
at least two major methodological shortcomings: First, when looking at intergenerational 
change, most studies have compared synthetic immigrant generations, and thus are not able to 
account for different compositions of immigrants in different generations in terms of unob-
served characteristics (Borjas 1994, Diehl & Koenig 2009). Second, a lack of truly comparable 
data prevents the study of immigrants’ religiosity between countries. Results usually cannot be 
compared to each other since they refer to different target groups and use different indicators 
of religion and religiosity (but see Fleischmann & Phalet 2012). 
In the following, I will try to overcome both of these problems by investigating adolescent-
parent dyads, employing the data of a recent comparative study on the integration of immigrant 
children in Europe. 
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3   Data, Measures and Methods 
 
3.1 Data 
The empirical part of this article uses data from the new Children of Immigrants Longitudinal 
Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2013). Funded by NORFACE 
(New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-Operation in Europe) since October 
2009, this project seeks to answer key open questions on the integration of children of immi-
grants in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Strictly 
comparable designs and measures in all countries allow me to study religious integration pat-
terns of immigrant children between countries. Between October 2010 and July 2011, the first 
wave of the study was conducted and 18,716 14-year old adolescents of native and immigrant 
origin were surveyed within their schools. In order to achieve a high number of adolescents 
with an immigration background, a three-stage disproportional stratified sampling design, over-
sampling schools with higher proportions of immigrant students, was applied. Within these 
schools, two school classes were randomly selected and all students within these classes were 
surveyed. Additionally, using bilingual survey instruments, self-completion and telephone in-
terviews were conducted with 11,201 parents.3 This offers the unique opportunity to investigate 
transmission processes and intergenerational change in religion and religiosity rather directly. 
Identical questions on religion were asked in the youth and parental questionnaires. 
The empirical analysis uses the first wave of CILS4EU data. I start with the whole student 
sample to detect trends in religiosity by looking at synthetic generations in the canonical way. 
In my core analyses, I then only use cases with complete youth and parental interviews (n = 
11,201) in order to investigate transmission processes among immigrant compared to native 
families. Here, I also further restrict my sample to 8,259 families who belong to any religious 
affiliation. Additionally, in the multivariate analyses I only investigate cases with no missing 
values on any of the model variables (n = 7,275). 
 
                                                 
3 Parental response rates are 37 percent, 78 percent, 74 percent and 49 percent for England, Germany, the Nether-
lands and Sweden, respectively. 
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3.2 Measures 
The central dependent variable is the intergenerational change in religious salience between 
adolescents and their parents. I use answers to the question “How important is religion to you?” 
included identically in both questionnaires, with answer categories ranging from “not at all 
important” to “very important”. Intergenerational change in religious salience then falls into 
one of three categories: decrease, stability or increase. Increase means that the adolescent rates 
religion higher than their parent does, stability indicates identical answers given by child and 
parent, and decrease is observed when religion is less important to the adolescent than to the 
parental generation.4 Of major interest in our empirical analyses are differences in religious 
salience between immigrants and natives belonging to different religious affiliations. In order 
to define religious groups I use self-reported religious affiliation and categorize it into the fol-
lowing broader categories: no religion, Christianity, Islam and other religion. Immigrant back-
ground is based on the respective country of birth of the respondent adolescent, the biological 
parents and the biological grandparents. An immigrant child is defined as a student belonging 
to one of the following generational categories: a) student born abroad (1st generation), b) stu-
dent born in the survey country, both parents born abroad (2nd generation), c) student and one 
parent born in the survey country, the other parent born abroad (2.5 generation or mixed mar-
riages), d) student and both parents born in the survey country, at least two grandparents born 
abroad (3rd generation). Consequently, natives are students who do not belong to any of these 
categories. 
Measures of cognitive-structural and social assimilation are used for both the adolescent and 
the parental generation. Since respondents and their parents are located in different life situa-
tions, structural assimilation is not operationalized identically for both generations. For parents, 
I use the degree of education (no education, lower secondary education, upper secondary edu-
cation or university education) and the current employment status. School performance is my 
measure of adolescents’ structural integration. Students were asked to assess their school per-
formance by answering the question “How well are you doing in the following subjects?” using 
the answer options “very well”, “quite well”, “OK”, “not that well” or “not well at all”. I created 
                                                 
4 In contrast to Maliepaard and Lubbers (2013), who find that intergenerational increase in religiosity occurs in 
only 0.5 percent of their sample, I find that this is anything but a rare phenomenon. It occurs in 13 percent of 
families in our sample on average, and it is even more pronounced in Muslim immigrant families. Therefore, it 
is important to distinguish between stability and increase in our empirical analyses, besides the theoretical ra-
tionale outlined before. 
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a mean index from three subjects – math, the survey country’s language, and English (in Eng-
land, only math and English). In Germany and the Netherlands – both countries with a stratified 
school system – I use the type of school attended as an additional indicator of structural assim-
ilation. Social assimilation is operationalized by the proportion of native friends. The question 
is: “Think about all of your friends. How many of them have a [survey country] background?” 
Answers in both the youths’ and the parents’ questionnaires range from “almost all or all” to 
“none or very few”. Finally, language is one central dimension of cognitive assimilation. In 
school surveys, we conducted an objective language test (synonyms in England, Germany and 
the Netherlands, antonyms in Sweden). For parents, I use self-assessed language proficiency, 
which is a mean index of how well the respondent parent thinks he/she (him-/herself) can speak, 
understand, write and read [the survey country’s language], using a 5-point scale with “not at 
all” and “excellently” constituting the negative and positive ends of the scale. 
In addition to these variables, I control for the sex of the respondent youth and the parent, as 
well as for parents’ religiosity in every model. All metric variables are standardized separately 
for England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden and have a mean of 0 and a standard devi-
ation of 1. 
 
3.3 Methods 
I start analyzing religiosity among immigrant and native children by looking at trends over 
synthetic generations; as this is done in many other studies too, this should be telling for reasons 
of comparison. I then examine how the level of religiosity changes over generations within one 
and the same family, analyzing adolescent-parent dyads. This method has successfully been 
applied to studying the transmission of cultural values among immigrant families in general 
(Idema & Phalet 2007, Jacob & Kalter 2011, Nauck 1989, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001, 
Schönpflug 2001) and religious transmission among non-immigrant families (Bao et al. 1999). 
To my knowledge, only one study investigates religious transmission using parent-child data 
(Maliepaard & Lubbers, 2013). This study, however, is restricted to one country only. 
After these descriptive views, I test theoretical expectations about the influence of assimilation 
in various dimensions on the probability of intergenerational change in religiosity among fam-
ilies in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, using a series of logistic regression 
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models. For this purpose, I use two distinct dependent variables. Decrease models estimate the 
probability of a decrease in religious salience compared with intergenerational stability. A rise 
in religiosity is contrasted to stability in the increase models. All families in which an increase 
in religious salience occurs are excluded in the decrease models, and vice versa. Basically, this 
is estimating a multinomial logit model using individualized regressions (Begg and Gray, 
1984). I pursue this approach instead of using common MNLM-estimates for reasons of statis-
tical modelling: Models should control for parents’ religious salience because the base level of 
religiosity in the parental generation crucially affects the likelihood of change in religious sali-
ence across generations. However, there exist several cases for which the predicted probability 
cannot be estimated due to logical impossibility. These are parents who state that religion is 
“not at all important” in the decrease models, and parents to whom religion is “very important” 
in the increase models. Therefore, I run different models and exclude these families in the de-
crease and increase models, respectively. 
 
4   Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive results 
Starting with the canonical approach, Figure 3.1 illustrates how immigrant adolescents’ reli-
gious salience develops over synthetic generations (black lines) compared with that of the na-
tive population (grey reference lines). Immigrants and natives are further differentiated accord-
ing to the religious affiliation stated by the respondent youth: Non-religious adolescents 
(dashed-dotted lines) are contrasted to Christian (dotted lines), Muslim (solid line) and other-
religious respondents (dashed lines). 
In general, I find that the pattern with respect to relative differences in the importance attached 
to religion is basically the same in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Unsurpris-
ingly, Figure 3.1 reveals that immigrant and native respondents who do not belong to any reli-
gion are very similar, each stating a very low importance of religion. Muslim immigrants show 
the highest values in terms of religious salience, and Christian respondents and respondents 
belonging to another religion lie between these two extremes. With respect to trends over syn-
thetic generations, Christian immigrants’ religious salience adapts to that of the Christian native 
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population. While first- and second-generation Christian immigrants are more religious than 
native Christians, those who belong to the third generation do not significantly differ from na-
tive Christians in Germany and Sweden. In contrast, religiosity among Muslim immigrants is 
more or less stable over generational categories. Moreover, second-generation Muslim immi-
grants are even significantly (at the 10 percent level) more religious than those in the first gen-
eration in the Netherlands. However, later Muslim immigrant generations display some minor 
assimilatory religious trends, though these are not statistically significant. The question arises 
whether I can observe this pattern as well when I look into families and examine changes be-
tween generations within one and the same family. 
Figure 3.1: Religious salience of natives and immigrants, by immigrant generation 
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For this purpose, I look at intergenerational change in religiosity within immigrant and native 
families of different religious groups, which are defined by parents’ religious affiliation. Table 
3.1 displays differences in terms of the importance of religion to adolescents and to their par-
ents. Families who affiliate with Christianity, both with and without an immigration back-
ground, display a declining importance of religion over generations in all countries. In contrast, 
religious salience remains considerably stable among Muslim families. At the same time, Mus-
lim families are much less likely to secularize over generations, that is, to experience a decrease 
in religiosity, compared with native and immigrant respondents of other religious denomina-
tions. In addition, the amount of intergenerational decrease in religiosity is almost outweighed 
by a considerable proportion of Muslim families in which adolescents are even more religious 
than their parents. Again, I find these patterns in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Swe-
den alike. 
To summarize, both methodological designs arrive at basically the same result. In line with 
Diehl and Koenig (2009) and contradictory to many empirical studies addressing the develop-
ment of religion and religiosity of Muslim immigrants in Western immigration countries (e.g. 
Connor 2010, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, van Tubergen 2007), I find descrip-
tively an impressive stability or even an increase in religiosity among Muslim families. In con-
trast, Christian immigrants in later generations seem to adapt to the Christian majority popula-
tion, and their intergenerational change in religious salience resembles the pattern observable 
in native Christian families. The multivariate analyses in the next part of the article aim at in-
vestigating whether this pattern remains when I additionally consider important background 
variables and measures of cognitive-structural and social assimilation. 
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4.2 Multivariate results 
Tables 3.2a to 3.2d show the results of my multivariate analyses. For every country, I estimate 
separate logistic regression models, using the likelihood of intergenerational change within 
families as the dependent variable. Due to the problem of comparing regression coefficients in 
logistic regressions models using different samples or different sets of independent variables 
(Mood 2010), average marginal effects are shown instead of logit coefficients or odds ratios. 
The base models display gross differences in intergenerational change in religious salience be-
tween religious immigrant groups, controlling only for adolescents’ and parents’ sex and par-
ents’ religiosity. Almost all religious immigrant groups differ from the reference group – native 
Christian families – showing a lower likelihood of a religious decrease and a higher likelihood 
of a religious increase over generations. However, whereas in all countries these effects are 
weak and (with one exception) not significant for Christian immigrants, Muslim families dis-
play a pronounced pattern of intergenerational stability or even increase in religiosity that is 
almost identical across countries. 
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In a next step, I look at the influence of parents’ and adolescents’ cognitive-structural and social 
assimilation on intergenerational change in religious salience within families (complete model). 
As briefly sketched in the theoretical section, I assume that parents’ assimilation moderates the 
strength of change in religiosity by affecting the efforts parents put into the religious socializa-
tion of their children. Additionally, the question is whether – controlling for parents’ cognitive-
structural and social assimilation – adolescents’ assimilation weakens the religious transmission 
process within families. However, my results suggest that the parents’ cognitive-structural and 
social assimilation does not seem to play a major role with respect to religious assimilation. 
Only a few coefficients reach statistical significance and the main effects of religious groups 
are only slightly reduced. The picture is not very clear over countries. On the one hand, current 
employment is related to the probability of an intergenerational decrease in religious salience 
in England and Germany (though in different directions), but not in the Netherlands and Swe-
den. In Sweden and the Netherlands, on the other hand, language skills reduce the likelihood 
of an increase in religiosity within families, and this is partly true also for Germany, but not for 
England. No clear conclusions are possible either with regard to the influence of parents’ social 
assimilation on intergenerational religious assimilation.5 When looking at the effects of adoles-
cents’ assimilation, I find some evidence for a link between structural and religious assimilation 
in England and Germany. In these two countries, self-assessed school performance is negatively 
related to intergenerational decrease.6 This result contradicts theoretical expectations derived 
from assimilation theories that structural and religious integration should co-occur. With re-
spect to social contacts and proficiency in the language of the country of destination, I find 
some effects supporting assimilation theory, but only in some countries and only for some as-
similation dimensions. In England, Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, the proportion 
of native friends is related to an intergenerational increase in religious salience. Language skills 
matter for a decrease in religious salience in Germany only, with better skills enhancing the 
likelihood of such a decrease within families. 
                                                 
5 Since parental indicators of assimilation in different dimensions might differ by whether the mother or the father 
filled out the parental questionnaire, I estimated all models with respective interaction effects (results not shown). 
Overall, only some of these interaction effects become significant. A comparison of the fit between models with 
and without interaction effects shows that only some models with interaction effects show a better model fit. 
6 Using an objective measure of school performance for the German subsample where questions about school 
grades were asked we obtain similar results. Therefore, this effect cannot be explained by an overestimation of 
school performance by a selective group in the sample. 
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To make sure that the effects of certain variables are not dominated by the reference groups, 
the last models leave out native families and estimates effects only for immigrants. I can ob-
serve that some assimilation indicators are slightly more pronounced and become statistically 
significant in the immigrant models; this mainly applies to indicators of adolescents’ assimila-
tion. Thus, cognitive-structural and social assimilation exert some influences on intergenera-
tional change in religiosity among immigrants. However, even when looking at immigrant 
youth only, the overall impact is rather weak, and – most importantly – the differences between 
Muslim and Christian immigrants can hardly be explained. 
Table 3.3: Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among 
native and immigrant families; separated by country of origin within Muslim immigrant group 
 Muslim model 
 Decrease Increase 
     
Immigrant-religion group (Ref.: Migrant: Christianity)     
     
England     
Migrant: Other religion 0.045  -0.049  
Migrant: Islam, Pakistan -0.363 *** 0.316 + 
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin -0.410 ** 0.331  
     
Germany     
Migrant: Other religion 0.008  0.186  
Migrant: Islam, Former Yugoslavia -0.207 * 0.167 + 
Migrant: Islam, Turkey -0.311 *** 0.222 *** 
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin -0.434 *** 0.305 ** 
     
Netherlands     
Migrant: Other religion 0.047  -0.023  
Migrant: Islam, Morocco -0.258 * 0.286 * 
Migrant: Islam, Turkey -0.337 ** 0.364 ** 
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin -0.254 * 0.082  
     
Sweden     
Migrant: Other religion 0.172  0.208  
Migrant: Islam, Former Yugoslavia -0.432 *** -0.026  
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin -0.154 + -0.090  
     
***  p < 0.001, **  p < 0.01, *  p < 0.05, +  p < 0.1 
 
Source: “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries”, own calculations. 
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects. 
Controlled for: parent’s education, parent’s employment status, parent’s proportion of native friends, parent’s 
language proficiency, adolescent’s school performance, adolescent’s school type (only Germany and the Neth-
erlands), adolescent’s proportion of native friends, adolescent’s language proficiency, parent’s religious sali-
ence, parent’s sex, adolescent’s sex, mode parental interview (only Germany and the Netherlands) 
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Finally, I wanted to check whether intergenerational transmission of religiosity differs across 
groups stemming from different regions of the world. For this purpose, I reran the immigrants’ 
models for England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden separately, and additionally differ-
entiated Muslim immigrant groups by their country of origin. Table 3.3, however, shows that 
there are only marginal (and non-significant) differences in the likelihood of an intergenera-
tional decrease or increase between Muslim immigrants from different countries of origin in 
England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (in contrast to Güngör et al. 2011, Maliepaard 
& Lubbers 2013). 
To summarize, the cognitive-structural and social assimilation of both parents and adolescents 
is only weakly related to intergenerational change in religiosity. In addition, the pattern of Mus-
lim immigrants’ intergenerational religious stability cannot be explained by adding measures 
of cognitive-structural and social assimilation dimensions for both parents and adolescents. 
 
5   Summary and Discussion 
This contribution aimed to improve our knowledge about the development of immigrant chil-
dren’s religiosity in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Drawing on major theoretical contributions in the sociology of religion and of migration, pre-
vious studies have revealed several challenges and shortcomings of research: On the one hand, 
theoretical approaches in both fields differ in their expectations about the general direction of 
trends and about the role of assimilation in other areas of life (e.g. Bankston & Zhou 1995, 
Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007). 
On the other hand, a lack of appropriate data prevents the comparative and direct study of im-
migrants’ intergenerational religious assimilation. As a consequence, studies have reached dif-
ferent conclusions with respect to immigrants’ religious assimilation (e.g. Connor 2010, Diehl 
& Koenig 2009, Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Güngör et al. 2011, Güveli & Platt 2011, 
Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, Maliepaard et al. 2010, 2012, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits et al. 2010, 
van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). I tackled some of these problems by 
investigating in four European countries adolescent-parent dyads and intergenerational change 
in religiosity within one and the same family, thereby using highly comparable designs and 
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instruments. Furthermore, I am able to relate intergenerational change in religiosity in immi-
grant families to secularization tendencies that take place in the majority population as well. 
In line with previous research on group differences in religiosity, I find that Muslim immigrants 
in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are on average highly religious, both com-
pared to the majority population and to immigrants with non-Muslim religious backgrounds 
(e.g. Connor 2010, Eilers et al. 2008, van Tubergen 2007, but see Connor 2009). One central 
result of my study is the remarkable intergenerational stability of religious salience among Mus-
lim families. In contrast to Christian immigrant respondents who are subject to secularization 
trends within their country of destination, Muslim immigrants and their parents on average dif-
fer less in the importance they attach to religion. For a considerable subsample, even an inter-
generational increase in religiosity is visible. This pattern is identical in England, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. In addition, it does not change substantially when I control for several 
assimilation measures both in the parent and in the adolescent generation. Thus, similar to Diehl 
and Koenig (2009), I show that general assimilation cannot sufficiently explain why Muslim 
immigrants in Europe do not adapt to secularization trends taking place in the majority popula-
tion. Overall, the effects of cognitive-structural and social assimilation are rather weak and 
inconsistent across countries. Again, this pertains to all countries I investigate in this study. 
All in all, I find empirical support for all three lines of theoretical reasoning outlined in the first 
part of this article. Contact with native peers affects intergenerational change within families, 
which speaks in favor of classical assimilation theories (Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007). 
At the same time, in line with arguments for segmented assimilation, structural assimilation is 
barely related to religious developments within immigrant and native families (Connor 2010, 
van Tubergen 2007; in contrast to Smits et al. 2010; but see for ambiguous effects Fleischmann 
& Phalet 2012, Maliepaard et al. 2010). Parents’ and adolescents’ structural assimilation is even 
inversely related to an intergenerational decrease in religious salience within families in some 
of the countries. A potential explanation for this result is that especially immigrants who pos-
sess a large amount of human capital are able to develop and maintain an ethnic counterculture 
in order to deliberately demarcate themselves from the mainstream culture (DiMaggio & Os-
trower 1990, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Zhou 1997). All in all, these findings challenge a well-
known assumption of assimilation theory that assimilation trends in different life domains ac-
company each other. Instead, my results suggest that assimilation must be conceptualized as a 
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multi-faceted process, whereby the strength and direction of the interplay between different 
assimilation dimensions urgently needs further research. Finally, I can also find some indirect 
evidence of a religious revival in later generations. Religious revival as a result of parents’ 
efforts to compensate for lacking acceptance by the native population can be detected when 
assimilation is important in the increase models; but this again is only sometimes the case and 
not consistent across countries. Thus, the exact mechanisms responsible for ethnic resilience, 
especially the role of perceived discrimination, need further research. 
In sum, my results demonstrate that it does not make much sense to view any of these major 
approaches as a candidate for a theory that would suffice to explain intergenerational change in 
religious salience among immigrant families. It will be an important and challenging task for 
future theoretical work to establish a more integrative framework; we need a more explicit ac-
count of the mechanisms underlying intergenerational stability or change, and we need more 
precise overarching hypotheses on the exact conditions under which the one or the other mech-
anism is more likely to occur. 
On the empirical side, I am able to overcome some methodological shortcomings of previous 
findings; but, of course, my study still has limitations: The relatively low response rate, espe-
cially in England and in Sweden, might be seen as problematic due to selective parental non-
response. Indeed, I find that immigrant families in general and Muslim families in particular 
are underrepresented in my core sample of adolescent-parent dyads. However, given the struc-
ture of our analysis, this is not as problematic as it might seem. Taking into account my de-
pendent variable – intergenerational change in religiosity – results would only be biased if the 
distance between parents and their children in terms of religious salience were subject to selec-
tivity. In this context, it is reassuring that the trends in the canonical account using synthetic 
generations, which do not suffer from the same non-response problem, confirm the major trends 
underlying my core analyses. 
Another criticism might be raised due to my measure of religiosity, since I only examine reli-
gious salience but not religious participation. This is an important objection in light of current 
discussions about symbolic religiosity (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Gans 1994). Unfortunately, in 
all but one country I only have information about the frequency of adolescents’ visits to 
mosques and praying, but none about that of their parents. Only for the Dutch subsample am I 
able to investigate adolescent-parent dyads with respect to intergenerational change in religious 
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practice. These results (not shown) indicate that Muslim immigrants have a higher likelihood 
of decrease in private, but not public forms of religious practice. At the same time, intergener-
ational increase in religiosity is more common in Muslim immigrant families, and this pertains 
to both visiting religious meeting places and praying. If the assumption of symbolic religiosity 
were true, an intergenerational change in praying should resemble my results on religious sali-
ence, and only mosque visits should be subject to decline. But still we have to be aware that the 
importance of religion is not a perfect indicator of individual religiosity and that its meaning 
might differ according to an individual’s religious affiliation. 
To conclude, religion is still a major part of Muslim immigrant children’s lives. The most im-
portant follow-up question is whether this has serious consequences for their life chances in 
general. My results using the first wave of the CILS4EU data suggest that the link between 
religiosity and integration into other domains of life is rather weak. Future research should 
focus on the precise causal relationships between religiosity and cognitive-structural as well as 
social assimilation, using longitudinal information. The crucial questions are certainly not about 
trends in religiosity among immigrant children per se, but rather about their long-term conse-
quences for social exclusion, educational outcomes and labor market success. 
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Chapter 4: 
Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity in Immigrant and 
Native Families: 
The Role of Transmission Opportunities and Perceived Transmis-
sion Benefits 
Konstanze Jacob 
 
(published online before print in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2018))* 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I investigate intergenerational transmission in religiosity among immigrants and 
natives, comparing families affiliating with Christianity, Islam or any other religious denomi-
nation in Germany. Thereby, I focus on the role of transmission opportunities and perceived 
benefits of religious transmission within and outside the family on the chance of successfully 
passing on religious attachment from parents to children. Furthermore, I investigate whether 
these factors contribute to explain group differences in the intergenerational transmission in 
religiosity. Using data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European 
Countries (CILS4EU), my empirical results show that family characteristics and everyday in-
teractions influence the strength of intergenerational secularization, but they can only partly 
account for differences in divergent transmission patterns. 
 
                                                 
* For the sake of consistency across chapters, I have slightly rewritten the published version of this article, harmo-
nized citation style and American English use and reformulated several sections. 
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1   Introduction 
In the last decades, research on immigration and the role of religion thereby experienced a 
continuous boom (Buijs & Rath 2006, Foner & Alba 2008, Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Grow-
ing interest in this topic is straightforwardly explained. Besides negative attitudes and public 
prejudice particularly towards Islam in Western European immigration societies, strong reli-
gious identities are seen as a reason for failure of immigrant children in the educational system 
and in the labor market, as a hindrance to adequate contact with members of the majority pop-
ulation as well as to cultural inclusion (Bisin et al. 2008, Damstra & Tillie 2016, Diehl et al. 
2009, Foner & Alba 2008, Connor & Koenig 2013). 
Studies in recent years consistently show that immigrants are more religious than their native 
counterparts, and that immigrants affiliating with Islam tend to be more religious than non-
Muslim immigrants (Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Connor 2010, de Hoon & van Tubergen 
2014, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Lewis & 
Kashyap 2013b, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). In contrast, empirical evidence on general 
trends in religious attachment among immigrants after migration is still inconclusive. Whereas 
some studies basically find a decrease of religious involvement among immigrants (Aleksynska 
& Chiswick 2013, Brünig & Fleischmann 2015, Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2013, Garcia-
Munoz & Neuman 2013, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits & Ultee 2013, van 
Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), others report a considerable stability, es-
pecially among Muslims (Diehl &  Koenig 2009, Güveli & Platt 2011, Lewis & Kashyap 
2013b, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Platt 2013, Soehl 2017, van Tubergen 2013). In addition, very 
little is known about how divergent patterns of adaptation in religiosity can be explained. More 
precisely, although several factors have been identified that (sometimes) influence religious 
attachments and behaviors, these factors cannot fully account for differences between religious 
groups in general and the exception of Muslim immigrants in particular. 
This paper investigates intergenerational transmission processes among immigrant and native 
families in one Western European destination country. Using data from the Children of Immi-
grants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016a), I 
examine parent-child dyads of families with and without immigrant background affiliating with 
Christianity, Islam or any other religion in Germany. This approach overcomes one important 
methodological problem of previous research. Studies analyzing intergenerational change in 
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religiosity to date have mainly compared synthetic immigrant generations (exemplary excep-
tions are de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, 
Soehl 2017, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), and thus are not able to account for different 
compositions of immigrant generations in terms of unobserved characteristics (Borjas 1994, 
Diehl & Koenig 2009). Furthermore, well-known secularization theory (Berger 1967b, Bruce 
2002, Wilson 1982) postulates that declining levels of religiosity in modernized societies are 
driven predominantly by failure of parents to successfully transmit religion to their children 
(Scourfield et al. 2012, Voas & Crockett 2005). Thus, in order to understand trends of secular-
ization in the overall population, it is necessary to scrutinize how religious transmission from 
one generation to the next takes place and under what conditions parents are (not) able and/or 
motivated to pass on their religious attachment to their offspring. Finally and most importantly, 
analyzing parent-child dyads enables to directly examine these interfamilial transmission pro-
cesses and to what extent family characteristics and everyday interactions within and outside 
the family affect them. 
For these reasons, I apply a micro foundation (Coleman 1990) in order to theoretically and 
empirically explain divergent trends in religiosity mentioned above, that is, developments in 
religious attachments over time and over generations as well as group differences in the inter-
generational transmission in religiosity. Building on established theories addressing the topic 
of immigration and religion, which illustrate these macro-level trends, this paper focuses on 
micro-level processes within families to detect whether they may account for group differences 
in the intergenerational transmission in religiosity between native Christians and between im-
migrants affiliating with Christianity, Islam or any other religious denomination. Two research 
questions stand in the center of this paper: First, do family characteristics and everyday inter-
actions influence intergenerational transmission in religiosity? And second, do they help to ex-
plain differences in the intergenerational transmission between natives and immigrants and be-
tween religious groups? To answer these questions, I develop a theoretical model that combines 
several research strands of intergenerational transmission research and assimilation theory. In 
a nutshell, I postulate that transmission opportunities within families and motivation to pass on 
religion from one generation to the next are of crucial importance. Although these two ideas 
have been occasionally applied to investigate intergenerational transmission in religiosity (e.g. 
Kelley & de Graaf 1997, de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014), to my knowledge no study system-
atically investigates transmission opportunities and transmission benefits together. In addition, 
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explaining religious group differences regarding the strength of intergenerational transmission 
by using transmission opportunities and motivation has largely been neglected in previous re-
search. Testing this model empirically by making use of the first wave of the Children of Im-
migrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU), my results show that 
although family characteristics and everyday interactions within and outside the family have an 
impact on intergenerational transmission in religiosity, they cannot fully explain the Muslim 
exception of strong resistance to secularization. 
 
2   Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Previous Research on Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity 
Secularization mainly operates via generational change, which means that cohort effects are 
crucially important for trends towards declining religiosity in the overall population, whereas 
age and period effects are negligible (Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, Scourfield et al. 2012, 
Voas & Crockett 2005, but see Need & de Graaf 1996). ‘If there is a process of secularization, 
this is in part due to the failure of the intergenerational transmission of religion. It is difficult to 
separate these two domains – secularization and transmission. To understand secularization we 
need to consider what is happening to religious transmission [...].’ (Scourfield et al. 2012: 92). 
This implies that religious upbringing is subject to change in modern societies, and seculariza-
tion trends on the societal level are resulting from less successful intergenerational transmission 
in religiosity from parents to children (Myers 1996).1 
Previous research on the intergenerational transmission in religiosity usually takes intergener-
ational transmission for granted (Arránz Becker et al. 2016, Bader & Desmond 2006, Bao et al. 
1999, Bengtson et al. 2009, Erickson 1992, Francis & Brown 1991, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 
2001, Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Myers 1996, Soehl 2017, Stolzenberg et al. 1995). Assuming 
that transmission takes place universally, it particularly stresses that parents form the main (or 
                                                 
1 The same argument is also implicitly assumed in assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Park 
1950). Since differences between immigrants and natives are expected to diminish especially over successive 
immigrant generations, transmission within families is a reasonable place to start when investigating religious 
assimilation. If transmission within families is strong, assimilation to the mainstream culture consequently is 
weakened. 
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in its strongest form: the only) socialization agents responsible for evoking religious values, 
attitudes and behaviors in their descendants. Most prominently, following social learning theory 
(Bandura 1977) the existence of socialization processes is rarely scrutinized; parents reinforce 
religious norms, monitor their children and sanction deviant religious behavior (de Hoon & van 
Tubergen 2014). However, these theories are hardly able to explain group differences in inter-
generational transmission. Simply put, they state that transmission takes place, but are not qual-
ified to explain why some families are more effective in passing on religion from one generation 
to the next than others. 
There are several ad-hoc explanations for group differences in the intergenerational transmis-
sion in religiosity – both between immigrants and natives and between immigrants with differ-
ent ethnic or religious backgrounds, yet still a theoretical foundation is largely lacking, not to 
mention an empirical test. Although some scholars have pointed out that the intergenerational 
stability of cultural values and attitudes is particularly pronounced in immigrant families while 
host-country specific values and attitudes are not necessarily internalized (de Hoon & van Tu-
bergen 2014, Idema & Phalet 2007, Nauck 1989, 2001, 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001, 
Schönpflug 2001), they are usually less interested in ethnic and/or religious differences within 
the immigrant population. 
With respect to transmission in religiosity, some recent studies have taken into account family 
(van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), peer (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Maliepaard & Lub-
bers 2013, Soehl 2017) and community characteristics (van de Pol & van Tubergen 2013), but 
do not comprehensively and systematically relate them to divergent patterns of transmission. 
Likewise, it has been found that transmission in Muslim immigrant families is more effective 
than in native and in non-Muslim immigrant families (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & 
Kalter 2013, Scourfield et al. 2012), and more effective in Turkish compared to Moroccan fam-
ilies (Güngör et al. 2011, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), 
however, reasons for these findings remain unclear. 
 
2.2 Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity Revised 
Transmission from one generation to the next involves two ‘actors’ – parents who transmit 
religious values and behaviors, and children who adopt them. I distinguish between conscious 
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(‘concerted cultivation’; Lareau 2011) and unconscious transmission (Francis & Brown 1991, 
Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Soehl 2017): On the one hand side, parents consciously and deliber-
ately put effort in shaping their children, for example, they explicitly teach their children about 
culture, norms and values, reinforce appropriate behavior and sanction deviant behavior, or they 
invest in the inculcation of values they hold in other ways. On the other hand side, in line with 
Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory, children passively learn attitudes and behaviors by 
role-model learning. More precisely, they indirectly adopt religious values from their parents – 
by processes of observation and imitation. 
I postulate that the central factors influencing the level of success of interfamilial transmission 
of religiosity are a) transmission opportunities, and b) perceived transmission benefits. Crucial 
for a) is the ability to transmit, that is, to what extent family members get into contact to each 
other. When family members spend much time together, it is more likely that children become 
acquainted with the religious values their parents believe in and that they eventually adopt these 
values. Thus, the presence of transmission channels is decisive (Jæger 2009) because this ena-
bles parents to provide their offspring with religious experiences and strengthen familiarity with 
religious contents. In addition, parents who actively engage in religious practices are better able 
to transmit religion to their children since in this way they act as role models, which facilitates 
passive role-model learning via observation and imitation (Bandura 1977, Erickson 1992, Saka 
2016, Vermeer 2014). Transmission opportunities are also related to family structure: it has 
been shown that children of traditional families with two biological parents are more religious 
(Bader & Desmond 2006, Myers 1996) and that transmission is especially effective if mothers 
and fathers affiliate with the same religious denomination (‘belief homogamy’; Erickson 1992, 
Francis & Brown 1991, Myers 1996, Need & de Graaf 1996, Soehl 2017, but see Grotenhuis 
& Scheepers 2001).2 
However, mere opportunities to transmit religion from one generation to the next does not nec-
essarily lead to effective transmission. In addition, b) perceived transmission benefits contribute 
to it, that is, parents are more or less inclined to influence their children’s attitudes and children 
are more or less motivated to listen and respond to their parents and perceive their parents’ 
behavior as worth imitating (Saka 2016). First and foremost, religious parents will perceive 
                                                 
2 Although these associations are a stable result in the literature, it is disputable whether family composition truly 
affects child’s level of religiosity, or whether it is rather a composition effect, that is, that highly religious parents 
more often live in traditional family forms and tend to have more religious children. 
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transmitting religion to their offspring as more important than non-believing parents, thus, they 
will put more effort in active religious socialization of their children (Bader & Desmond 2006, 
Myers 1996, Scourfield et al. 2012, Voas & Crockett 2005, but see Kelley & de Graaf 1997). 
Furthermore, research among the majority population suggests that authoritative parenting is 
particularly effective when it comes to the intergenerational transmission of religious beliefs 
and practices (Bao et al. 1999, Bader & Desmond 2006, Ozorak 1989, Vermeer 2014). An 
authoritative parenting style is characterized by a warm and supportive home climate combined 
with a general interest in children. Thus, transmission should be stronger in families, in which 
love plays a major role, family cohesion is high and in which parents are interested and involved 
in their child’s lives. 
Although growing up is a sensitive and important period for the development of religious at-
tachments (Ozorak 1989), parents are not the only socialization agents in the lives of young 
people. Especially during adolescence, c) relationships outside the family, especially to peers, 
become more and more important for religious beliefs and practices (Bebiroglu et al. 2015, 
Erickson 1992, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, Need & de Graaf 1996). Highly religious per-
sons in the surrounding might support one’s own religiosity, they might also serve as role mod-
els or support one’s own religiosity via shared religious activities. In contrast, if peers are less 
attached to religion, the opposite can be expected. It is fair to say that this is especially relevant 
for descendants of immigrants: given their on average higher religiosity, exposure to secular 
host-country environments enhances familiarity with their cultural values and makes it more 
likely to adopt them, which is in line with central arguments of assimilation theory (Alba & 
Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Park 1950, Soehl 2017). Consequently, I 
expect that contact to secular peers alters the opportunity to get in touch with secular values 
and attitudes and perceived benefits of adopting the religion of the parents, thus suppresses or 
supports the transmission in religiosity within families (Soehl 2017). 
 
2.3 Group Differences in Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity 
After describing general mechanisms of intergenerational transmission in religiosity within 
families, this section addresses group differences in the strength of religious transmission. ‘Re-
ligious transmission in minority ethnic communities may be a very different phenomenon than 
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in the ethnic majority population and understanding the process may require some distinctive 
theoretical insights.’ (Scourfield et al. 2012: 93). 
In order to answer the question why intergenerational transmission in religiosity among immi-
grant families deviates from the native population, one of the most prominent theoretical argu-
ments is that maintaining ethnic and religious identities functions as a means to ensure in-group 
solidarity, to maintain ethnic and/or religious group ties, and to protect families against risks at 
higher ages (Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Nauck 1989, 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001). Thus, 
as a result of shared migration experiences, family cohesion is stronger, and relationships be-
tween family members are tight-kniter in immigrant, especially Muslim families (Arends-Tóth 
& van de Vijver 2008, Merz et al. 2009, Nauck 1989, 2001, 2007, Steinbach 2013). As outlined 
in the previous section, perceived transmission benefits in religiosity are associated with rela-
tionships between family members. Since religion is an important part of the cultural heritage 
of many immigrant groups, these families perceive religious transmission as key to cultural 
reproduction. This should be especially relevant in secular Western European societies; thus, 
parents have higher incentives in investing explicitly in their child’s religious upbringing. Ad-
ditionally, since interfamilial transmission of Islam as a minority religion is not reinforced and 
supplemented by the wider social Christian environment, Muslims are particularly affected 
(Duderija 2007, Kelley & de Graaf 1997, Soehl 2017, Voas & Fleischmann 2012, Voas & 
Storm 2012). Consequently, I expect that immigrant families, especially those who affiliate 
with Islam, subjectively assess benefits for religious transmission higher than native families. 
With respect to transmission opportunities, I expect that immigrants grow up in a more home 
and family-oriented environment, and, as a consequence, religiosity is passed on to a greater 
extent compared to native families. This might have several reasons: first, immigrant parents, 
especially those from countries dominated by Islam, show lower risks of divorce (Feng et al. 
2012, Kalmijn et al. 2005, Milewski & Kulu 2014). Second, chances to interact are larger in 
immigrant families because their leisure-time activities and personal social networks are more 
home-oriented (Anderson 2014, Granato 2002, Heß-Meining 2004). Third, parents of Muslim 
denomination show themselves more overt religious behavior (Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, 
Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Lewis & Kashyap 2013b; 
van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), and this gives children the opportunity to observe this 
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behavior. On the other hand side, opportunities to get into contact with secular worldviews 
outside the families should be less frequent for immigrants, and again, especially for Muslims. 
To sum up, I assume that the degree of intergenerational transmission in religiosity is basically 
influenced by a) opportunities to pass on religious values and attachments from parents’ to 
child’s generation, b) parents’ and child’s perceived transmission benefits, and c) child’s op-
portunities to get in contact with non-religious worldviews outside the family. Families with an 
immigration background – and among them especially families with Muslim affiliations – are 
expected to display stronger transmission rates because their family members assess religious 
transmission more valuable and because they interact more frequently with each other and less 
frequently with their rather secular environment. 
 
3   Data and Measures 
 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analyses of this paper use data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal 
Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016a). Funded by NORFACE 
(New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-Operation in Europe), the project aims 
at answering key open questions on the integration of immigrant children in four European 
countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Applying a three-stage school-
based sampling design with oversampling schools with high immigrant proportions, 18,716 
adolescents with and without an immigrant background were surveyed in their schools in 
2010/2011 (CILS4EU 2016). In addition, using bilingual survey instruments, 11,714 interviews 
with one parent were conducted, which allow me to study the intergenerational transmission of 
religion directly by investigating parent-child dyads since identical questions concerning reli-
gion and religiosity were asked in the survey instruments for youth and parents. 
The empirical analyses are based on the first wave of the German subsample of CILS4EU, 
which is a representative sample of students attending 9th grade in German secondary schools 
(in 14 federal states) (n=4,637). I only use cases with a complete parental interview with either 
the biological mother or father; in addition, I restrict my sample to 3,145 native Christian 
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families and immigrant families who belong to any religious affiliation (see section 
“measures”). In addition, only cases without missing information on any of the model variables 
are included (n=2,693). 
 
3.2 Measures 
The central dependent variable is the intergenerational change in religious salience between 
adolescents and their parents. The question ‘How important is religion to you?’ is included 
identically in the student and the parents’ questionnaires, with answer categories ranging on a 
four-point scale from ‘not at all important’ to ‘very important’. Intergenerational change in re-
ligious salience falls into one of three categories: decrease, stability or increase. Increase means 
that the adolescent rates religion higher than their parent does, stability indicates identical an-
swers given by child and parent, and decrease is observed when religion is less important to the 
adolescent than to the parental generation.3 
Of major interest in the empirical analyses are differences in religious salience between immi-
grant and native families affiliating with different religious denominations. Thereby, immigrant 
background is based on the respective country of birth of the respondent youth, the biological 
parents and grandparents (Dollmann et al. 2014). An immigrant child is defined as born abroad 
(first generation) or as born in Germany with at least two grandparents born abroad (second and 
third generation). Natives are respondents who do not belong to any of these categories. To 
define religious groups, I use self-reported religious affiliation (information from parents if 
available, from adolescents otherwise) and categories it into the following broader categories: 
Christianity, Islam and other religion (for instance, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Yazidism). A 
combination of these two indicators forms the central independent variable; it distinguishes 
between native Christians, immigrant Christians, immigrant Muslims and immigrants with an-
other religion. Thus, I excluded families who do not belong to any religious denomination 
                                                 
3 An alternative option to construct the dependent variable is to use a difference measure between parents’ and 
youths’ religious salience, ranging from -3 to +3. However, only 11 percent of adolescents deviate from their 
parent by more than one answer category. In addition, using such a metric scale requires that the effects of all 
independent variables are similarly important for any position of the scale, and also for positive (increase) and 
negative (decrease) values. Since these are unrealistic assumptions, I decided to use categories to estimate the 
chances whether intergenerational change in religiosity occurs or not. 
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(n=434; 12 percent) as well as 6 native families with non-Christian religious denominations and 
1 immigrant family with missing religious denomination from all analyses. 
Opportunities to transmit religiosity between generations are operationalized by the frequency 
of youths’ free time activities. Respondents were asked on a 5-point scale, how often they pur-
sue certain hobbies in their leisure time. I distinguish between outgoing activities (go to the 
cinema; go out to a pub/bar/nightclub/party; spend time in a sports/music/drama/other club; go 
to a concert/DJ event) and in-home activities (visit relatives; read a book (not for school); read 
a newspaper) as a proxy how often adolescents are at home, and thus they can interact with 
their parents (assuming that they are present, too, and that youth engage in outside-home activ-
ities without their parents). Both variables simply count the number of activities that are pur-
sued on a regular basis (at least ‘once or several times a month’). Further indicators for trans-
mission opportunities are the employment status of the responding parent and information about 
family structure – whether the responding adolescent lives with both biological parents in one 
home.4 
For perceived transmission benefits, I use the level of agreement about the following state-
ments: “Germans should do all they can to keep their customs and traditions” and “Immigrants 
should do all they can to keep their customs and traditions.5 I combine these two variables into 
one single indicator, whereby the first statement is used for Germans and the second statement 
for immigrants. These questions are available both for adolescents and their parents. 
To operationalize family relations, respondents were asked how strongly they agree to several 
statements about family life. In a first step, I perform an exploratory factor analysis in order to 
separate different meaningful dimensions of these family relations; the resulting four-factor 
solution is displayed in Table 4.1. Cronbach’s alpha lies between 0.71 (good atmosphere) and 
0.87 (loveliness) for these scales, thus, all of them reach a satisfactorily level of internal con-
sistency. In addition, I use the question ‘How well do you get along with your mother/father?’ 
as a general assessment about the relationship between respondent and his/her parent. 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, measures about religious behavior are not included in the parental questionnaire. Thus, it is not 
possible to include these as important opportunities to pass on religiosity to children via role-model learning in 
my analyses. 
5 I would prefer to use a direct question on the importance of preserving religious rather than ethnic customs and 
traditions. However, religion and religiosity can be regarded as a significant part of one’s ethnic heritage (Foner 
& Alba 2008, Soehl 2017). 
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Table 4.1: Family relation indicators 
Factor Items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
   
Loveliness Whenever I feel sad, my parents try to comfort me. 0.869 
 My parents try to help me when I have a problem.  
 My parents show me that they love me.  
 My parents try to understand what I think and feel.  
 We like to spend free time with each other.  
 We feel very close to each other.  
   
   
Good atmos-
phere 
It becomes tense when everyone is at home. 0.706 
When were together, the atmosphere is uneasy.  
We fight about small things.  
   
   
Strictness My parents often tell me to be quiet. 0.759 
 My parents are very strict with me, even over small things.  
 My parents often criticize me.  
   
   
Involvement My parents say that I must tell them everything that I do. 0.717 
 My parents want to know parents of people I hang out with.  
 I always need to tell my parents exactly where I am and what 
I am doing when I am not home. 
 
   
 
The school-based sampling design of CILS4EU allows me to depict my theoretical ideas more 
accurate since I am able to use religious rather than ethnic characteristics of everyday contacts 
outside the family. Furthermore, reversed causality issues should be less problematic when us-
ing characteristics of classmates rather than characteristics of friends, that is, that respondents’ 
own level of religiosity affects contact to a more or less religious environment. For these rea-
sons, I use two different variables to depict opportunities to get into contact with religious vs. 
secular influences outside the family: First, I include the share of classmates who affiliate with 
any other religious denomination than the respondent or who do not have any religious attach-
ment at all. In addition, I use the average level of religious salience as described above among 
all students in classroom. To facilitate the interpretation of this variable, it is reversed in all 
analyses such that higher values stand for lower religious salience and thus contact to a more 
secular surrounding outside the family. 
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In addition to these variables of immediate theoretical interest, I control for adolescents’ school 
type6 and parents’ education as rough measures for the general degree of integration into the 
host society, sex of parent and child as well as for parents’ religious salience and mode of 
parental interview in every multivariate model. All metric variables are standardized and have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Furthermore, all results are design-weighted in order 
to account for peculiarities of sampling design and for non-response on school, class and stu-
dents’ level (CILS4EU 2016). 
 
4   Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
Figure 4.1 shows the frequency distribution of the dependent variable ‘intergenerational change 
in religious salience’ between adolescents and their parents separately for religion-immigrant 
groups. Already descriptively I can confirm that there are pronounced differences regarding the 
importance of religion to adolescents and their parents, which is in line with existing research 
on the intergenerational transmission in religiosity among immigrant and native families (de 
Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, Soehl 2017, 
van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014). As can be seen in Figure 4.1, families affiliating with Chris-
tianity, both with and without immigrant background, display a declining importance of religion 
over generations. In contrast, the level of religious salience remains considerably stable among 
Muslim families: almost 60 percent do not change their level of religious attachment over gen-
erations. At the same time, the probability for these families to secularize is only about half as 
high as for Christian families. This finding is even more remarkable when taking into account 
the level of religiosity in the parental generation (see Table 4.2): although Muslim parents are 
on average highly religious – two third of them rate religion as ‘very important’, stability is the 
                                                 
6 Respondent adolescents’ eventual educational achievement, which is a common indicator of immigrants’ inte-
gration, is not yet known (Jonsson et al. 2018). However, in the German tracked educational system, attended 
school type can be used as a proxy for their aspired educational degree, thus their structural integration into the 
host society. The variable distinguishes between lower, intermediate and upper secondary schools, in ascending 
order of level of structural integration, and comprehensive schools including all of the above mentioned school 
types. 
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modal category. Therefore, the picture in Figure 4.1 displays an impressive picture of strong 
intergenerational transmission in religiosity in Muslim immigrant families on a very high level.7 
Figure 4.1: Change in religious salience over generations; distribution of dependent variable 
separately for religious-immigrant groups 
 
 
The following section describes all central explanatory variables as described in Section 3.2, 
that is, transmission opportunities, transmission benefits, and secularization opportunities out-
side the family, separately for native Christians and immigrants affiliating with Christianity, 
Islam or another religious denomination (Table 4.2). 
Concerning transmission opportunities, immigrant children are less often engaged in outgoing 
activities such as going to the cinema, going out or spending time in clubs compared to their 
native Christian counterparts. At the same time, they spend less time doing home-oriented 
                                                 
7 This pattern does not change substantially when I look at change in religiosity separately for different levels of 
parental religiosity (available upon request). Two third of children of Muslim parents in the highest religious 
salience category do not deviate from their parents; and the chances of intergenerational secularization goes 
down to 5 percent for families in which religion is ‘not very important’ to parents. As opposed to this, intergen-
erational decrease in religiosity is about as likely as stability in Christian families when parents are moderately 
religious.  
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activities like reading or visiting relatives, although the difference between Muslim immigrants 
and Christian natives is not statistically significant. In addition, Muslim immigrant parents are 
less often employed and tend to live in traditional families with two biological parents present. 
Consequently, we can expect that divergent opportunities to pass on religion from parents to 
children might lead to more effective transmission processes in Muslim immigrant families. 
Children of Muslim parents report the highest degree of loveliness in their family, which sig-
nificantly differs from Christian families, both Germans and immigrants. In contrast, Christian 
immigrant families show the lowest levels in this regard. Despite some slight differences in size 
and significance, the same pattern can be identified with respect to subjective relationship as-
sessment to the responding parent and atmosphere in the home environment, which is least 
favorable in Christian immigrant families and most favorable in Muslim immigrant families. 
Furthermore, immigrant parents are stricter with their children, and at the same time they are to 
a greater degree involved in their children’s lives. Particularly among Muslim immigrant fam-
ilies, parents are highly interested in what their children are doing when they are not at home. 
Muslim immigrant youth think that maintaining immigrant customs and traditions is more im-
portant than Germans and Christian immigrants do, whereby Christian immigrant show the 
lowest values on these variables. Interestingly, German Christian parents assess preserving their 
cultural heritage as equally important as Muslim immigrants. Basically, these results are in line 
with my theoretical expectations: Muslim immigrant families are cohesive entities character-
ized by a lovely atmosphere combined with parents who are involved in their children’s lives 
(authoritative parenting). Unlike these families, Christians display lower levels of love and co-
hesion accompanied by high levels of parental strictness and involvement. 
Finally, opportunities to get into contact with religious vs. secular worldviews outside the fam-
ily were operationalized by religious characteristics of the school class. Descriptive results 
show the well-known picture of ethnic school segregation: Muslim adolescents visit school 
classes with lower shares of co-religious classmates and with a higher average level of religious 
salience among all students. This pertains to a lesser extent to Christian immigrant students as 
well. 
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Table 4.2: Distribution of independent variables, separately for religious-immigrant groups 
 
Native 
Christian 
Immigrant 
Christian 
Immigrant 
Muslim 
Immigrant 
other 
Total 
      
Transmission opportunities      
Two biological parents present (freq.) 72.94 66.79 * 88.82 * 87.32 * 73.18 
Child’s outgoing activities (mean) 0.066 -0.065 * -0.368 * 0.084 * 0.000 
Child’s in-home activities (mean) 0.053 -0.193 * -0.007 * 0.662 * -0.000 
Parent employed (freq.) 86.96 73.97 * 57.52 * 79.22 * 81.61 
      
Transmission benefits      
General relationship assessment (mean) -0.002 -0.084 * 0.221 * -0.239 * -0.000 
Loveliness (mean) 0.011 -0.113 * 0.170 * 0.057 * 0.000 
Good atmosphere (mean) 0.012 -0.092 * 0.114 * 0.067 * -0.000 
Strictness (mean) -0.069 0.194 * 0.063 * 0.581 * -0.000 
Involvement (mean) -0.083 0.067 * 0.481 * 0.109 * 0.000 
Importance to keep traditions (child) (mean) -0.004 -0.228 * 0.513 * 0.561 * -0.000 
Importance to keep traditions (parent) (mean) 0.115 -0.472 * 0.183 * -0.013 * 0.000 
      
Secularization opportunities outside family      
Average religiosity in class (reversed) 0.167 -0.195 * -0.835 * -0.278 * 0.000 
Share of classmates with other or no religion -0.262 -0.132 * 2.170 * 2.869 * -0.000 
      
      
Parent’s religious salience (freq.)      
Not at all important 5.29 4.77 1.63 0.00 4.83 
Not very important 41.76 31.45 6.45 11.75 36.31 
Fairly important 42.48 34.87 26.01 22.85 39.34 
Very important 10.47 28.90 65.91 65.40 19.52 
      
Parent’s education (freq.)      
No education 0.34 3.74 15.33 12.14 2.45 
Lower secondary education 60.18 56.36 62.50 65.07 59.63 
Upper secondary education 22.69 25.03 14.49 18.38 22.41 
University education 16.80 14.86 7.68 4.41 15.52 
      
School type (freq.)      
Lower secondary school 12.38 20.88 33.52 17.87 16.05 
Intermediate secondary school 34.37 31.65 27.65 15.17 33.11 
Upper secondary school 37.51 31.22 19.56 53.77 34.69 
Comprehensive school 15.74 16.25 19.27 13.18 16.15 
      
Type of sex dyad (freq.)      
Mother - Daughter 41.67 44.12 38.12 23.09 41.76 
Father – Daughter 8.50 11.12 17.93 2.66 9.86 
Mother – Son 39.75 37.89 32.08 16.12 38.56 
Father – Son 10.08 6.87 11.87 58.13 9.83 
      
Mode parental interview (freq.)      
Self-completion 72.05 66.47 59.17 64.97 69.71 
Telephone 27.95 33.53 40.83 35.03 30.29 
      
N 1,414 689 568 22 2,693 
      
*  Difference (t-test) compared to native Christians is significant at p < 0.05. 
 
Source: “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries”, German subsample, own calcula-
tions. Results are weighted; numbers of cases are displayed unweighted. 
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With respect to control variables, the descriptive findings are in line with previous research: 
Muslim parents are predominantly located in the highest religious salience category, whereas 
Christian parents are moderately religious. At the same time, immigrants perform worse in 
terms of educational attainment than natives. An interesting side result is that Muslim fathers 
are more likely to participate in the parental interview compared to their Christian counterparts. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
This section intends to show whether group differences in transmission opportunities, perceived 
transmission benefits and opportunities to secularize outside the family affect the degree of 
intergenerational transmission in religiosity, and in how far these factors can explain religious 
group differences therein. 
Table 4.3 shows the results of these multivariate analyses. These are logistic regression models, 
using the probability of intergenerational change in religiosity among families as the dependent 
variable. In order to account for my initial research interest in the intergenerational transmission 
vs. secularization, I summarize intergenerational increase and stability in religiosity into one 
(reference) category. Although intergenerational increase in religiosity can be seen as a failure 
of intergenerational transmission as well, very different processes drive these familial develop-
ments (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Soehl 2017). Furthermore, the number of 
cases in the “increase” category is rather small (see Figure 4.1). Thus, for the sake of simplicity, 
all models estimate the probability of secularization over generations compared to stability or 
increase in religiosity.8 However, there exist several cases for which the predicted probability 
cannot be estimated due to logical impossibility. These are parents who state that religion is 
‘not at all important’; therefore, I exclude these families in all multivariate models (n=133). In 
addition, due to the problem of comparing regression coefficients in logistic regressions models 
using different samples or different sets of independent variables (Mood 2010), average mar-
ginal effects are shown instead of logit coefficients or odds ratios. 
Model 1 displays gross differences in intergenerational change in religious salience between 
religious-immigrant groups, controlling for parents’ religiosity, adolescent’s school type, 
                                                 
8 Estimating secularization vs. stability and leaving out cases for which an intergenerational increase in religiosity 
over generations occurs do not substantially alter the results (available upon request). 
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parent’s education, sex and mode of parents’ interview. As in the descriptive section of this 
paper, the main effects reveal that Muslim families differ significantly from the reference group, 
native Christian families, by showing a lower likelihood of a decrease over generations com-
pared to stability and increase. Whereas this indicates a pronounced pattern of intergenerational 
stability in religious salience among Muslim families or even an increase therein, the coeffi-
cients for immigrants affiliating with Christianity or other religious denominations are marginal 
in size and not statistically significant. Thus, secularization patterns in these families are com-
parable to German Christians once controlling for higher religiosity in the parents’ generation 
and other background variables. 
In the next step, I examine the impact of explanatory variables on the likelihood of intergener-
ational secularization, and whether they contribute to explain this outstanding pattern of inter-
generational transmission among Muslim immigrant families. 
Whether immigrant children live in families with two biological parents present is not important 
for the likelihood of intergenerational decrease in religiosity. The same pertains to parents’ 
employment status (in contrast to Myers 1996). Furthermore, indicators used to depict how 
often adolescents are at home show that home-oriented leisure time activities make intergener-
ational stability in religiosity more likely, whereas outgoing activities such as going out or 
spending time in clubs do not make a significant difference concerning the intergenerational 
transmission in religiosity. Thus, children who spend more time with their parents are more 
likely to adopt the religious level of their parents. In sum, opportunities to pass on religiosity 
from one generation to the next do not seem to be of major importance. Although in-home 
leisure time activities diminish chances of secularization over generations, the other indicators 
do not.9 
As described in the theoretical part of this paper, I expect that an authoritative parenting style 
(that is, warmth and love in the parent-child relationship and interest in child) affects intergen-
erational transmission positively. Results of my multivariate analyses confirm this assumption: 
a better subjective assessment of the parent-child relationship and a more loving relationship 
                                                 
9 Sub-group analyses according to the level of religiosity in the parents’ generation (available upon request) show, 
however, that in families with high initial religious salience intergenerational secularization is significantly more 
likely when youth spend more time outside the household. It is possible that sufficient transmission opportunities 
are mainly relevant when it comes to the preservation of high levels of religious attachment. 
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among family members significantly diminish the likelihood of a decline in religiosity over 
generations. Furthermore, parental involvement and interest in child’s activities contributes to 
intergenerational stability or increase in religious salience. These results are consistent with 
previous research on intergenerational transmission in religiosity in the majority population 
(Bao et al. 1999, Bader & Desmond 2006, Myers 1996, Ozorak 1989, Vermeer 2014). Variables 
covering the interest in maintaining the customs and traditions of one’s own group display di-
vergent results: whereas the likelihood of an intergenerational decrease in religiosity is signifi-
cantly smaller when children assess that keeping customs and traditions is important, the oppo-
site is the case for parents. However, this unexpected finding is mainly attributable to Christian 
families (see model 3b including additional interaction effects with religion-immigrant groups). 
Native and immigrant Christian parents who think it is important to keep German/ethnic cus-
toms and traditions increase the likelihood that their children are less religious than they are; 
thus: intergenerational secularization. This relationship, however, is negative for Muslims im-
migrants. To conclude, perceived benefits to transmit religiosity are important: the kind of re-
lationship between parents and children alters the chances of passing on religious attachment 
to children in the expected direction, as well as adolescents’ opinions whether the cultural her-
itage of one’s ethnic group should be maintained. 
Finally, I expected that social contact to secular peers outside the family influence the intergen-
erational transmission process within families, more precisely, that spending time with persons 
who do not support (the same) religion weakens it. In fact, the more secular classmates are (in 
terms of their own religious salience), the more likely secularization over generations occurs. 
The share of peers with another religion, however, is not important. Thus, it is not contact to 
peers who are different in terms of religious affiliation per se that is decisive, but rather the 
general religious climate in young people’s everyday environment, the classroom. 
All in all, however, the outstanding transmission pattern in Muslim immigrant families (model 
1) cannot be explained by all of these explanatory variables. Although the initial main effect 
decreases by about one fourth in size from -0.419 to -0.309, it is still significant in the final 
model. Thus, although transmission opportunities, perceived transmission benefits and secular-
ization opportunities outside the family exert some influence on the intergenerational transmis-
sion in religiosity, it cannot fully account for the strong stability in religiosity in Muslim immi-
grant families. 
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5   Discussion 
This paper aimed at investigating intergenerational transmission in religiosity among families 
with and without immigrant background in Germany. Building on existing approaches in the 
field of transmission research and assimilation theory, I developed a theoretical model of inter-
generational transmission in order to explain group differences therein between native Chris-
tian, immigrant Christian and immigrant Muslim families. Opportunities to pass on religiosity 
from one generation to the next, perceived transmission benefits and opportunities to get in 
contact with secular values of the receiving country built the core elements of this model. 
My empirical results using data from the first wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal 
Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) reveal that motivation to transmit religiosity 
within families, and contact with a secular environment outside the family are important deter-
minants in the transmission of religiosity from parents to children, whereas opportunities to 
transmit are less relevant. Especially an authoritative parenting style – that is, a warm and sup-
portive parent-child relation combined with high levels of involvement in children’s life – and 
child’s motivation to maintain customs and traditions of the heritage culture significantly influ-
ence the level of religious transmission (Bao et al. 1999, Bader & Desmond 2006, Myers 1996, 
Ozorak 1989, Vermeer 2014). The well-known picture of intergenerational stability of religious 
salience in Muslim immigrant families, who are subject to secularization trends within their 
country of residence to a lesser extent than Christian immigrants and the native population (de 
Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Scourfield et al. 2012, Soehl 2017), does 
not change substantially when I take into account transmission benefits and transmission op-
portunities. Although the initial difference decreases somewhat in size, it remains highly sig-
nificant. Thus, strong religious transmission among Muslim immigrants cannot be explained 
by these factors alone. 
Following from these insights, Muslims’ strong preservation of religious traditions remains an 
unsolved pattern in Western European immigration societies. Religious transmission from par-
ents to children seems to be more important in Muslim compared to Christian families; how-
ever, this is only one part of the story. Has religion a different status for Muslims compared to 
their Christian counterparts? In other words, the importance of being religious might be an 
inherent religious element in Islam that is responsible for individual tendencies not to secular-
ize. Alternatively, the institutional status of Christianity in Germany might serve as a signal of 
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individual religiosity that Muslims are not able to possess. Thus, the only way for them to be 
religious is to feel and behave religious. 
Of course, data limitations might matter as well. Transmission opportunities were operational-
ized rather indirectly – by using free time activities and parent’s employment situation, which 
implies that family members interact more frequently when they are at home more often. At the 
same time, it cannot be excluded that adolescents undertake outgoing activities with their par-
ents. This might explain its minor importance in my statistical analyses. Direct measures of 
contact among family members might improve future elaborations in this respect. Furthermore, 
the cross-sectional character of the data set enables to depict only a snapshot in adolescents’ 
lives, whereas transmission is a long-term process that starts at a very young age and is probably 
never completed. In this way, the causal interplay between parents’ and adolescents’ religiosity 
and factors that are influencing religious transmission from one generation to the next is diffi-
cult to disentangle. In particular, the possibility that children’s acceptance of parents’ values 
and attitudes influence the quality of family relations (Arránz Becker et al. 2016, Vermeer 
2014) is hard to exclude. It might also be the case that more religious parents do not allow their 
children to engage in outgoing-activities, thus supporting direct interactions, which might en-
hance opportunities for intergenerational religious transmission. Furthermore, transmission 
might operate in the opposite direction as well, that is, that – especially with increasing age – 
adolescents influence their parents’ religious attachments. Not only for this reason, an important 
follow-up question pertains to long-term consequences of parental influences of adolescents’ 
religiosity. Studies among the majority population found a weakening direct influence of par-
ents during adolescence and at the transition to marriage (Francis & Brown 1991, Grotenhuis 
& Scheepers 2001, Need & de Graaf 1996, Ozorak 1989, Stolzenberget al. 1995), yet it is not 
known whether this applies to minority groups as well. 
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Chapter 5: 
Ethnic and Religious Differences in Religious Development 
at the Transition from Adolescence to Early Adulthood 
Konstanze Jacob 
 
(under review in: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion) 
 
Abstract 
This contribution investigates developments of religious salience and behavior between ado-
lescence and early adulthood among natives and immigrants with Christian and Muslim affili-
ation. Transferring life-course research arguments to the situation of immigrants in Germany, I 
furthermore test which factors are linked to change or stability in religiosity, and analyze 
whether they are similarly important for different immigrant-religion groups. While most re-
search on religious identity development of young immigrants stems from the US, comparable 
European studies typically do not focus on migration and/or solely study adults. Using the first 
six waves of the German sample of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four 
European Countries (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE), my results demonstrate delayed seculari-
zation tendencies among minority youths in comparison to majority youths between the age of 
14 and 22, and stability or even an increase in religious practice among immigrants who affiliate 
with Islam – in contrast to Christians. Further analyses support that transitions from school to 
vocational training or work are positively related to religiousness, whereas leaving the parental 
home is not relevant in this regard. 
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1   Introduction 
How the religiosity of immigrants develops in the short and in the long run is of central im-
portance for immigration societies. Strong religious identities are is supposed to be negatively 
related to other integration dimensions, such as inclusion into the labor market and the educa-
tional system (Carol & Schulz 2018, Connor & Koenig 2013) and detrimental to the creation 
of social ties (Damstra & Tillie 2016) since they might generate negative attitudes and prejudice 
in the majority population and might reduce immigrants’ incentives to integrate into the receiv-
ing society (Soehl 2017). 
Previous research suggests that immigrants – and among them especially those with Muslim 
affiliations – are more religious than the majority population in terms of beliefs and practice 
(e.g. Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Lewis & Kashyap 2013b, van Tuber-
gen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). In addition, by comparing adolescents’ religious 
attachment with that of their parents, various studies find that intergenerational transmission in 
religiosity within Muslim immigrant families is considerably strong in comparison with natives 
and immigrants with Christian denominations (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob 2018, 
Jacob & Kalter 2013, Scourfield et al. 2012, Soehl 2017). Taken together, these results imply 
that high levels of religiousness are likely maintained in subsequent immigrant generations. If 
religion is actually linked to further disadvantages, it is crucial to broaden our knowledge about 
whether these patterns stabilize beyond adolescent years. This period of life is understudied, 
however, or more specifically, little is known how religious beliefs and behavior of immigrants 
develops when they advance in age and reach adulthood eventually. 
In scholarly literature addressing the majority population it is well-known that late adolescence 
and early adulthood is the period in life in which most frequently religious change occurs, by 
tendency in the direction of decreasing religious attachments (Denton et al. 2008, Desmond et 
al. 2010, Lee et al. 2017, Need & De Graaf 1996, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Smith 
et al. 2002, Uecker et al. 2007). This is supposed to result from the shifting focus of primary 
social relations from the parental home environment to peers, friends and potential future 
spouses, and from important life-course transitions such as moving out, leaving school and 
entering vocational training, university or the labor market, and getting married and having 
children (Desmond et al. 2010, Gunnoe & Moore 2002, Levenson et al. 2005, Petts 2009, Reg-
nerus et al. 2004, Schweitzer 2000, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Willits & Crider 1989). 
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Combining these two research strands, this paper extends the life-course perspective (George 
1993) to the situation of immigrants and their descendants in Germany. Two research questions 
stand in the center of this paper: The first one is rather explorative: How does religious salience 
and behavior develop between adolescence and early adulthood among natives and immigrants 
with Christian and Muslim affiliation? Very few studies investigate this period of life; they find 
that there is a slight decrease in religious attachment among Christians, whereas Muslims’ re-
ligiosity is characterized by stability or even increase (Dimitrova 2014, Güngör et al. 2012, 
Simsek et al. 2019, van der Does 2018, Verkuyten et al. 2012, see Phalet et al. 2018 for an 
overview). However, either this empirical evidence is based on cross-sectional or retrospective 
data, or it covers a small period of time of about two years. In contrast, applying a longitudinal 
research design, in the current study I am able to pursue religious change between the age of 14 
and 22. Second, I test hypotheses about the reasons behind these trends, derived from life-
course research addressing the majority population and adapted to the situation of immigrants 
in their receiving societies: transition from school to vocational training, work or university, 
leaving the parental home, and characteristics of parents and peers. What contributes to change 
or stability in religiosity in adolescence and early adulthood? And are these factors similarly 
important for natives and immigrants with Christian and non-Christian religious affiliation? 
The statistical analyses use six waves of the German sample of the Children of Immigrants 
Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE). My results 
demonstrate that Christian and Muslim immigrants secularize with respect to religious beliefs, 
but at a slightly later age than Christian natives. Religious behavior, however, remains stable 
or even increases in young Muslims’ adolescence, whereas it becomes less frequent for Chris-
tians. When it comes to explanations of these trends, leaving school is weakly related to an 
increase in religiosity, but leaving the parental home is not. For immigrants, the composition of 
friendship networks matters. 
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2   Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Religious Change in Adolescence and Early Adulthood 
It is widely accepted in past research that religious change happens most frequently in late 
adolescence and early adulthood (Albrecht & Cornwall 1989, Lee et al. 2017, Need & de Graaf 
1996, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Schweitzer 2000, Smith et al. 2002, Uecker et al. 
2007). This is not only evident because it concerns a crucial developmental stage of identity 
formation, but also since this period of life is characterized by changes and transitions that are 
supposed to be related to religion (Desmond et al. 2010, Levenson et al. 2005, Ozorak 1989). 
Accordingly, numerous studies show that a considerable share of young people becomes en-
tirely disaffiliated, or reduces attending religious meeting places like churches or mosques and 
being involved in religious organizations. In addition, private religious practices such as regular 
praying becomes less frequent, and a shift occurs towards negative attitudes about being reli-
giously attached (e.g. Denton et al. 2008, Desmond et al. 2010, Lee et al. 2017, Petts 2009, 
Schweitzer 2000, Smith et al. 2002, 2003, Uecker et al. 2007). In contrast, internal dimensions 
of religion such as religious salience and beliefs seem to diminish less strongly (Desmond et al. 
2010, Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2003, Uecker et al. 2007). However, these aggregate 
figures alone might be misguiding in order to understand the whole story of changes in religi-
osity in adolescence and early adulthood. As a matter of fact, there are also young people whose 
religious involvement remains stable or even increases. Therefore, macro trends of decreasing 
religiosity simply result from secularizing individuals hiding these divergent tendencies (Den-
ton et al. 2008, Lee et al. 2017, Petts 2009). Therefore, it is necessary to take into account micro 
level explanations, that is, under what conditions individuals deliberately or unconsciously de-
cide to change their religiosity, be it in one or the other direction, or not. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Explanations for Religious Change 
Shifts in religious attachments and behavior in the life period of early adulthood are attributed 
to two different processes: first, gradual changes in the social composition of significant net-
works, and second, changes that occur through biographical events – in the language of life-
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course research: trajectories and transitions (George 1993, Ingersoll-Dayton et al. 2002, Petts 
2009). 
In general, social surroundings change and diversify during adolescence. According to Durk-
heim’s (1897) social integration theory, the more socially integrated individuals are into a cer-
tain group, that is, the more interaction they have to its members, the more they conform to the 
values, norms and beliefs of that group. Applying this basic idea to religion, social relations 
affect both opportunities to get in touch with secular or religious values and attitudes as well as 
perceived benefits of feeling and behaving religiously (Desmond et al. 2010, Gunnoe & Moore 
2002, Need & De Graaf 1996, Petts 2009). More specifically, significant others act as important 
role models whose behavior is observed and imitated (Bandura 1977). Furthermore, religious 
values and norms are supported via shared activities; or they are reinforced or devalued by 
positive or negative feedback within the group, depending on whether they are recognized or 
not (Brechwald & Prinstein 2011, de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Leszczensky 2013, Mun-
niksma et al. 2015, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). 
Adolescents become less attached to their parents and engage more and more with peers and 
other persons outside their family of origin (Phalet et al. 2018). Younger children tend to take 
over their parents’ attitudes and behavior without scrutinizing them. With increasing age, how-
ever, they seek to gain emotional independence from their parents, decide autonomously from 
them in terms of what they think and do.1 As a consequence, it is more and more adolescents’ 
own voluntary decision to what extent they believe in or practice religion. Thus, intergenera-
tional transmission in religiosity becomes less significant (Denton et al. 2008, Levenson et al. 
2005, Regnerus et al. 2004, Smith et al. 2002, Willits & Crider 1989).2 Instead, relationships 
outside the family, especially to friends and peers, become more and more important for reli-
gious beliefs and practices (Bebiroglu et al. 2015, Erickson 1992, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 
2001, Need & de Graaf 1996). Consequently, if adolescents move into new environments that 
are more secular compared to their family of origin, they should become less religious, and vice 
versa (Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Simsek et al. 2019). 
                                                 
1 Some scholars argue that youth tend to even actively rebel against their parents by deliberately not adopting their 
ideals and attitudes in order to distance themselves from their parents (Willits & Crider 1989). 
2 This stands in contrast to assumptions of socialization theory (e.g. Bader & Desmond 2006, Bandura 1977, Er-
ickson 1992, Myers 1996) that assumes long-lasting influences of early socialization, therefore, religious attach-
ment should be stable over time (Petts 2009). 
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In addition to these trajectories, crucial transitions (George 1993, Ingersoll-Dayton et al. 2002, 
Petts 2009) during late adolescence and early adulthood possibly affect contact with others of 
similar or different faith. They can also have direct effects when they initiate re-evaluations of 
religious thinking and behavior, thus, making religious change more or less likely (Albrecht & 
Cornwall 1989, Denton et al. 2008, Schweitzer 2000). 
Moving out is probably one of the most important events in young adults’ lives and it is related 
to religiousness (Petts 2009). When children stop living together with their parents, the influ-
ence of intergenerational transmission is less strong since the relationship between parents and 
their children is weakened. Previous research has shown that closeness and quality of parent-
child relations has an influence on intergenerational transmission in religiosity (Bao et al. 1999, 
Bader & Desmond 2006, Jacob 2018, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Vermeer 2014, but 
see Desmond et al. 2010). Thus, when children stop living together with their parents, it can be 
expected that the effect of parents on their offspring’s’ religiosity decreases. 
It has been shown that marriage and child births raise religious involvement, while cohabitation 
and premarital sexual intercourse reduces it (Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Uecker et 
al. 2007, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Thornton et al. 1992). Recently married couples are supposed 
to find emotional support and valuable interactions with similar others in religious organiza-
tions, and parents of young children are interested in offering religious upbringing for their 
children (Petts 2009, Stolzenberg et al. 1995). In contrast, cohabiting individuals are less likely 
religiously engaged since these kinds of behavior contradict religious norms of many religious 
denominations. Thus, the motivation to attend religious services is expected to diminish due to 
negative sanctions by these institutions and its members, as well as to compensate for negative 
feelings due to cognitive dissonance between actual behavior and religious teachings (Petts 
2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Uecker et al. 2007, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Thornton et al. 
1992).3 
Transitions in the educational and occupational career suddenly change the persons that you 
interact with in everyday life. This is especially evident when adolescents leave school and 
                                                 
3 However, one has to be careful whether this effect is actually causal: It is also possible that those who are religious 
marry more often, cohabite less frequently and have children earlier (Petts 2009, Thornton et al. 1992, Uecker et 
al. 2007). Alternatively, the relation can be simply the result of unobserved heterogeneity with both related to 
age, for instance (Stolzenberg et al. 1995). 
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enter vocational training or the labor market, or start studying at university. If this comes to-
gether with a change in the religious composition of these new environments, change in reli-
gious attachment can be expected. In addition, these new and unknown activities might offer 
new, more attractive and useful alternatives as being religious (Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 
2002).4 
To summarize my theoretical considerations so far, different pathways exist with respect to 
religious developments in adolescence and early adulthood, whereby decline in religiosity is 
most common, but this pertains to a lesser extent to religious salience compared to religious 
affiliation and practice. These changes in religious attachment and behavior can be explained 
by changing opportunities and benefits of being religious when networks of young people di-
versify, with parents becoming less and peers becoming more important; or they can be re-
garded as consequences of important life events. Among these, moving out of the parental 
home, starting serious romantic relationships and transitions into higher education or the labor 
market affect incentives to be religious. 
 
2.3 Religious Change of Majority and Minority Youths 
After describing empirical findings and theoretical explanations for changes in religiosity in 
adolescence and early adulthood, this section aims at transferring these arguments to immigrant 
youth in Western Europe. So far, very few studies examine religious attachments of young 
immigrants in the European context (Dimitrova 2014, Güngör et al. 2012, Simsek et al. 2019, 
van der Does 2018, Verkuyten et al. 2012, see Phalet et al. 2018 for an overview). They find 
that immigrants and natives with Christian background secularize in a similar manner, whereas 
Muslims’ religiosity stabilizes or even increases during adolescent years. However, only two 
studies (Simsek et al. 2019, van der Does 2018) use a longitudinal design and even those merely 
cover a time span of approximately two years. In addition, to my knowledge reasons for diver-
gent developments of religious beliefs and behavior are yet to be explored. 
                                                 
4 Furthermore, according to secularization theory, education itself has often been regarded as a force that causes 
people to become irreligious (Levenson et al. 2005, Need & De Graaf 1996, Uecker et al. 2007). Higher educa-
tion expands knowledge about alternative explanations and doubts about religious reasonings about facts and 
questions in life. Empirical results are mixed, however (Need & De Graaf 1996, Uecker et al. 2007). 
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Following the reasoning outlined in section 2.2, it can be expected that descendants of immi-
grants become less religious irrespective of their religious background and adapt to the religi-
osity of their native peers. Given that immigrant families are usually more religious (Aleksyn-
ska & Chiswick 2013, Jacob & Kalter 2013, van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 
2011), a shift in the social environment of young immigrants towards peers outside the family 
increases the likelihood of being exposed to secular values and attitudes. Basically, this argu-
ment corresponds to assimilation theory, which also claims that contact with members of the 
receiving society enhances familiarity with prevalent attitudes and behavior and eventually 
makes it more likely to adopt them (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Maliepaard and Alba 
2016, Park 1950, Soehl 2017). This is what Simsek and colleagues (2019: 162) label “universal 
secularization”. However, in the context of migration the expectation of ‘automatic’ seculari-
zation requires to be scrutinized and refined. 
First, it can be argued that the level of parental religiosity possibly affects to what extent new 
social environments outside the family of origin matter for religious developments. On the one 
hand, contacts with secular norms and values should be especially influential for individuals 
without extended prior exposition, that is, those who grow up in highly religious families. Com-
bined with the circumstance that immigrant parents are more religious, this would result in 
stronger declines in religiosity for immigrants in comparison to natives. On the other hand, 
polarization hypothesis (Martin et al. 2003, Ozorak 1989, Regnerus & Uecker 2006) argues that 
adolescents with highly religious parents maintain or even increase their level of religiosity, 
while moderately religious individuals are more likely to secularize. Proponents of this hypoth-
esis argue that highly religious families put more effort in religious transmission and also tend 
to select environments that are consistent with their own religious worldviews.5 Applied to the 
situation of minority youths, it can be expected that they depict stability in religiosity to a 
greater extent. A similar reasoning follows from segmented assimilation theory (Bankston & 
Zhou 1995, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes & Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997a), which also argues that 
immigrants tend to maintain their ethnic and religious heritage in their host societies in order to 
ensure in-group solidarity and cohesion (Nauck 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001, Simsek et al. 
2019). In addition, it depends on characteristics of these new social environments whether con-
tact with secular values eventually increases. Thus, if immigrants do not establish contacts with 
                                                 
5 This hypothesis is heavily debated, however, and also not consistently confirmed empirically (Regnerus & 
Uecker 2006). 
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secular segments of the receiving society, but instead maintain intra-ethnic ties, their religiosity 
is less likely to decline. 
Second, it is likewise debatable whether parents’ influence diminished in an equal manner dur-
ing adolescence. Empirical research shows that there are ethnic differences with respect to par-
ent-child relations: Family cohesion is stronger, and relationships between family members are 
more tight-knit in immigrant, especially Muslim families (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver 2008, 
Heß-Meining 2004, Jacob 2018, Merz et al. 2009, Steinbach 2013). Thus, these groups might 
stay attached to their families of origin, probably even after they moved out, and as a conse-
quence, maintain their religious identities. 
In sum, I hypothesize that there are plausible arguments for both stability or decrease in reli-
gious developments at the transition from adolescence to early adulthood. Furthermore, it de-
pends on specific circumstances if one or the other scenario is more likely, among them the 
level of parental religious attachment and characteristics of social environments immigrants 
enter during adolescence. In the empirical part of this paper, I explore how religiosity develops 
and whether these factors have varying effects for immigrants and natives affiliating with Chris-
tianity or Islam. 
 
3   Data and Measures 
 
3.1 Data 
The empirical part of this paper uses data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey 
in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2017). Funded by NOR-
FACE (New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-Operation in Europe), this project 
seeks to answer key questions on the integration of children of immigrants in four European 
countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Applying a three-stage school-
based sampling design with oversampling schools with high immigrant proportions, 18,716 
adolescents with and without an immigrant background were surveyed in their schools in 
2010/2011 (CILS4EU 2016). The first wave of data collection was followed by two subsequent 
waves, with a time gap of approximately one year between each survey. In addition, I make use 
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of the German extension of CILS4EU (CILS4EU-DE; Kalter et al. 2019), a follow-up research 
project which is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and which follows the 
original sample of CILS4EU in their early adulthood. 
The empirical analyses are based on the first six waves of the German sample of CILS4EU and 
CILS4EU-DE. Yearly repeated measures of religious beliefs and practice offers the unique op-
portunity to investigate intraindividual dynamics of religious change between the age of 14 and 
22, applying longitudinal data analysis techniques. I only use cases who participated in at least 
two waves; and I restrict my sample to 3,649 native Christian, immigrant Christian and immi-
grant Muslim respondents. In addition, only cases without missing values on any of the model 
variables are included (n=3,351). 
 
3.2 Measures 
Three central dependent variables are used in the empirical analyses: religious salience, visits 
of religious meeting places and frequency of prayer. Religious salience is operationalized using 
answers to the question “How important is religion to you?” with answer categories ranging on 
a four-point scale from “not at all important” to “very important”. The questions “How often 
do you visit a religious meeting place (e.g. a church, a mosque, a synagogue or a temple)?” and 
“How often do you pray?” are used to represent the two measures of religious behavior. The 
scale for these two variables ranges from “never” to “every day”. 
Of major interest in the empirical analyses are differences in religious salience between immi-
grant and native families affiliating with different religious denominations. Thereby, immigrant 
background is based on the respective country of birth of the respondent youth, the biological 
parents and grandparents (Dollmann et al. 2014). An immigrant child is defined as born abroad 
(first generation) or as born in Germany with at least two grandparents born abroad (second and 
third generation). Natives are respondents who do not belong to any of these categories. To 
define religious groups, I use self-reported religious affiliation (information from wave 1 is 
replaced by information of subsequent waves if missing). A combination of these two indicators 
forms the central independent variable; it distinguishes between native Christians, immigrant 
Christians and immigrant Muslims. Thus, I excluded respondents who do not belong to any 
religious denomination (n=525; 12 percent) as well as 70 respondents with another religious 
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denominations and 1 immigrant with missing information about religious denomination from 
all analyses. 
The influence of two important life-course transitions in adolescence and young adulthood are 
tested in the empirical section of this paper. First, the event of leaving school is derived from 
changes in self-reported main educational or vocational activity, which is included annually in 
the questionnaire since wave 3.6 I do not only take into account the occurrence of this event, 
but also distinguish whether respondents (a) start vocational training in school or (b) in a com-
pany and in school (‘duale Ausbildung’), (c) work, (d) study at university or (e) do something 
else after leaving school. Second, I identify when respondents move out and leave their parents’ 
home using two different data sources: In waves 1, 2 and 3 and in wave 6, information whether 
adolescents are living together with their parents are available. In addition, moves can be de-
termined using changes in address information, which is particularly necessary between wave 
3 and 6 because no question about the living situation is available in wave 4 and wave 5.7 
The influence of parents cannot be estimated using repeated measures. Instead, I make use of 
wave 1 information about parents’ religious salience included in the parental questionnaire.8 
The question and answer categories are identical to those in the regular questionnaire (see 
above). The impact of friends is operationalized by the proportion of native friends. The ques-
tion is: “Think about all of your friends. How many of them have a German background?” 
Answers range from “almost all or all” to “none or very few”. 
In addition to these variables of immediate theoretical interest, I control for adolescents’ sex 
and language proficiency and parents’ education (as rough measures for the general degree of 
integration into the host society) in every model. 
 
                                                 
6 In wave 1, all respondents attended school since a school-based sample design was applied, in which schools 
were selected as primary sampling units and all students in two randomly school classes were asked for partici-
pation (CILS4EU 2016). This also applies to the majority of cases in wave 2 who were re-interviewed in their 
schools. The remaining cases were already asked in wave 2 what they are currently doing. 
7 Unfortunately, I am not able to test the effect of marriage and childbirth on religiosity. Only 12 respondents are 
married at the time point when wave 6 was conducted in 2016, and 31 children were born to 28 respondents. 
Thus, the number of cases is too small for meaningful statistical analyses. 
8 Parallel to wave 1, bilingual self-completion and telephone interviews were conducted with one parent. The 
response rate of the parental survey was 78 percent; thus, I add a variable for missing information in each model. 
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4   Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Changes in Religious Salience and Religious Behavior 
The empirical section starts by investigating the development of religious attachments and be-
havior of native Christians, migrant Christians and migrant Muslims aged between 14 and 22 
years. To this end, Figure 5.1 depicts predicted values of three dependent variables – religious 
salience, frequency of praying and visits of religious meeting places – derived from random-
effects models, displayed as growth curves (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008).9 
Figure 5.1: Change in importance of religion, frequency of praying and visits of religious meet-
ing places, separately for religion-immigrant groups (growth curves) 
 
 
Source: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries (CILS4EU), German subsample, 
waves 1-6, own calculations 
Predicted values are displayed for: Girls; Parents’ highest education: Secondary school; Language proficiency: 
“very well” 
                                                 
9 All models additionally control for sex, parental education and language proficiency. Detailed results are avail-
able from the author upon request. 
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With respect to religious salience, the corresponding graph implicates that there is a trend to-
wards decreasing religiosity for all investigated groups. However, this process does not occur 
simultaneously: Whereas religious salience drops in a steady manner from age 14 onwards for 
young people of German origin until they turn 20 years old, the same happens delayed for 
minority adolescents with Christian and Muslim affiliation, at around the age of 17. Younger 
respondents seem to remain as religious as in their early teenage years, but they become less 
religious after they turn 18 years old. In addition, the importance immigrants attach to religion 
falls less strongly for both immigrant groups in comparison to their native counterparts. Thus, 
the initial differences between religion-immigrant groups concerning the degree of religious 
attachment even increases at the transition into early adulthood. 
The picture is quite different when focusing on religious behavior (upper right and bottom graph 
of Figure 5.1). For native and immigrant Christian youths, a more or less clear downward trend 
is visible for both indicators (praying frequency and church attendance). In stark contrast, Mus-
lim immigrants remain rather stable on average, or even enhance their mosque visits when they 
are around 16 to 17 years old, but these respondents return to their initial frequency of mosque 
visits later on. Taken together, these results correspond to the results by Simsek et al. (2019) 
and van der Does (2018) who analyzed the first three waves of CILS4EU. However, my results 
expand those by improving our knowledge about what happens afterwards. They suggest that 
Muslims religious beliefs drop in their late teenage years, whereas mid-adolescence is a tem-
porary time span in which religious behavior increases temporarily and drops again later on. 
In a second step, I examine how individual religious salience develops over the survey period. 
More precisely, I compare answers given to the question “How important is religion to you?”, 
which was asked in every wave; and I distinguish between increase, stability and decrease in 
religious salience: ‘stability’ means that identical answers are given at the start and end of the 
survey period (including respondents with temporary drop or rise in religious salience in be-
tween). Participants are assigned to the ‘decrease’ category when religion is less important to 
them in later waves (for instance, when it changes from “very important” in wave 1 to “not very 
important” in wave 6), and ‘increase’ means a rise in religious salience.10 
                                                 
10 I do not show results of religious conversion or religious disaffiliation (Regnerus & Uecker 2006), that is, 
whether respondents switch their religious denomination or become completely non-religious. In the data set 
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Figure 5.2 shows that stability in religious salience is the modal category for all religion-immi-
grant groups. However, one can also see that this is most common among migrant Muslims, 
with almost two third showing the same level of religiosity in the first and last occasion they 
participated in CILS4EU, in comparison to approximately 50 percent among Christians with 
and without immigrant background. When looking at individual change in religiosity, this pat-
tern is primarily attributable to variations in the tendency to secularize in adolescence and early 
adulthood: Whereas decline is most common among native Christians (32.7 percent), followed 
by migrant Christians (27.7 percent) and migrant Muslims (22.2 percent), there are hardly any 
group differences when it comes to religious increase. 
Figure 5.2: Individual changes in religious salience, separately for religious-immigrant groups 
 
 
 
                                                 
more than 90 percent do not change religious affiliation over time, 5 percent become non-affiliated and 2 percent 
change their religious denomination from one to another. Another 3 percent are non-affiliated in between, but 
stay religiously attached eventually). Therefore, with the data at hand it is not reasonable for substantial and 
statistical reasons to consider these developments in early adulthood. 
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Combining these two single results, previous research can be replicated for the majority popu-
lation (Denton et al. 2008, Lee et al. 2017, Petts 2009). For all three indicators, I find decrease 
in the development in religiosity in early adulthood among native Christians, whereas at an 
individual level stability is still the most common pattern. Immigrant Christian youths also ex-
perience a decline in religious beliefs and behavior, which is by and large comparable to that 
of the majority population, but on a slightly higher overall level of religiousness. Muslim im-
migrants also display reduced religious salience; however, this does not pertain to religious 
behavior. My results suggest that even a temporary increase in mosque visits during mid-ado-
lescence occurs, and this stands in contrast to empirical evidence among the majority population 
(Desmond et al. 2010, Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2003, Uecker et al. 2007), which finds 
that religious beliefs and attitudes do not diminish as much as open forms of religiousness. 
 
4.2 Explanations for Changes in Religious Salience and Religious Behavior 
After concentrating on the first research question in the previous section, I will now proceed to 
the explanation of religious developments in the transition to adulthood. In the theoretical part 
of this paper, several factors have been identified that have an impact on religiosity, that is, the 
family of origin, friends and peers, and important life-course transitions. Tables 5.1 to 5.3 dis-
play the results of random-effects models testing these assumptions for three indicators of re-
ligiosity. The models are calculated separately for religious-immigrant groups in order to find 
out whether explanatory factors are equally important for these groups or not. 
With respect to transitions, leaving school is positively related to religiousness, especially when 
individuals transition into vocational training. For instance, starting a school-based vocational 
training after school leads to a significant increase in religious salience for native Christian and 
migrant Muslim adolescents, and enhances religious practice among migrant Christians. Enter-
ing the labor market, either as an apprentice in a company or by starting to work immediately, 
affects religious salience and church visits of natives, respectively. Entering university for study 
reasons, in contrast, does not yield significant effects in any model. It thus seems to be essential 
whether young people stay in the educational system or not. 
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Table 5.1: Random-effects model predicting religious salience, separately for immigrant-reli-
gion groups 
 
Native 
Christian 
Migrant 
Christian 
Migrant 
Muslim 
       
Age trend (Ref.: 14 and younger)          
15 -0.086 * -0.013  -0.023     
16 -0.147 *** -0.104  -0.013     
17 -0.210 *** -0.163 * -0.076     
18 -0.316 *** -0.200 * -0.180 **  
19 -0.377 *** -0.287 *** -0.201 **  
20 -0.347 *** -0.282 ** -0.236 *** 
21 -0.373 *** -0.251 ** -0.260 *** 
22 and older -0.528 *** -0.100  -0.416 *** 
       
Main activity after leaving school       
Vocational training (in school) 0.055 + 0.054  0.068 +   
Vocational training (in a company and in school) 0.071 * 0.018  0.075     
Work 0.114  -0.039  0.091     
University -0.020  -0.031  -0.083     
Something else 0.077 * 0.100 + -0.009     
       
Moving out -0.017  -0.100  0.051     
       
Share of German friends -0.007  -0.045 *** -0.025 **  
       
Parent’s importance of religion 0.285 *** 0.385 *** 0.375 *** 
Missing 0.372 *** 0.733 *** 0.992 *** 
       
Sex (Ref.: Female)       
Male -0.176 *** -0.050  -0.068 +   
       
Language proficiency -0.002  -0.050 * -0.021     
          
Parental education (Ref.: No secondary education)       
Secondary education -0.315  -0.131  -0.005     
Tertiary education -0.242  -0.170  -0.163 *   
          
Constant 2.055 *** 2.021 *** 2.446 *** 
       
          
N person years 7,511  3,775  3,814     
N persons 1,610  844  897     
          
R2 (within) 0.040  0.026  0.031     
R2 (between) 0.106  0.194  0.191     
R2 (overall) 0.093  0.158  0.148     
       
***  p < 0.001, **  p < 0.01, *  p < 0.05, +  p < 0.1 
 
Source: “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries” (CILS4EU, CILS4EU-DE), 
German subsample, waves 1-6, own calculations. 
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Table 5.2: Random-effects model predicting visits of religious meeting places, separately for 
immigrant-religion groups 
 
Native 
Christian 
Migrant 
Christian 
Migrant 
Muslim 
       
Age trend (Ref.: 14 and younger)       
15 -0.078  -0.131  0.136     
16 -0.119 * -0.161 + 0.217 *   
17 -0.106 * -0.164 + 0.268 **  
18 -0.198 *** -0.164  0.139     
19 -0.324 *** -0.425 *** 0.080     
20 -0.292 *** -0.368 *** 0.123     
21 -0.258 *** -0.354 ** 0.032     
22 and older -0.350 *** -0.248 + -0.061     
       
Main activity after leaving school       
Vocational training (in school) 0.022  0.116 * -0.011     
Vocational training (in a company and in school) 0.002  0.029  0.006     
Work 0.179 * -0.142  0.043     
University 0.053  0.037  0.051     
Something else 0.104 ** 0.099 + 0.070     
       
Moving out 0.018  -0.099  0.069     
       
Share of German friends 0.014  -0.018  -0.020     
       
Parent’s importance of religion 0.287 *** 0.369 *** 0.464 *** 
Missing 0.323 *** 0.695 *** 1.322 *** 
       
Sex (Ref.: Female)       
Male -0.062 * 0.005  0.627 *** 
       
Language proficiency -0.018  -0.056 * -0.099 **  
       
Parental education (Ref.: No secondary education)       
Secondary education 0.257  0.130  0.181 +   
Tertiary education 0.437 + 0.161  0.043     
          
Constant 1.088 *** 1.316 *** 0.836 *** 
       
          
N person years 6,336  3,192  3,241     
N persons 1,610  844  897     
          
R2 (within) 0.031  0.045  0.018     
R2 (between) 0.123  0.145  0.192     
R2 (overall) 0.099  0.120  0.151     
       
***  p < 0.001, **  p < 0.01, *  p < 0.05, +  p < 0.1 
 
Source: “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries” (CILS4EU, CILS4EU-DE), 
German subsample, waves 1-6, own calculations. 
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Table 5.3: Random-effects model predicting frequency of praying, separately for immigrant-
religion groups 
 
Native 
Christian 
Migrant 
Christian 
Migrant 
Muslim 
       
Age trend (Ref.: 14 and younger)          
15 0.013  -0.193 + 0.026     
16 -0.070  -0.240 * 0.041     
17 -0.194 ** -0.309 ** 0.125     
18 -0.239 ** -0.411 ** 0.092     
19 -0.353 *** -0.477 *** 0.069     
20 -0.394 *** -0.532 *** 0.203     
21 -0.419 *** -0.375 ** 0.136     
22 and older -0.620 *** -0.549 ** -0.223     
       
Main activity after leaving school       
Vocational training (in school) 0.045  0.184 * -0.046     
Vocational training (in a company and in school) 0.006  0.063  -0.084     
Work 0.068  -0.092  0.070     
University 0.079  -0.022  0.045     
Something else 0.158 ** 0.087  0.015     
       
Moving out 0.009  -0.162 + 0.230     
       
Share of German friends 0.008  -0.050 * -0.015     
       
Parent’s importance of religion 0.459 *** 0.482 *** 0.562 *** 
Missing 0.579 *** 0.756 *** 1.413 *** 
       
Sex (Ref.: Female)       
Male -0.233 *** -0.087  0.177 *   
       
Language proficiency 0.012  -0.016  -0.058     
       
Parental education (Ref.: No secondary education)       
Secondary education 0.696 *** 0.239  0.152     
Tertiary education 0.799 *** 0.335  0.042     
       
Constant 0.439 * 1.368 *** 1.259 *** 
       
          
N person years 6,328  3,185  3,223     
N persons 1,610  844  897     
          
R2 (within) 0.038  0.023  0.006     
R2 (between) 0.119  0.123  0.088     
R2 (overall) 0.104  0.096  0.071     
       
***  p < 0.001, **  p < 0.01, *  p < 0.05, +  p < 0.1 
 
Source: “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries” (CILS4EU, CILS4EU-DE), 
German subsample, waves 1-6, own calculations. 
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In contrast to my theoretical expectations, moving out of the parental home does not signifi-
cantly affect religiosity, with one exception – praying frequency of migrant Christians. By ten-
dency, the direction of the coefficients hint at a negative effect for Christian migrants and a 
positive effect for Muslims, whereas no relation is observable for natives. This would imply 
that Muslims become more religious when they leave their parental home, whereas the opposite 
pertains to Christian immigrants. 
The share of German friends as an indicator for contact with secular segments of the receiving 
society is influential only for immigrants; and it plays a more important role for religious sali-
ence compared to practice. The interpretation of coefficients corresponds to theoretical expec-
tations: Having a higher share of German friends is linked to diminishing religiosity. Further-
more, parents’ religious salience is by and large the most important factor for religious attach-
ments of their children. 
Comparing R2 (between) and R2 (within), the model explains variance between individuals to 
a greater extent than variance within individuals. This means that, although some coefficients 
of time-varying variables reach significance, their explanatory power is restricted. 
 
5   Summary 
This study aimed to improve our knowledge about the development of religiosity at the transi-
tion from adolescence to early adulthood. Combining life-course research with the sociology 
of migration, it investigates how immigrants’ and natives’ religious salience and behavior 
changes between the age of 14 and 22. Research among the majority population suggests that 
this period of life is crucial for religious identity development, and religious change happens 
most frequently at that time (Albrecht & Cornwall 1989, Lee et al. 2017, Need & de Graaf 
1996, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Schweitzer 2000, Smith et al. 2002, Uecker et al. 
2007). Furthermore, I examine the explanatory power of several factors that are supposed to be 
related to religious change or stability and whether these explanations are applicable to the 
situations of immigrants in Germany. More specifically, I test whether leaving school, moving 
out and characteristics of significant others affect developments in religiousness (Desmond et 
al. 2010, Gunnoe & Moore 2002, Levenson et al. 2005, Petts 2009, Regnerus et al. 2004, 
Schweitzer 2000, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Willits & Crider 1989). 
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Analyzing six waves of the German sample of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey 
in Four European Countries (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE), my results demonstrate that decline 
in religious salience occurs for all religion-immigrant groups, whereby this process starts at a 
slightly later age for Muslim and Christian immigrants in comparison to natives. Similar pat-
terns are observable for visits of religious meeting places among Christian immigrants and na-
tives who secularize in a similar manner during their adolescent years. However, Muslims’ 
mosque visits and praying behavior do not change substantially during the survey period, even 
a temporary increase in mosque visits is observable. Thus, there is a trend towards seculariza-
tion among Muslim immigrants with respect to religious salience, but not behavior. This con-
tradicts insights of life-course research that religious beliefs change to a lesser extent compared 
to religious practice (Desmond et al. 2010, Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2003, Uecker et al. 
2007). 
When turning to possible explanations for religious stability or change, leaving school and en-
tering the labor market seems to be related to increases in religiosity, whereas no effect was 
found for the transition from school to university. Combining these results with the overall 
trend, it is possible that higher rates of religious decline among native Christian adolescents can 
at least partly be attributed to their longer stay in the educational system. On the other hand, 
entering the vocational system or the labor market, which leads to increases in religiosity, might 
be linked to a less secular environment. Opposed to educational transitions, moving out is not 
relevant for religious developments in early adulthood. However, although this study covers a 
longer time span in comparison to existing research in this area (Simsek et al. 2019, van der 
Does 2018), it is possible that respondents are still too young for meaningful interpretations of 
life-course effects in general. The effects of leaving the parental home are based on 587 cases 
only; therefore, lacking effects might be the result of insufficient statistical power. The same 
applies to the effect of getting married and having children, which I was not able to take into 
account since the number of cases is too low. Thus, future research in this area should further 
elaborate on the impact of these significant transitions. However, appropriate data that covers 
a sufficiently long period in young people’s lives and entails a sufficiently high number of 
immigrants is rare. 
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1 Summary of Dissertation 
This dissertation examined how secular societies in North-Western Europe influence immi-
grants and their descendants who are living in these countries in terms of religious beliefs and 
practice. Given that these families stem from rather religious regions in the world in comparison 
to their respective host societies (Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Güveli 2015, Phalet et al. 
2018, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), it is interesting to know how their religious attach-
ments develop in the short and in the long run after migration. Especially assumptions about 
negative consequences of strong religious identities on immigrants’ structural and social inclu-
sion and prejudice against Islam demonstrate the scientific and societal relevance of this topic 
(Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2009, Carol & Schulz 2018, Connor & Koenig 2013, Damstra 
& Tillie 2016, Schlueter et al. 2019, Soehl 2017, Strabac & Listhaug 2008). 
In the introductory chapter, I illustrated that empirical research about immigrants’ religiosity is 
ambiguous with respect to confirmed empirical findings. Some studies find that religious at-
tachments of immigrants tend to decrease over time or successive immigrant generations (e.g. 
Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, Platt 2013, van der Bracht et al. 2013), others provide 
evidence for stability (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2009, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Smits & Ultee 2013) 
or an increase in religious practices (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2013, Smits et al. 2010, van Heelsum 
& Koomen 2016). Furthermore, empirical research has yet to provide satisfying explanations 
for these trends. Not only do their results differ with respect to factors that are supposed to be 
related to religiousness (for instance, education, employment situation, discrimination experi-
ences) (e.g. Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Fleischmann et al. 2019, Güveli & Platt 2011, 
Leszczensky et al. 2019, Maliepaard & Phalet 2012, van Tubergen 2006), the clarification of 
religious and ethnic differences rarely stands in the center of research attention. 
Against this background, two research questions guided this dissertation. I built on existing 
research by applying advanced research methods and designs that overcome several methodo-
logical shortcomings, and I attempt to broaden existing theoretical approaches to the study of 
immigrants’ religiosity by making use of arguments of adjacent disciplines: 
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(1) How religious are majority and minority youths with different religious backgrounds, and 
how does religious attachment change over time and over generations? 
(2) To what extent can alternative theoretical approaches be used to study religious develop-
ments in North-Western European immigrant societies? 
Starting with a rather descriptive approach, chapter 2 investigated how religious majority and 
minority youth in Europe are in terms of religious affiliation and level of religiosity; and how 
the level of religiosity is related to social conditions such as generational status, ethnicity and 
gender, and core explanations including religious socialization and education. Analyzing the 
religiosity of young people in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, I was able to 
demonstrate that immigrant youths are more often affiliated with any religious denomination, 
and pray and attend religious services more often compared to natives. Likewise, religious sa-
lience is higher among minority youths. Comparing adolescents’ religious salience with that of 
their parents, intergenerational decline is visible for majority youth, whereas stability is most 
common in Muslim families. 
Chapter 3 intended to comprehensively test hypotheses derived from established theories in the 
sociology of religion and of migration (assimilation theory, secularization theory, segmented 
assimilation theory, market model of religion, reactive ethnicity approach). I asked what pat-
terns of intergenerational transmission in religiosity can be identified among different religious 
groups, and whether cognitive-structural and social integration contributes to explain these di-
vergent trends. My analyses demonstrated that Muslim immigrant families display a pattern of 
strong intergenerational stability in religiosity in all countries; in contrast to native and Chris-
tian families who show trends of secularization that are fairly similar to each other. In addition, 
I found empirical support for all lines of theoretical explanations, whereby indicators of cogni-
tive-structural and social assimilation are rather weakly and inconsistently related to change in 
religious salience from parents to their children. The central conclusion of this chapter was that 
neither of these existing theories is able to fully account for patterns of intergenerational trans-
mission in religiosity. 
Therefore, chapter 4 was a first attempt to theoretically examine and empirically test an alter-
native approach to explain divergent transmission patterns in religiosity. Making use of theo-
retical ideas in psychological and social psychological research, a theoretical model was 
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developed that highlights the importance of opportunities to pass on religion from one genera-
tion to the next and perceived transmission benefits. My results, however, showed that although 
raw ethnic differences concerning the likelihood of intergenerational secularization decrease 
somewhat when taking into account transmission opportunities and benefits, and motivation to 
transmit religiosity within families and contact with a secular environment is important in pre-
dicting transmission in religiosity, strong religious transmission among Muslim immigrants 
cannot be explained by these factors alone. 
Finally, chapter 5 focused on religious developments at the transition from adolescence to early 
adulthood. Thereby, I transferred theoretical arguments of life-course research to the situation 
of immigrants in Germany, which emphasize the role of significant others and important tran-
sitions in young people’s lives, such as leaving the parental home and transitions in the educa-
tional career. Random-intercept models showed that Muslim and Christian immigrants’ reli-
gious salience decreases at a slightly later age in comparison to Christian natives. In contrast, 
religious behavior remains stable or increases for Muslim adolescents, whereas native and im-
migrant Christian adolescents become less religious in terms of church visits and praying fre-
quency. Additionally, leaving school is positively related to change in religiousness, but mov-
ing out is not. 
 
2 Need for an Answer 
After summarizing the central results of the substantial chapters of my dissertation, I am able 
to formulate answers to both research questions: 
With respect to the first question, my results again replicate the well-known fact that immigrants 
are more religious than natives, and that Muslim immigrants stand out as an exceptional case 
in this regard by being more religious on all accounts. The same conclusion can be drawn with 
respect to religious change after migration: Using various statistical designs, I detected that 
Christian immigrants are basically rather similar to Christian natives, but Muslims show a con-
siderable pattern of resistance to secularization in their receiving societies. Analyzing intergen-
erational transmission in religiosity, Muslim immigrant families are characterized by religious 
stability rather than decline. However, results of chapter 5 indicate that, although to a slightly 
lower degree in comparison to natives, young Muslim immigrants decline in religious salience, 
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but this is not true for religious behavior. An open question is how these developments proceed 
in adulthood. Therefore, data is urgently needed that covers this crucial period of life in which 
changes in religiosity can be expected. Especially the interesting question whether they become 
more religious when starting their own family as research among the majority population sug-
gests is by now a blind spot in empirical research. 
The answer to my second research question is quite disillusioning. While I was able to identify 
several factors that influence majority’s and minority’s religious attachment, none of these, 
however, are qualified to completely explain Muslims’ exceptional case of stability in religios-
ity. While Christian immigrants are fairly similar to their Christian native counterparts, Mus-
lims depict stronger resistance to secularization. Among these influential factors are certainly 
characteristics of family life such as family cohesion and parenting styles as well as character-
istics of social contacts outside the family. 
However, these are only few pieces of the puzzle. It is compelling to conclude that the enduring 
importance of religion might simply be an inherent element of Islam. In other words, that Mus-
lims simply are socialized in a way that they “cannot be Muslims without being highly reli-
gious”. Thus, although there are tendencies visible that Muslim immigrants react to seculariza-
tion in their current countries of residence, at my current state of knowledge I can say I do not 
know the answer. Therefore, the central takeaway message is that further research should con-
tinue to search for an answer. 
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